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Abstract
This research explores the socio-structural features of the migration and assimilation deci-
sion. The socio-structural features explored are the impact of extended family members on
the migration decision of individuals within a household, and productivity differences on the
assimilation rate of new immigrants.
Extended families are a common feature of developing country households. I generalize
the Mincer (1978) model of husband-wife migration by including decision makers from the ex-
tended family. The model with extended families predicts that migration decisions may become
freer than in the husband-wife model because spouses are not more likely to be tied to their
partners than members of the extended family. That is, marital status is a smaller deterrent
to migration in extended family settings relative to nuclear families. I provide justification for
the implications of the model using data from Nepal.
Immigrants from poorer source countries have lower assimilation rates compared to immi-
grants from richer countries. Theory suggests that new immigrants from poor countries are
exposed to co-ethnics more often than comparable immigrants from richer countries, which
lead to lower assimilation rates. However, many new immigrants come with pre-immigration
experience with the local culture which decreases learning costs. I insert investment into the
matching model of Konya (2007). All immigrants face a cost to assimilating by investing in
a process of cultural assimilation, but some new immigrants with large pre-immigration ex-
perience have significantly lower costs to investing. I provide evidence from the Longitudinal
Survey of Immigrants in Canada: Waves 1-3. Source country richness has a significant posi-
ii
tive effect on assimilation rates. But conditional on pre-immigration experience with the local
culture, the exposure channel through which source country richness affects assimilation rates
becomes insignificant.
However, exposure to co-ethnics is not random, new immigrants face location choices among
neighbourhoods in the host country. These location choices determine the level of exposure to
other immigrants and the costs of learning the local native-born culture. I expand the model to
include neighbourhood choice. Among neighbourhoods with fewer co-ethnics, immigrants from
richer source country groups will sort into assimilating neighbourhoods. And neighbourhoods
with a relatively large number of co-ethnics will receive some non-assimilating types. Using
data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada: Waves 1-3, I show that sorting
is an important component of the exposure channel through which productivity differences
affect assimilation rates. However, controlling for sorting, source country richness still has
a significant positive effect on assimilation rates. There appears to be an alternate channel
through which productivity differences affect assimilation rates.
iii
For my parents.
iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Sam Bucovetsky for the contin-
uous supervision of my Ph.D study and research, for his patience, enthusiasm, and immense
knowledge. His guidance helped me in all aspects of research and writing of this thesis.
I would also like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Uros Petronijevic and Dr.
Benjamin Sand, for their encouragement, insightful comments and recommendations to im-
proving the research presented in the thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Mahmudul Anam
for sharing his time and being available to serve on the committee.
My sincere thanks to Dr. Tasso Adamopolous for offering me the research assistantship
opportunities on diverse and exciting projects, and for his comments and difficult questions in
the presentation of my research at the seminars. I would like to thank Dr. Nippe Lagerlo¨f for
his insightful and thoughtful contributions to the various drafts of the job market paper and
providing insight into the job market.
A big thank you to all the seminar participants, discussants and friends: Akram Panahi Dar-
gahloo, Andrew Hencic, Andrew Dickens, Chiara Marazzi, Imran Aziz, Michelle Tong, Rachel
Harris, Sara Tumpane, Shafkat Ali, and Vajiheh Mahdiyan Amirabadi, for the discussions and
helping each other succeed.
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family: my parents Romel and Lynette
Monteiro for their unquestioning support, my siblings Sternin and Stacy Monteiro for their
cheerfulness, and my wife Dewlyn D’Souza for her patient and caring nature.
v
Table of Contents
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements v
Table of Contents vi
List of Tables viii
List of Figures xi
1 Introduction 1
2 Extended Family Migration Decisions: Evidence from Nepal 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Empirical findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 Optimal Immigration and Investment into Cultural Assimilation 31
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
vi
3.5 Extension: spatial sorting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4 Cultural Assimilation: Learning and Sorting 72
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Bibliography 104
Appendix 111
vii
List of Tables
3 Number of households experiencing group and/or chain migration, or neither . . 19
4 The number of migrant households with children that live at home and abroad,
by number of migrant children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 The number of households with migrant husband and migrant wife pairs, by
number of migrant members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6 The number of households with migrant husband-wife pairs, by number of mi-
grant pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7 Nepali households that have supplied at most one migrant to India or within
Nepal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8 Nepali households that have supplied at most one migrant to India or within
Nepal, IV = usable agricultural land. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7 Relative amount of selection required on un-observables to explain the E effect . 29
1 Interior or corner equilibrium outcomes given ωa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2 The effect of parameters on likelihood of assimilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 Measurement error in English speaking proficiency across waves. . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Worsening of English speaking proficiency across waves t and t + 1 by refugee
status, English speaking proficiency, education, and formal pre-immigration ex-
perience with the English language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
viii
5 Probit estimation results of English speaking proficiency: mother tongue is not
English and do not reside in Quebec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6 Estimates of correlation coefficients from bivariate probit models of English
speaking proficiency: mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec. 67
1 Mixed or sorting equilibrium outcomes given h. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2 The effect of parameters on likelihood of assimilation ρj . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3 Measurement error in English speaking proficiency across waves. . . . . . . . . . 96
4 Worsening of English speaking proficiency across waves t and t + 1 by refugee
status, English speaking proficiency, education, and formal pre-immigration ex-
perience with the English language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5 Probit estimation results of English speaking proficiency: households whose
mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec. . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6 Probit estimation results of living/working in an ethnic enclave: households
whose mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec. . . . . . . . . 101
A1 Number of female and male headed households with in-laws, grandchildren,
brothers/sisters, other relatives, and unrelated persons living in the household
(excludes migrants), by number of persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A2 Number of migrant and non-migrant households with in-laws, grandchildren,
brothers/sisters, other relatives, and unrelated persons living in the household
(excludes migrants), by number of persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A3 Number of households with members that migrated for work, study, marriage,
other family, and security reasons, by number of migrants. . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.S1 Summary Statistics of Nepali households that supply migrants to India. . . . . . 115
A.S2 Summary Statistics of Nepali households that supply migrants within Nepal. . . 116
ix
A1 Ethnic, linguistic and changes in birthplace diversity indices across major im-
migrant receiving countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A2 Descriptions of variables used in this study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A2 Descriptions of variables used in this study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A3 Summary statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A4 OLS estimation results of English speaking proficiency: mother tongue is not
English and do not reside in Quebec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A5 Probit estimation results of English speaking proficiency: mother tongue is not
English and do not reside in Quebec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A1 Descriptions of variables used in this study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A1 Descriptions of variables used in this study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A2 Summary statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A2 Summary statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A3 OLS estimation results of English speaking proficiency: households whose mother
tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
x
List of Figures
3.1 The interior equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Cases for the assimilation-specific investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 The equilibrium outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 The social planner optimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Policy outcomes in Northern interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1 Non-assimilating immigration; mj ≥ mi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 Assimilating immigration; mj ≥ mi and ω > ωin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Mixed equilibrium; β > 1/2, mj ≥ mi and h < mimj/(mi +mj + 2mimj) . . . . 84
4.4 Existence of h; mj ≥ mi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Inferring migrant husbands, migrant wives, and non-migrant couples from avail-
able information in the DHS, Nepal 2011 (household file). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
xi
1 Introduction
The factors driving potential migrants to leave their home country and learn the culture of
the host country may be separated by socio-structural elements and personal motivators. Eco-
nomic and sociological research on the influence of personal motivations on the migration
and integration decisions of migrants are numerous. Ability, talent, drive to succeed, demo-
graphic characteristics, pre-immigration wealth, social status, among other observables and
unobservables are important drivers of the decision to migrate and assimilate. However, very
little research has studied the various aspects of the structural elements in the home and host
country that also influence the migration and assimilation decisions.
To name a few important aspects of the socio-structural dimension that might influence
potential migrants’ decisions: institutions in the home country, institutional differences between
the home and host country, family structure, historical experiences of the home country, the
extent of cultural frictions between the home and host country, and exposure to co-ethnics.
In this thesis I study the effect of family structure, cultural frictions and co-ethnic exposure
on the migration and assimilation decision. Family structure is shown to have an effect on
how migration decisions are formed. Similarly, the productivity differences between the source
and host country are shown to have effects on assimilation rates in the host country through
exposure to co-ethnics.
The first chapter of this thesis analyzes the impact of the presence of extended family
members in the household on the husband-wife migration decision. Extended families are a
common feature of developing country households. These households are very relevant in the
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decision to migrate. This paper generalizes the Mincer (1978) model of husband-wife migration
by including decision makers from the extended family. The model with extended families
predicts that migration decisions may become freer than in the husband-wife model because
spouses are not more likely to be tied to their partners than members of the extended family.
That is, marital status is a smaller deterrent to migration in extended family settings relative
to nuclear families. I provide justification for the implications of the model using data from
the Demographic and Health Surveys: Nepal 2011.
Once the decision to migrate has been formed, potential migrants face cultural frictions
in the host country. Cultural frictions prevent new immigrants from accessing the benefits of
immigration, for instance, higher wages, better job mobility, and shorter job searches. This
research is interested in communication frictions. Communication frictions are alleviated by
learning the local culture. Cultural assimilation of immigrants is an integral part of a well
functioning multicultural society that leads to better communication and frictionless interac-
tions between immigrants and native-born. Cultural assimilation is a form of learning that
occurs through engagement with the local culture overtime or investment into cultural capital
accumulation.
Productivity differences between the source and host country incentivize immigration from
poorer countries. Potential migrants from poorer source countries have larger incentives to mi-
grate than comparables from richer source countries. Hence immigrants from poorer countries
form a larger portion of the immigrant stock in the host country and are more often exposed
to co-ethnics. A larger exposure to co-ethnics is associated with lower assimilation rates. On
the other hand, many new immigrants come with pre-immigration experience with the local
culture which influences their decision to invest in further learning by decreasing the costs of
learning.
The model developed in chapter 3 inserts investment into the matching model of Konya
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(2007) with communication frictions represented by lack of knowledge of the local culture and
exposure to co-ethnics. All immigrants face a cost to assimilating by investing in a process of
cultural assimilation. But some new immigrants with large pre-immigration experience with
the local culture become selected into the assimilating group without investing. Additionally
I consider formal and informal learning. I provide evidence from the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants in Canada: Waves 1-3.
Cultural assimilation is measured by English speaking proficiency, source country richness
is measured by RGDP per capita in immigrant’s place of birth, formal learning is proxied
by learning of English through courses or schooling, informal learning is proxied by learning
of English through media, family/friends or self-study, and formal/informal pre-immigration
experience with the local culture is measured in the same way as formal and informal learn-
ing but it is undertaken prior to landing. Source country richness has a significant positive
effect on assimilation rates through exposure to co-ethnic and allowing for investment. How-
ever, conditioning on pre-immigration experience with the local culture and further learning,
source country richness has no significant effect on assimilation rates. This implies that pre-
immigration experience with the local culture and further learning are important components
of the channel through which productivity differences affect assimilation rates. Finally, formal
learning is shown to be an important contributor to cultural assimilation, but not informal
learning.
That being said, exposure to co-ethnics is not random, new immigrants face location choices
among neighbourhoods in the host country. These location choices determine the level of ex-
posure to other immigrants and the costs of learning the local native-born culture. I expand
the model of chapter 3 to include neighbourhood choice. Among neighbourhoods with fewer
co-ethnics, immigrants from richer source country groups will sort into assimilating neighbour-
hoods. And neighbourhoods with a relatively large number of co-ethnics will receive some
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non-assimilating types. On the other hand, immigrants from poor source countries will have
some non-assimilating immigration in all neighbourhoods.
Using data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada: Waves 1-3, sorting
is proxied using an ethnic enclave measure, where living and working in an ethnic enclave
is determined jointly by an over-representation of co-ethnics in CMA/CA of first arrival and
non-official language spoken at work. Including the sorting variable in the regression overad-
justs for the exposure channel through which productivity differences affect assimilation rates.
Since sorting is probably endogenous I instrument with average housing costs in CMA/CA of
arrival. Sorting has a significant negative effect on assimilating immigration and is certainly
an important component of the exposure channel. However, overadjusting the exposure chan-
nel, source country richness still has a significant positive effect on assimilation rates. This
implies the presence of an alternate channel. I find that source country richness appears to
be significantly positively related to sorting, conditional on the size of the co-ethnic group.
New immigrants from richer source countries are more likely to cluster compared to similar
co-ethnics from poorer countries. The hypothesized alternate channel is probably related to
quality, as opposed to size, of the co-ethnic group.
4
2 Extended Family Migration Decisions: Evidence
from Nepal
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2.1 Introduction
Family plays a decisive role in the decision to migrate. The relevance of husband-wife (nuclear)
families in forming migration decisions and how these decisions differ from the motivations of
single persons is a recurring topic of concern in the economic and sociological literature. Married
couples are understood to have a smaller degree of freedom in the decision to migrate as they
aim to maximize the welfare of the family as a whole rather than their own individual net
benefit. Long (1974) showed empirically that married men in the US are less likely to migrate
within/between counties and across states than unmarried men. This evidence was formalized
in a neoclassical model of family migration decision in Mincer (1978) and further formalized
within a model of altruism in Becker (1981). Massey (1990) reiterates the evidence through a
sociological perspective with further evidence provided in Maxwell (1988). Miller (1976), Speare
Jr. & Goldscheider (1987) and Maxwell (1988) further stress the importance of the family life
cycle in the decision to migrate. More recent evidence by McKinnish (2008) and Tenn (2010)
show tied-ness of the wife to the husband’s migration decision through smaller wage returns
and opportunities for employment after migration. Moreover, Miller (1976) is the first paper
to take up extended families and how the presence of extended family members will impact the
family migration decision. Root & De Jong (1991) introduce extended family members within
the context of developing countries where such families are a common feature. They find that
family migration is a function of the extended families’ involvement in the migration decision
process, such that, the extended family has the power to pressure the decision to migrate for
or against the nuclear families’ own welfare.
The husband-wife model is an important contribution to understanding migration in de-
veloped countries where households are essentially ‘nuclear’. However, the extended family
household is the dominant family structure in developing countries (Bongaarts & Zimmer,
2002). The complexity of the extended family differs by region but is nonetheless prolific.
6
Extended family structures are complex as they include the nuclear family, plus grandparents,
uncles, aunts, cousins, etc. Migrants from developing countries leave behind some portion of
the family structure and the migrating part of the household is only a subset of the complete
family structure. It is highly unlikely that migration leaves an ‘empty household’.
The relevance of the household in individual migration decisions cannot be understated
(Mincer, 1978 and Massey, 1990). The household’s characteristics play an important role in
determining whether migration is valuable, or not, to the point that it determines the extent of
the push towards it. Kley (2011) draws attention to the migration decision process. Potential
migrants have ‘place utility’ and at the pre-decision stage form expectations about the attain-
ment of valued goals in the host country (taking into consideration the pull factors). However,
within the pre-decision stage potential migrants will weigh the effects of their actions on peers
and household members. Certain household characteristics will lead to a lower likelihood of
migration because of high economic, social and emotional costs. The constraints imposed by
marital status on the migration decision within nuclear families do not carry over without com-
plications when considering the presence of extended family members. Extended families may
further constrain the nuclear family migration decision or encourage nuclear family migration
(Root & De Jong, 1991). However, lesser understood is the fact that the presence of extended
family members may dissolve nuclear family migration and present a new situation where one
spouse migrates while the other remains. The migration observed in these situations may be
predominately temporary but is certainly an important dimension to consider. The tied-ness
of the spouse is given a new dimension as he/she becomes no more tied to members of the
extended family than his/her own spouse. The goal of this research is to uncover the conditions
under which such situations appear in the Mincer (1978) model and present empirical evidence
for these cases.
Very little research has attended to the intersections between individual decisions and
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household characteristics within the context of migration (Mincer, 1978; Becker, 1981; Bor-
jas & Bronars, 1991). Mincer’s (1978) model with husband-wife decision makers works well
in understanding the type of migration that occurs in western industrialized countries where
households are commonly nuclear. As such, marital status is a deterrent to individual migra-
tion decisions and married men are significantly less likely to migrate than unmarried men.
Mincer’s (1978) model when applied to the developing world should predict a lot less married
men migration than what is currently observed. Instead, a significant amount of married men
migration (without their spouses) does take place. This is shown to be the case using data on
Nepali households (“Descriptive Analysis: The Extended Family” in section 3 of this paper).
Furthermore, Mincer’s (1978) model predicts significant tied-ness of the spouse to the hus-
band’s decision in the US where households are typically nuclear. In “Regression Analysis:
Migration from the Extended Family” in section 4 of this paper, I show that married men
(without their spouse) migration are more likely than couple migration in extended families
than nuclear ones. That is, the presence of extended family members frees the spouse’s decision
to migrate.
The estimation strategy of this paper is to provide justification for the implications of
the theoretical model using data from Nepal. Unlike Mincer (1978) and Becker (1981) where
individual migrants within the household are expected to be ‘tied-stayers’ or ‘tied-movers’
to the migration decisions of the spouse; in the model of this paper there are further inter-
dependencies with members of the extended family that may free the migration decision. The
deterrent effect of marital status on migration decisions as predicted in Mincer’s (1978) model
are only special conditions of a more general picture of migration decisions in an extended
family. The presence of extended family members will dampen the effect of marital status on
migration decisions and the prevalence of tied-movers.
The set up of the paper is as follows: a theoretical model is provided, followed by empirical
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justification for the implications of the theoretical model. And finally the conclusion.
2.2 Theoretical model
I will develop a model of the individual’s migration decision in an extended family structure.
Similar to Mincer (1978), I assume that all migration decisions exclude children. However, chil-
dren are quite relevant for household decisions, so their presence is treated for appropriately
in the empirical section. The model extends migration in a husband-wife household and con-
siders the role of extended family members. There are only two countries: the sending country
and the receiving country. Let Gi be the net benefit to individual i such that if Gi > 0 then
the individual’s private calculus indicates a gain from migrating. Likewise Gi ≤ 0 indicates a
preference to staying. The net benefit of migrating to an individual i is decomposed as
Gi = Ri − Ci + v(si),
where Ri−Ci is the standard economic returns minus cost and v(si) is the value to individual
i from living as a unit with s other family members. It is assumed that v′(si) > 0, v′′(si) < 0
and v(0) = 0. The individual net benefit Gi for each individual i in the family is a measure of
the net economic benefit of migrating had this individual made an independent decision. The
total net benefit for a household with n members, if all migrate, will be1
Gf = G1 +G2 + ...+Gn.
In a husband-wife household (n = 2 and m = 2) any differences in the net benefits of migration
between spouses are associated with tied migration. The subscripts denote 1 = husband and
1The model presented in Mincer (1978) and extended in this paper assume away sociological considerations
concerning gender-roles ideology or some other within-household roles held by members of the extended family.
Under this assumption, the net benefit is simply a sum of un-weighted individual net benefits. Certainly, gender-
roles ideology play a significant role in family migration decisions as it brings into question the sufficiency of
net economic benefit as an explanation for tied-ness. For instance, if the husband assumes a role of provider in
the family, the mutually recognized right to exercise power in the family migration decision will discount the
wife’s net economic gain (or loss) from a prospective geographic move (Bielby & Bielby, 1992).
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2 = wife. The net benefit of migration to the husband and wife from migrating together are
G1 | (s1 = 1) = R1 − C1 + v(1)
G2 | (s2 = 1) = R2 − C2 + v(1),
where conditional notation is adopted to indicate i is living with si other family members. On
the other hand, the net benefit to the husband from migrating alone is
G1 | (s1 = 0) = R1 − C1
G2 | (s2 = 0) = 0.
The wife is a tied mover if she faces a negative return to migration, R2−C2 < 0, and the family
gains from migrating as a unit, G1 | (s1 = 1) +G2 | (s2 = 1) > G1 | (s1 = 0) +G2 | (s2 = 0) or
R2 − C2 + 2v(1) > 0. This is the conclusion produced in Mincer (1978). In fact, in the n = 2
case, the spouse with lower returns to migration becomes tied to the other’s decision.
This model differs in the case when n > 2, the presence of an extended family member.
Suppose the household consists of a 1 = husband, 2 = wife and 3 = extended family member.
If the husband and wife migrate together their net benefits are identical to the n = 2 case. But
if the husband migrates alone leaving the wife behind with the extended family member the
wife receives a larger payoff
G1 | (s1 = 0) = R1 − C1
G2 | (s2 = 1) = v(1).
Now the wife is a tied mover if she faces a negative return to migration, R2 − C2 < 0, and
the nuclear family gains from migrating as a unit, G1 | (s1 = 1) + G2 | (s2 = 1) > G1 | (s1 =
0) + G2 | (s2 = 1) or R2 − C2 + v(1) > 0. Since R2 − C2 + v(1) > 0 is strictly less than
R2−C2 + 2v(1) > 0 from the n = 2 case, the wife is less tied to migrate in the presence of the
extended family member.
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The extended family contains some husband-wife couples which I denote by the marital
pairing function φ(i, j) and let m be the number of married persons. A non-marital pairing
function η(i, j) denotes a pair of any two persons in the household. In reality the family
decision problem is more complex and the assumption of independence between net benefits of
family members must be relaxed. A multivariate distribution of G1, ..., Gn has means µ1, ..., µn,
standard deviation σ1, ..., σn, and correlations coefficients ρij ∀i, j. The probability of migrating
for any person in the household is P (Gi > 0), the area in the distribution of Gi to the right of
Gi = 0. Converting this area to a standardized value
2 and using it in Zi = (0−µi)/σi = −1/CVi
at zero will yield the coefficient of variation measure CVi. The probability P (Gi > 0) is assumed
to be the same for all potential migrants so the coefficient of variation does not differ among
individuals of the household, CVi = CVj ∀i 6= j.
The means and standard deviations among individuals of the household are related as
µi = kijµj and σi = kijσj. The parameter kij ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the relative dominance
in net benefit of individual j to i so that a smaller kij signifies greater dependence of j on the
net earnings of i. Similarly, ρij ∈ [−1, 1] measures the correlation in net benefits between i
and j so that a smaller ρij signifies greater frictions in the migration decision between family
members i and j. Based on this information the CV in the extended family context can be
constructed as
CVf =
σ (
∑n
i=1Gi)∑n
i=1 µi
=
σ
(∑m
i=1Gφ(i,i′) +
∑n
i=m+1Gi
)∑n
i=1 µi
=
(∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 σiσjρji
)1/2∑n
i=1 µi
where i′ denotes the spouse of i in the marital pairing function φ(i, i′). Additionally, σi = kijσj
and µi = kijµj. Adjusting the parameters kij and ρij gives rise to multifarious situations and
interdependence among individuals within the extended family structure.
The existence of one particular situation is of relevance in this study: a tied-mover of
the husband-wife model becoming untied in the extended family framework. There are two
2Using the standard normal table (z-value).
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arguments to support the intuition in regards to the existence of such a situation: (1) there
is no reason to assume a priori that a spouse is more (or less) tied to their partner than they
are to members of the extended family, and (2) a common feature of migration in developing
countries are household risk distribution through remittances (Stark & Levhari, 1982; Stark
& Bloom, 1985; Katz & Stark, 1986; Gubhaju & De Jong, 2009; and Mendola, 2012). Within
certain parameter configurations for kij and ρij, the independence of an individual’s migration
decision in an extended family structure could lead to outcomes no different from a model
with only individual decision makers. The frictions in the migration decision of individuals
are relaxed within an extended family setting as opposed to the predictions in Mincer (1978).
These situations and related others are worth exploring using an example.
Example. Consider a three person household with one couple, n = 3 and m = 2. To be
specific, let 1 = husband, 2 = wife and 3 = wife’s mother. Using µ2 = k21µ1, σ2 = k21σ1,
µ3 = k31µ1 and σ3 = k31σ1, the CV for the entire extended family is
CVf = CV1
(
1 + 2k21ρ21 + 2k31ρ31 + 2k31k21ρ32 + k
2
21 + k
2
31
1 + 2k21 + 2k31 + 2k31k21 + k221 + k
2
31
)1/2
,
and the following sub-pairing assumes k31 → 0. This gives the CV from the husband-wife
model
CVφ(1,2) = CV1
(
1 + 2k21ρ21 + k
2
21
1 + 2k21 + k221
)1/2
.
The extended family model approaches the husband-wife model under the special case when
the extended family member is not dependent on the migrating married couple. But this only
proves that the extended family model is a more general model than the husband-wife model.
This result does not provide a testable hypothesis; instead proposition 1 below is empirically
testable. The next sub-pairing is the coefficient of variation in the joint probability of migrating
between the wife and her mother
CVη(2,3) = CV1
(
k221 + 2k31k21ρ32 + k
2
31
k221 + 2k31k21 + k
2
31
)1/2
.
The following proposition characterizes the parameter space in which husband migration
(without the wife) occurs.
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Proposition. P (Gφ(1,2) > 0 | s1 = 0, s2 = 1) > P (Gφ(1,2) > 0 | s1 = s2 = 1) where k21 ∈ (0, 1]
and ρ21 ∈ [−1, 1]. The husband’s probability of migrating (without the wife) is greater than the
probability of migrating as a couple.
Proof. Assume P (Gφ(1,2) > 0 | s1 = 0, s2 = 1) ≤ P (Gφ(1,2) > 0 | s1 = s2 = 1). Since
Gφ(1,2) | (s1 = 0, s2 = 1) ≡ G1 | (s1 = 1, s2 = 1). Then, P (G1 > 0) ≤ P (Gφ(1,2) > 0). Let
P (G1 > 0) = 16%, which translates as Z1 = 1 and CV1 = −1. This implies that P (Gφ(1,2) >
0) ≥ 16%, which in turn would translate as Zφ(1,2) ≤ 1 and CVφ(1,2) ≤ −1. Setting CV1 = −1
and CVφ(1,2) ≤ −1
CVφ(1,2) = (−1)
(
1 + 2k21ρ21 + k
2
21
1 + 2k21 + k221
)1/2
≤ −1.
Some algebraic manipulation reduces the inequality to
k21(ρ21 − 1) > 0.
Since k21 ∈ (0, 1] and ρ21 ∈ [−1, 1], the case of k21 ≤ 0 and ρ21 − 1 ≤ 0 can be ruled out.
This only leaves k21 > 0, then ρ21 − 1 > 0 and ρ21 > 1 which contradicts ρ21 ∈ [−1, 1]. Thus,
P (G1 > 0) > P (Gφ(1,2) > 0).
The proposition states that husband migration (without the wife) is the outcome of a
family migration decision process under very reasonable parameter conditions of ρ21 ∈ [−1, 1]
and k21 ∈ (0, 1]. The above example is a useful exposition, and more cases may be derived,
to present the case that migration decisions in an extended family setting will reduce the
potential of tied-movers. Migrant husbands (or wives) are likely to appear as the extended
family structure becomes more complex. The interactions between the strength of correlations
between family members and the level of dominance of some members of the household create
a variety of instances in which migrant husbands (or wives) emerge.
The relationship between martial status and migration decisions when viewed from the
perspective of extended families, assuming all other factors unchanged (such as occupational
choice and location decisions), the nuclear family’s net gains in migration are not a sufficient
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condition for migration of the marital couple. The net gains to the couple must be accompanied
by normal conditions in relation to the other members of the extended family. For the marital
couple to migrate, either spouse should have sufficient correlations in the net gains (or losses)
with each other and much less correlation with other members of the family. Also, the similarity
in returns from migration between family members will affect how tied they are to others in
the household.
2.3 Empirical findings
To test the implications of the model I use households recorded in the Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) for Nepal 2011. Nepali individuals and/or families have migrated to
many different countries around the world but for the purposes of this study we are concerned
with households that have supplied migrants to India or within Nepal. The DHS records
demographic, health and economic information of 10,826 households in Nepal, out of which
5,876 (54.28 percent) are migrant households. This data set is a more reliable indicator of
actual migration than the census because of the extent of undocumented migration that occurs
between India and Nepal3. The 2011 Nepal census recorded 25.42 percent of all households
with an absent migrant member, small in comparison to the 54.28 percent recorded in the DHS.
Furthermore, the DHS is better for the purpose of studying the structure of the household.
Since the unit of analysis is the household in the sending country, there is likely to be some
attenuation bias; that is, entire households have migrated leaving no extended family behind4.
Attenuation bias is not a major issue using the DHS because the number of migrants from these
households (11,215; 18 percent of all individuals) closely resembles the Nepal Living Standards
3More so due to the trafficking of women and children (Datta, 2005). The difficulty in accurately estimating
migration numbers is presented in Sharma & Thapa (2013).
4This was mentioned previously as leaving an ‘empty household’.
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Survey 2010-2011 figure of 20 percent.5
Nepal-India migration is a widely studied area of economic and sociological research. India
and Nepal maintain open borders and have close historical, cultural and economic ties (Dutt,
1981). Nepali migration to India is concentrated in certain occupations and geographic regions
of India. Nepali’s are involved in the tea gardens of West Bengal (Datta, 2005), as sex workers
in Calcutta (Datta, 2005), as watchmen in factories (Dutt, 1981), and as gurkhas of the Indian
army (Dutt, 1981). The economic factors that push Nepali migration are caused by “increasing
fragmentation of landholding, indebtedness, ecological crisis through intense cultivation and
deforestation, rising population without further land to cultivate and chronic deficits in food
production” (Dutt, 1981). The pull factors from remittances (Seddon, Adhikari & Gurung,
2002) are important as well. By excluding Nepali’s that have migrated to other countries the
sample is reduced by 38 percent. Restricting to this smaller sample of migrants I avoid a bulk
of the issues relating to unobservable (and unmeasurable) political and cultural differences
between Nepal and the receiving country. Some of the receiving countries that are excluded
from this sample are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Malaysia and Dubai. The Gulf countries do not
offer citizenship to Nepali’s and have very strict visa requirements for migrant workers. The
visa requirement for Gulf countries entail that wives must be sponsored by the husband and
all husbands must be holding a full-time job. Thus all migration to the Gulf countries must
involve a ‘tied-spouse’ or a ‘trailing spouse’ to the husband’s migration decision. Tied-ness in
this sense would not be due to the controlled net benefits of migration but from exogenous visa
requirements. Including this sample would not serve as an appropriate testing ground for the
implications of the theoretical model as it would severely bias the results.
The empirical hypothesis of this study is: spouses are less tied in their migration decisions
within extended family settings relative to nuclear families. Firstly using statistics from the
5I did not use the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010-2011 because it is not easily available to researchers
from non-Nepali institutions.
15
DHS, I present the relevance of the extended family in Nepal within the migration context.
Secondly, I show that migrant husbands (without their wives) are significantly more likely in
extended families than nuclear families.
Descriptive analysis: the extended family
In this section, I present the relevance of extended families and their characteristics for mi-
gration in Nepal by the following three implications: (1) how relevant is the extended family
structure among Nepali households? (2) among the households’ migrant members, is the domi-
nant motive to migrate based on factors related to private calculus? and (3) what is the extent
of migrant husbands among Nepali households?
The justification of the relevance of the extended family structure in Nepal is easily es-
tablished. Based on the relationship to the head of the household, 7,834 (72 percent of all
households) Nepali households are male headed and 2,992 (28 percent) are female headed.
Among the male headed households presented in table A1 located in the appendix: 1,786 (23
percent) households have a son/daughter/parent in-law living within the household, 1,706 (22
percent) have grandchildren living within the household, 464 (6 percent) have a brother/sister
living within the household, 874 (11 percent) have some other relative (uncle/aunt/cousin/etc.)
living within the household, and 247 (3 percent) have an unrelated person (renter or friend)
living within the household. Similarly, within the female headed households: 648 (22 percent)
households have a son/daughter/parent in-law living within the household, 538 (18 percent)
have grandchildren living within the household, 147 (5 percent) have a brother/sister living
within the household, 372 (12 percent) have some other relative (uncle/aunt/cousin/etc.) liv-
ing within the household, and 56 (2 percent) have an unrelated person (renter or friend) living
within the household. The extended family structure does not differ between male and fe-
male headed households; thus, there is no advantage to separating male and female headed
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households for the purpose of analyzing the extended family structure.
Whether there is a difference in the extended family structure between migrant and non-
migrant households must also be tested. Based on the results of table A2 located in the
appendix there are 4,950 (46 percent of all households) Nepali non-migrant households and
5,876 (54 percent) migrant households. Among non-migrant households: 676 (14 percent) have
a son/daughter/parent in-law living within the household, 610 (12 percent) have a grandchild
living within the household, 304 (6 percent) have a brother/sister living within the household,
560 (11 percent) have some other relative (uncle/aunt/cousin/etc.) living within the household,
and 173 (3 percent) have an unrelated person (renter or friend) living within the household. On
the other hand, among migrant households: 1,758 (30 percent) have a son/daughter/parent
in-law living within the household, 1,634 (28 percent) have a grandchild living within the
household, 307 (5 percent) have a brother/sister living within the household, 686 (12 percent)
have some other relative (uncle/aunt/cousin/etc.) living within the household, and 130 (2
percent) have an unrelated person (renter or friend) living within the household. There is
a noticeable difference in the extended family structure between migrant and non-migrant
households. Many more migrant households have in-laws and grandchildren present6. Thus it
seems that family structure has some relation to migration.
To show that the dominant motive for migration is based on private calculus alone, that
is, the justification of implication (2), I examine the motive for migration (these are illustrated
in table A3 of the appendix). There are many motives for migration: work, study, marriage,
other family, or security. It would be unreasonable to suppose that an individual’s incentive
to migrate involves economic motives but removes from the non-economic ones. That being
6Note that migrant households are defined as a household that has atleast one member living outside of
Nepal or within another region in Nepal. As such, the statistics presented of migrant households does not
include the migrant members that have moved away. This is because the data only captures the characteristics
of the household after the member has moved away. Moreover, I cannot know with certainty the member’s
relationship (son/daughter/cousin/etc.) to the head of the household. Migrant households are larger than the
picture that is presented here.
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said, I am interested in a particular incentive with an ultimate view in mind, that is, incentives
aimed at understanding the tied-movers (if any) involved. This particular aim removes study
and marriage as a relevant incentive because it should not involve any tied-movers. Work,
other family and security related motives are relevant for private calculus and may involve
some tied-movers. Only 7 (0.07 percent) households reported members moving for security
reasons, and 890 (8.22 percent) households reported members that moved due to other family.
I will rule out security as a relevant motive for migration due to its small number. Other
family, although small in proportion, does seem to matter for migration. Other family is an
important motive for understanding tied-movers because there is good reason to suppose that
pioneering migrant members from a household had economic motives for migrating but subse-
quent members migrated for other family reasons, although these might actually be economic
reasons. Additionally, the ‘trailing spouse’ would fall under this category.
Migration might occur in groups or as a chain. To determine the intensity of ‘chain migra-
tion’ (migrant members that leave the household and move to the same location as previous
migrant members) as a motive behind Nepali migration it must be compared to ‘group mi-
gration’ (a group of individuals that move out of the household and are destined to the same
location and in the same time period). Frequencies for group and chain migration are displayed
in table 3. It seems that neither chain migration nor group migration is common for Nepali
migration. Nepali households supply migrants to various locations with some randomness in
the years. This is indicative of a risk diversification motivation in the supply of migrants as
proposed by Radu (2008). The evidence for risk diversification is indicated by the frequency of
households that experience chain migration to those that experience group migration, 798 (14
percent of all migrant households) and 426 (7 percent) respectively. A much larger number,
4,100 (70 percent) households exhibit neither group nor chain migration7.
7And 552 households (9 percent) exhibit group and chain migration.
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Table 3: Number of households experiencing group and/or chain migration, or neither
Group Migration
No Yes
Chain Migration
No 4100 (69.78) 426 (7.250)
Yes 798 (13.58) 552 (9.394)
Percent in parentheses
The final implication (3) is difficult to establish as the DHS does not record the migrant’s
relationship to the head of the household. This relationship information is essential to deter-
mine the extent of tied-movers as would be predicted by the husband-wife model. Tied-movers
in group migration is commonly understood as a nuclear portion of the extended family mi-
grating while tied-movers in chain migration is associated with the ‘trailing spouse’, and none
of these were of great importance among migrant households. However, this evidence does
not completely remove the possibility of tied-movers in the decision to migrate from extended
families because I am not dealing solely with husband-wife couples. The inability to iden-
tify migrant members’ relationship to non-moving members of the household within the DHS
data, I reason in the following way: children under the age of 5 are unlikely to migrate with-
out their mother/father8, and thus the children among non-movers/movers must have their
mother/father present as well. Table 4 depicts the incidence of migrant households with chil-
dren living elsewhere or within the household, presumably with their father and/or mother.
A very small number of migrant households have children under the age of 5 living elsewhere,
presumably with their mother/father, 439 (7 percent of migrant households); and many more
migrant households have children under the age of 5 living with non-movers, presumably among
them is their mother/father, 2,351 (40 percent)9.
Implication (3) requires that children and mothers (fathers) that remain with the non-
movers must also have husbands (wives) that migrated. As previously mentioned, I am not
8Only two children were reported to be without a parent or caretaker present.
9The remainder 53 percent of migrant households have no children under the age of 5 within the household.
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Table 4: The number of migrant households with children that live at home and abroad, by
number of migrant children
Number of children Migrant children Non-migrant children
0 5437 (92.53) 3525 (59.99)
1 329 (5.599) 1520 (25.87)
2 95 (1.617) 680 (11.57)
3 11 (0.187) 125 (2.127)
4 3 (0.0511) 22 (0.374)
5 4 (0.0681)
6 1 (0.0170)
Total 5876 (100.00) 5876 (100.00)
Percent in parentheses
able to determine the relationship of the persons that migrated to the persons that remained.
Instead I do have parent alive (or dead) and living within households (or not) information of
children under the age of 5 among those that remained in Nepal. I identify children under 5
years as the starting point; then determine whether the child’s father and/or mother is alive;
if the father/mother is alive, whether he/she lives in the household and is currently identified
as married; if he/she does not live in the household then he/she must be migrant; I pair the
alive mother living in the household with the alive father living elsewhere and call them the
‘migrant husband’ pair. Similarly, I am able to identify the ‘migrant wife’ pair. This reasoning
is presented as figure 1 in the appendix and the results are presented in table 5. No household
reported a migrant wife, but a larger number, 1,418 households (24 percent), reported a migrant
husband.
The final step is to determine the frequency of ‘migrant husband-wife’ pairs; that is, the
incidence of husbands and wives moving together. I deconstruct group migration into husband-
wife pairs. Due to the inability of directly extracting relationship information among migrant
members, I use an alternate route: two migrant members must be migrating to the same
location but be of different sex10. Although a very inaccurate and generalized proxy for migrant
10They may migrate at different times to account for the trailing spouse.
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Table 5: The number of households with migrant husband and migrant wife pairs, by number
of migrant members
Number of migrant members Migrant wives Migrant husbands
0 5876 (100.00) 4458 (75.87)
1 954 (16.24)
2 404 (6.875)
3 48 (0.817)
4 11 (0.187)
7 1 (0.0170)
Total 5876 (100.00) 5876 (100.00)
Percent in parentheses
couples11, the frequency estimated is an upper bound; a more accurate measure of husband-
wife couples would give a smaller frequency. The results presented in table 6 indicate that
1,219 (21 percent of migrant households) households supplied couples. Compared to the 1,418
households that supplied migrant husbands, a more accurate measure of couples would only
justify implication (3) further. Thus, husband-wife migration is not more likely than migrant
husband pairs and removes the prominence of tied-movers when considering extended families.
I have shown that extended families are an important feature of Nepal and that husband-
wife migrant pairs are not more likely than migrant husbands. It is clear from the descriptive
exposition so far that migration within an extended family is possible, that migration is based
on private calculus, and tied-movers, i.e. migrant husband-wife pairs, are not as common as
migrant husbands within the extended family framework of Nepal.
Regression analysis: migration from the extended family
Household wealth distribution, gender distribution within the household, age and gender of
the household head, education/literacy level of the household, location of the household, stage
of family life cycle and presence of extended family members, need to be considered as factors
11The measure of couples used here would include a brother/sister pair, unmarried couples, mother/son,
father/daughter, etc.
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Table 6: The number of households with migrant husband-wife pairs, by number of migrant
pairs
Number of migrant pairs Husband-wife pairs
0 4657 (79.25)
1 731 (12.44)
2 289 (4.918)
3 119 (2.025)
4 51 (0.868)
5 15 (0.255)
6 8 (0.136)
7 4 (0.0681)
8 1 (0.0170)
12 1 (0.0170)
Total 5876 (100.00)
Percent in parentheses
influencing migration of household members. Further, the location of migration in India or
within Nepal and age at migration of the migrant are included as controls. The thematic
discussion of this article has been to infer the relevance of the extended family dynamic in
the context of the migration decision. Within the regression framework I show that migrant
husbands (relative to migrant husband-wife and non-migrant households) are significantly more
likely to be selected from extended families than non-extended ones. Migrant husbands are
about 2.5 times more likely to appear from a household with an extended family member
present. This finding satisfies the implication that wives become untied to their spouses’
decision to migrate in the presence of an extended family member. The empirical model to
estimate is a logistic regression of the form
Y = 1(X ′γ + Eα +  > 0)
where E is a dummy variable indicating the presence of the extended family member, Y
is a dummy variable indicating the husband in the household is migrant, X is the set of
observable controls, and  is the model error. Extended families are defined as households with
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the presence of in-laws, grandparents, grandchildren, brother/sisters, other relatives and/or
unrelated persons. The nuclear family (or non-extended families) are households that do not
include these persons. I also show that migrant husbands are more likely be from Nepali
households that have an extended family member present, are poor, are female headed, and
the head is younger.
I present odds ratios of the logistic regression framework to study the implications of house-
hold characteristics. To be completely robust in the analysis I present the logistic regression
results in sub-samples. Considering the fact that migrant households may differ by the years
since migration, I run a separate regression in sub-samples ‘less than one year’, ‘less than two
years’, ‘less than five years’ and ‘less than ten years’. The results of the regressions are provided
in table 7.
There is potential endogeneity in the relationship between wealth and likelihood of migra-
tion. This occurs through remittances that are not explicitly captured in the DHS. Remittances
have been proven to be a great source of income and development for households and villages
in Nepal and these are captured by the wealth index. Remittances are the main pull factor
leading the supply of migrant members to India and other countries such as United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Malaysia. Seddon et. al. (2002) find that the value of
remittances from outside South Asia, although a small share of total remittances, are worth far
more than those from India and within Nepal. However, there has been decreasing relevance
of India as a destination for remittances: 32.9 percent in 1995/96, 23.2 percent in 2003/04,
and 11.3 percent in 2010/11; Nepalis are opting for better paying destinations outside of In-
dia and Nepal. That being said, although the share of remittances from India had decreased,
the volume of remittances in real terms had increased: NPR 1355 million in 1991/92 to NPR
12,100 million in 2005/06 (Sharma & Thapa, 2013). The wealth index indirectly captures total
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Table 7: Nepali households that have supplied at most one migrant to India or within Nepal.
Dependent Variable:
Migrant husband
Less than 1 year Less than 2 years Less than 5 years Less than 10 years
Extended family 2.048∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗ 2.418∗∗∗ 2.614∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.364) (0.328) (0.326)
Poor 1.837∗∗ 1.664∗ 1.648∗∗ 1.633∗∗
(0.409) (0.332) (0.291) (0.259)
Urban 0.683 0.722 0.704 0.635∗
(0.188) (0.178) (0.150) (0.125)
Poor * Urban 0.413 0.584 0.607 0.668
(0.255) (0.361) (0.330) (0.338)
Eastern 0.565∗ 0.682 0.612∗ 0.630∗
(0.162) (0.175) (0.138) (0.133)
Central 0.636 0.750 0.722 0.723
(0.172) (0.180) (0.152) (0.140)
Western 0.659 0.650 0.652 0.662
(0.196) (0.173) (0.151) (0.140)
Mid-western 0.803 0.855 0.830 0.910
(0.204) (0.195) (0.163) (0.163)
Cluster altitude 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000142) (0.000126) (0.000108) (0.000100)
Age of oldest child 1.005 1.005 1.010 1.017∗
(0.0138) (0.0122) (0.00951) (0.00883)
Secondary education 0.289 0.357 0.503 0.466
(0.327) (0.365) (0.446) (0.380)
Higher education 0.183 0.323 0.442 0.432
(0.207) (0.281) (0.334) (0.313)
Literacy program 0.546 0.658 0.655 0.631
(0.332) (0.367) (0.343) (0.296)
Male members 0.359∗ 0.408∗ 0.369∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.163) (0.130) (0.109)
Male headed 0.244∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0540) (0.0486) (0.0445) (0.0417)
Age of head 0.970∗∗ 0.973∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.00957) (0.00758) (0.00681)
Age at migration 1.035∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗
(0.00913) (0.00830) (0.00707) (0.00665)
Destination city: Kathmandu 0.654 0.515 0.654 0.795
(0.342) (0.236) (0.253) (0.302)
Destination city: Other city in Nepal 0.412 0.418∗ 0.515 0.691
(0.204) (0.182) (0.190) (0.251)
Destination city: Rural area in Nepal 0.273∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.342∗∗ 0.445∗
(0.133) (0.139) (0.123) (0.157)
Destination city: Mumbai 0.597 0.676 0.652 1.000
(0.379) (0.384) (0.311) (0.451)
Destination city: Delhi 0.847 0.825 0.930 1.151
(0.472) (0.408) (0.392) (0.479)
Destination city: Punjab 0.420 0.399 0.452 0.598
(0.270) (0.231) (0.238) (0.308)
Destination city: Other cities in India 0.664 0.692 0.749 0.908
(0.319) (0.296) (0.272) (0.325)
Observations 1,023 1,266 1,698 2,077
Pseudo R2 0.277 0.255 0.228 0.228
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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wealth such as income (formal and informal), inheritances, savings, as well as remittances12.
Historical research emphasized differentials in employment opportunities between Nepal and
India as a relevant impetus for hill emigration, as was the granting of land entitlements in the
1960s to keep Nepali’s from moving to the Assam region of India. Wage differentials were not
seen as important for driving out-migration (Subedi, 1991). The complication arises because
the wealth index is capturing opportunities for members in the household from staying, and
the fact that neither remittances nor opportunities are observed directly. A large wealth index
may be due to accumulated remittances from supplying migrants, but an increase in the supply
of migrants may be due to fewer opportunities in the poor household and a risk diversification
strategy. To work around the possibility of such omitted variables bias, I estimate by years since
migration. The set of estimates for recent migrants, i.e. less than one year since migration,
provide conditions under which households send their first member not too long ago to avail of
the benefits from remittances; thus, the lack of opportunities is the main driver for migration
in this set of regressions. Interestingly, increasing the number of years since migration from
one to two, two to five, and from five to ten years does not change the regression estimates
greatly. Thus, omitted variables bias due to a time-dependent process is not a major concern.
The construction of the wealth index differs for rural and urban households. Some goods
in the household’s consumption basket differ between urban and rural households and the
weighting used to construct the wealth index reflects this. Thus, the wealth index is interacted
with an urban/rural indicator to take account of these differences. Surprisingly, household
wealth does not seem to be a great determinant of husband migration in any of the results
presented. A very different result is presented in Kotorri (2010) where the probability of
12The wealth index is a composite measure of a household’s cumulative living standard. It does not directly
capture the sources of wealth but indirectly infers them from the quantity and quality of consumption goods
in the household. For instance, households that own a color TV are richer than those with a black/white TV.
Similarly, those that use tap water are richer than those that use well water. The wealth index falls in line with
the ‘relative deprivation hypothesis’ of Stark & Taylor (1989). Moreover, the wealth index captures non-market
activities; a very relevant source of income for households in the developing world (Shields & Shields, 1989).
25
emigration among Kosovar-Albanian households is negatively related to household income13.
Similar findings are found among Micronesian-US and Micronesian-Hawaii migrants (Akee,
2010). Hatton & Williamson (2002) provide an alternate theory that poverty is a constraint
to migration since it is generally expensive to migrate. This view is not carried in the case of
Nepal-India migration due to open borders and close geographic distance. On the other hand,
Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) and Lacuesta (2010) find that Mexican-US migrants are selected
from the middle of the wage distribution. The lack of significant selection in Nepal-India
migration is a new and interesting finding that deserves its own study.
A second endogeneity issue appears in the relationship between extended families and mi-
grant husbands. Namely, the decision to migrate by husbands may induce extended families to
form. For instance, a husband from a nuclear household plans to migrate alone but invites his
mother or mother-in-law to live with the family in his absence to assist in household duties.
The presence of an unobserved confounding variable is the source of bias in the model. In
the example described, the omitted variable is household duties. The identification strategy I
use is two-stage residual inclusion (Cai, Small & Have, 2000). This approach is ideal because
it always for the controlling of omitted variables more completely in the second stage of the
estimation.
I identify households that have ‘usable agricultural land’ and use this variable as exogenous
variation in the model. The reasoning is as follows: nuclear households that possess agricul-
tural land will have a greater need for someone to work it. Thus, the migration decision of
husbands would require the wife to receive some support which would come from extended
family members. Usable agricultural land appears to be a strong instrument14. The results
are displayed in table 8. Including usable agricultural land as an instrumental variable for the
13The empirical methodology pursued in Kotorri (2010) is similar to what I have conducted in this paper by
studying the characteristics of the household with migrant members.
14The Wald-χ2 estimate in the first stage regression is large and significant.
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presence of extended family members increases the likelihood of migrant husbands appearing
from extended families. Moreover, the change in the coefficient estimates are large. Thus, the
coefficient estimates are suffering from severe omitted variables bias, but appear to increase
the magnitude of the coefficient estimates rather than make them insignificant.
Table 8: Nepali households that have supplied at most one migrant to India or within Nepal,
IV = usable agricultural land.
Dependent Variable:
Migrant husband
Less than 1 year Less than 2 years Less than 5 years Less than 10 years
Extended family 13.84∗∗ 20.11∗∗∗ 26.53∗∗∗ 13.36∗∗∗
(11.82) (15.03) (13.07) (6.278)
First stage residual 0.0657∗∗ 0.0449∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗
(0.0563) (0.0340) (0.0190) (0.0376)
Observations 1,023 1,266 1,698 2,077
AIC 898.2 1071.5 1387.1 1628.5
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Linkages to the migration system have been proved to be of importance (Root & De Jong,
1991). That is, the presence of family/kin at the destination (as opposed to the origin) might
be driving the results of this model. The presence of ties at the destination implies a smaller
need for familial support so that the husband would consider migrating alone rather than have
his wife along with him. These linkages are not captured in the estimation model due to the
lack of post-migration characteristics. Instead the regression subsample used is households that
have supplied only one migrant to India or within Nepal over the last ten years.
The lack of post-migration information constraints the regression results of this paper be-
cause I cannot capture individual specific benefits from migration. The effect of individual
specific characteristics are important for explaining the motivation for migration of unmarried
men and women (Gubhaju & De Jong, 2009). Hence the small pseudo-R2 estimates.
Overall, there is clear evidence that the presence of extended family members does relieve
the wife’s tied-ness to the husband’s migration decision. The migration constraints imposed
by the nuclear family dynamic are weaker in an extended family.
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Selection on observables and un-observables
The DHS records a large amount of household characteristics, which were used as controls in
the empirical model. However, only a few characteristics of the migrant were included in the
survey, so that, the robustness of the effect of extended family members on the likelihood of
husband migration might be put into question. There will be selection bias due to unobserved
migrant characteristics that are interacting with the extended family variable which would
in turn have no significant independent effect on the likelihood of husband migration. For
instance, high skill migrants might be more likely to come from extended families and are also
more likely to migrate.
This section of the paper performs a robustness check on the selection bias that are bothering
the results of the regression analysis. Selection on observables and un-observables is a strategy
developed in Altonji, Elder & Taber (2002b) to be able to measure the degree of selection on
un-observables by using the degree of selection on observables as a benchmark. This strategy
is useful in identifying the extent of omitted variables bias if indeed there is large amounts
of hidden migrant information. It serves as a useful quantification tool to judge whether
the regression results relating the presence of extended family members and the likelihood
of husband migration is robust to inclusion of the unobserved part. I estimate jointly, the
bivariate Probit model
E = 1(X ′β + u > 0)
Y = 1(X ′γ + Eα +  > 0)
where E is a dummy variable indicating the presence of the extended family member, Y is a
dummy variable indicating the husband in the household is migrant, X is the set of observable
controls, u and  are unobserved selection bias. The second equation is the estimated model
of the regression analysis and the first equation is the projection of the variable of interest E
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onto the model observables X ′γ and un-observables . The selection model is formalized as
Proj(E|X ′γ, ) = φ0 + φX′γX ′γ + φ
where φX′γ and φ are the observed and unobserved selection terms. The following condition
formalizes the idea of “selection on observables is the same as selection on un-observables”
φX′γ = φ
The derivation of this condition and assumptions are stated in Altonji, Elder & Taber (2002b).
An informal characterization of condition 1: the ratio of unobserved selection required to
explain the extended family effect is
α̂(
σ2E
σ2uˆ
)
(E(ˆ|E = 1)− E(ˆ|E = 0))
≡M.
If the estimate of this ratio is too high then it is highly unlikely that the un-observables, if
they were observed, would explain the entire E effect. The estimate of this ratio is provided
in table 2.7 below
Table 2.7: Relative amount of selection required on un-observables to explain the E effect
Parameter Value
α̂ 1.72
σ2E 0.50
σ2uˆ 0.64
E(ˆ|E = 1) 0.59
E(ˆ|E = 0) 1.72
M -2.50
The estimate of the ratio M indicates that a shift in the un-observables would have to
be two and half times as large as the shift in the observables to be able to explain away the
E effect; but this is too large for practical purposes. So it is unlikely that including more
variables to this model would explain away the effect of extended family households on the
likelihood of husband migration. Therefore, the estimated relationship between the presence
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of extended family members and the likelihood of husband migration is robust to the inclusion
of unobserved factors.
2.4 Conclusion
The husband-wife model of migration is an appropriate model under certain instances e.g.
to characterize migration between/within developed countries. However, it is unrealistic to
suppose all migration involves a husband-wife decision. Migration from developing countries
is more likely to be from extended families and this type of family structure is proven to be of
importance among several developing countries around the world (Bongaarts & Zimmer, 2002).
As was presented in the theoretical model of section 2, tied-movers become less likely within the
extended family structure and frees up the migration decision within certain situations. The
husband-wife model continues to be of relevance from the perspective of the receiving country if
these pairs of migrants do not appear to have extended families in the sending country. Studies
that do not account for the family dynamic in the sending country and assume tied-movers
are involved in the migration decision of the husband-wife pair may only be observing special
cases of the sending country’s family dynamic, and the extent of tied-movers will depend on
the relevance of the extended family structure in the sending country.
I present conclusive evidence to justify the implications of the model using data from Nepal.
I show that extended family structures are of importance in Nepal, the dominant motive for
migration is based on factors closely related to private calculus, and those normally considered
to be tied-movers in the husband-wife model are not as common as migrant husbands within
the extended family framework of Nepal. Within a regression framework I show that migrant
husbands are significantly more likely to be supplied to India (or within Nepal) from extended
families than nuclear ones. This result remains robust to alternative identification strategies
and the inclusion of unobserved factors.
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3 Optimal Immigration and Investment into Cultural
Assimilation
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3.1 Introduction
Immigration applicants are a self-selected group of individuals in the sending country (Borjas,
1987). Immigrants will select themselves for migration given their skills, ability, wealth status
and their drive to succeed. Immigrants choose to migrate to other countries to improve their
economic and social condition relative to their home country outcomes. But immigration
is a costly process. A large portion of the costs that immigrants must incur is the cost of
integration and assimilation. Researchers have studied assimilation in various aspects. A
large body of work has emerged in the study of economic assimilation with emphasis on wage
assimilation (Borjas, 1987, 1994, 1999; Chiswick, 1978) and job search assimilation (Bowlus,
Miyairi & Robinson, 2016). The wage assimilation literature aims to identify how quickly new
immigrants, facing an initial wage discount, will achieve wage parity with the native-born.
Analogously, researchers in job search assimilation aim to identify the length of time required
for new immigrants to mimic the job search parameters of comparable native-born. A smaller
literature exists to identify degenerative health parameters among new immigrants in the health
assimilation context (Antecol & Bedard, 2005; Biddle, McDonald & Kennedy, 2007). Finally,
a small literature exists on civic assimilation (Vigdor, 2008). This paper is concerned with the
processes in cultural assimilation (Konya, 2007; Lazear, 1999).
The seminal article in cultural assimilation is by Lazear (1999). The model developed in
Lazear’s (1999) article is based on an understanding that gains from diversity is the reason
people of uncommon culture interact. Incentives arise for people of uncommon culture to
interact with each other and exchange useful knowledge. The conditions required for such
an exchange of useful information is (1) there should be very little overlap between the two
cultures’ sphere of knowledge, (2) the knowledge gained must be useful, and (3) learning
should be low cost. Learning costs were shown to depend inversely on the size of the own
cultural group, so that, if a person’s own cultural group is large then there are higher costs
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from learning the other culture. Konya (2007) contributes to the diversity model by specifying
the coordinating cultural groups as the dominant native-born and the minority immigrant.
Productivity differences between the source and host country are introduced, so that, there are
larger gains to migrating from poorer source countries. Without any barriers to movement,
the number of immigrants from poor source countries will be larger. The new immigrants in
the host country incur migration costs and may choose to incur additional learning costs to
learn about the local native-born culture. Learning the local culture allows new immigrants
to communicate more effectively with native-born. However, their incentives to learn are
inversely related to the size of (exposure to) the immigrant group (van Tubergen & Kalmijn,
2009). Source country richness affects cultural assimilation through exposure. In this paper
I introduce the role of pre- and post-immigration experience in making formal or informal
learning decisions. Where pre-immigration learning alleviates communication frictions through
an endowment or selection effect, while further learning post-immigration through a form of
investment. Pre-immigration learning controls for selection from within the source country.
Konya (2007) and Lazear (1999) show that years spent in the host country leads to higher
levels of integration. They show this using cross-sectional census data from the U.S. This same
result is reiterated in Chiswick, Lee & Miller (2004) using longitudinal data from Australia.
They find unanimously that years since immigration is a significant determinant of integration,
but the number of years suggested by these papers is much longer than what I find in the data.
I find that the majority of new immigrants will assimilate within a few years. Using data
from the Canadian 2001 Census of Population I find that 81.91% of new immigrants that come
from non-English speaking households whose mother tongue is not English, are 18-64 years
old, and do not reside is Quebec will have learnt to speak English within their first year arrival.
Similarly, 88.36% within 2 years, 89.84% within five years and 91.47% within 10 years. The
preliminary evidence supports the suggestion that assimilation through investments are more
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likely.
New immigrants face cultural barriers that make communication with native-born difficult.
Given that communication with others is an integral part of a productive society, authorities in
major immigrant receiving country are increasingly interested in issues surrounding immigrant
assimilation because faster assimilation and/or close integration with native-born are assumed
to be beneficial for all. Alberto, Johann & Rapoport (2013) show increasing birthplace diversity
among all persons living in major immigrant receiving countries such as USA, UK, Austria,
Norway, Germany, Belgium and Canada between 1990 and 2000 (see table A1). On the other
hand, the birthplace among migrants of these countries did not became much more diverse in
the ten years15. In fact, the USA grew in total immigration and became less diverse. This
indicates that immigrants are a growing proportion of the population but are being selected
from fewer source countries. In 2011, Canada had a foreign-born population of 6,775,800
people (20.6 % of the total population). The highest proportion among the G8 countries. Asia
(including the Middle East) was Canada’s largest source of immigrants over the five years
2006-2011. Although the share of immigration from Africa, Caribbean, Central and South
America increased slightly. Canada appears to be becoming more diverse in it’s source country
selection (Statistics Canada, 2013). Ultimately, governments are not interested in removing
all immigration; some immigration is worthwhile and preferred. In the sphere of immigration
policy design, the type of immigration is of greater concern.
Unlike discussions pertaining to economic assimilation where immigrants are competing
with native-born for jobs and higher wages, cultural assimilation looks closely at the comple-
mentarities that exist between the two groups. The economic literature studying immigrants
has tended to focus on the low/high skilled dichotomy. An additional high-skilled immigrant
encourages growth in wages of comparable native-born. On the other hand, evidence exists
15Except for New Zealand. New Zealand took in a lot of new immigrants and from a variety of source
countries
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to the effect that low-skilled immigrants reduce wages of comparable native-born (Peri, 2012).
The policies that are designed then reflect the preferred type of immigration. Bianchi (2013)
discusses the effective policy tools available to immigration authorities for control of the skill
composition among migrants. The policy tool is the cost of migration. Since skill level is
directly determined by individual wealth in the sending country and the cost of migration im-
pacts differently by altering the returns to migration for different wealth levels, it is clear that
increasing the cost of migration will have the effect of increasing the amount of high skilled
migration and reducing the amount of low skilled migration.
Besides economic factors; safety and security, loss of national identity, and cultural conflicts
are also equally relevant factors in designing immigration policy. Thus, it does not seem
likely that the low/high skilled dichotomy of Bianchi (2013) to be of increasing relevance in
studying immigration policy when immigration authorities and public opinion should be just
as concerned about the social and political impact of the type of immigration. A large reason
for Brexit was the immigration and refugee crisis in Europe; the British voted for sovereignty
over immigration policy, which is regarded as a national issue. In this paper I focus attention
on the wider scope of assimilating/non-assimilating immigration dichotomy.
Why is the assimilating/non-assimilating immigration dichotomy more relevant than the
high/low skilled immigration dichotomy? as previously mentioned, it doesn’t seem likely that
immigration authorities will screen potential migrants solely on their technical skill level. In
2013 the Canadian immigration point system allocated 28% of maximum allowable points to
language proficiency, accounting for the largest portion of total skill allocation. This under-
standing stems from the fact that skill level may not be directly relevant to success. One could
easily imagine a high-skill immigrant working a low-skill position because they do not have
the networking and other tertiary skills to market their potential. Assimilation encompasses
a wider notion of success for immigrants than the narrower conception of skill. Similarly,
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one could imagine a low skilled immigrant performing extremely well in his/her skill class be-
cause she can network and does not face the insurmountable cultural barriers that some other
immigrants would face. In particular, assimilating immigration is conducive to complimentar-
ities with native-born. Cultural assimilation focuses less on the depressing effect of low-skilled
immigrants on comparable native-born wages (when native-born and immigrants are easily sub-
stitutable) and more on the complimentarities that are created through social relationships,
larger business networks, and a multicultural society that caters to heterogeneous tastes.
Cultural barriers lead to frictions in communication and lower economic productivity. The
alleviation of these frictions is the assimilation process through learning about the local cul-
ture. New immigrants will learn through time spent in the host country as well as through
formal/informal investments into cultural accumulation. The sum of all an immigrant learns
forms the cultural capital that may be leveraged to reduce the barriers in communication. Most
studies view assimilation solely as a time dependent process. In this paper I take the view that
assimilation is also a form of learning that accumulates through investment. Cultural capital
is a form of social capital that facilitates integration of new immigrants into the local culture.
van Tubergen & Kalmijn (2009) generalize three mechanisms that influence language accu-
mulation: exposure, incentive and efficiency. Social capital negatively interacts with language
accumulation through exposure. In this paper I identify the exposure channel through which
source country richness affects assimilation rates by conditioning on pre- and post-immigration
experience with the local culture.
The empirical strategy of this paper is as follows. Firstly, I test the predictions of the
theoretical model with data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada: Waves
1 to 3 where cultural assimilation is measured by proficiency in English, and investment into
native-born culture is measured by formal/informal learning of English. Since the data is
longitudinal, it is an improvement over cross-sections used in prior studies because I am able
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to observe new immigrants integrating over the course of the first 5 years in Canada and any
investments into the local culture they might have made along the way. Secondly, I provide
causal estimates of learning by taking advantage of the data’s panel structure. Finally, I infer
the presence of unobserved heterogeneities that are functioning in the assimilation process
because some immigrants have a greater ability to adapt to new environments and learn.
In the next section I formulate a model that treats investment dichotomously, discuss the
externalities, solve for equilibrium and the planner’s optimum. In section 3 I discuss policy
implications and the receiving countries’ best response to equilibrium levels and composition of
immigration. Section 4 of the paper tests the model using Canadian data and section 5 looks
at extensions. And finally the conclusion.
3.2 Model
A random matching model is used to describe the equilibrium levels of migration and type of
migration. There are two sets of agents in the model: potential migrants and native-born. I
suppose there are only two countries in the world: North and South where the South is less
developed relative to the North. Thus migration flows from South to North. The native-born
agents are located in the North and potential migrants are located in the South. The potential
migrants in the South make a decision about whether to stay in the South or migrate to the
North. Additionally, potential migrants must also decide whether to assimilate or not. The
decision to assimilate in this model depends on the potential migrant’s investment into learning
Northern culture.
Whence the migrate and/or assimilate problem has been solved, in the North there will
be two subsets of immigrants: assimilating and non-assimilating. Besides these subsets there
is the set of native-born. The native-born have a very small role in the model because they
face no specific decision problem. The native-born have preferences over the outcomes of the
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model, the level of immigration and the level of assimilating immigration, but have no impact
on the outcome. Potential migrants on the other hand face the same set of outcomes and are
able to choose a strategy based on a set of individual-specific characteristics.
Individuals in the North are drawn together randomly so that matches are created. Efficient
matching is the primary mode of production. The model introduces communication frictions
that inhibit ease of production by randomly matching agents. A match between persons of
similar culture are able to generate a surplus but matches between persons of different culture
create no surplus. Matches between non-assimilating and native-born create no surplus while
matches between non-assimilating and assimilating immigrants, or assimilating immigrants and
native-born, do generate a surplus. Four scenarios can be imagined in such a model: (i) there
is no migration; in this scenario there are only productive matches between native-born in the
North. However, non-migrants in the South prefer to migrate North because a match between
an assimilating immigrant and a native-born in the North leads to a higher surplus than in
the South (although this is only implied by the assumption of a less developed South and
there being atleast some Southerners willing to make an investment in Northern culture), (ii)
there is only assimilating immigration; in this scenario there is a great benefit to native-born
because many more productive matches can be facilitated than having no migration at all, (iii)
there is assimilating and non-assimilating immigration; in this scenario there may be too much
non-assimilating immigration or too little depending on the size of the immigrating group,
and (iv) finally, there is only non-assimilating immigration; although the least likeliest scenario
there is the possibility of a large initial non-assimilating immigrant influx that can benefit from
matches with its own kind, but at the expense of native-born losing out on the matches that
could have happened had atleast some of the immigrants been assimilating instead. Clearly, the
first scenario is dominated by the second while the second scenario is the most efficient relative
to the other two. The third scenario has contestable results as was discussed in Konya (2007)
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because there may be too much non-assimilating immigration. And the fourth scenario is a
possibility when one thinks of a new immigrant refugee group making its way into a country.
Unlike other two-sided matching problems there is no competition among the set of agents
as in the worker-employer (Roth, 1985; Crawford & Knoer, 1981; Crawford & Kelso, 1982;
Albrecht & Vroman, 2002) or marriage market models (Gale & Shapley, 1962)16. There is no
competition among potential migrants for better outcomes in the North. In fact, there may be
considerable amount of cooperation because a large group of non-assimilating immigrants can
be of benefit to each other when they all migrate together since it increases the chances of a
productive match (as in scenario (iv) above). For instance, the ability of Miami’s labor market
in the 1980’s to absorb the Mariel boatlift (where a large influx of unskilled Cuban immigrants
made their way to the shores of Miami) was attributed to large waves of previous immigrants
in the last two decades before the Mariel boatlift (Card, 1990; and Portes & Shafer, 2006). The
cooperation may only be implicit through forced coordination by asylum seekers and refugees
facing political strife or social issues in the sending country. Similarly, coordination can also
be had through efforts in the receiving country through worker import for special purposes; for
example, Chinese workers were brought from the Guandong province to build the Canadian
Pacific Railway, many of these Chinese workers stayed as immigrants. Similarly, temporary
foreign worker programs are common in many developed countries experiencing labor shortages
in some industries. The type of coordinated effort is relevant. In the case of asylum seekers
and refugees there is a negative impact on native-born. In the case of worker import, a labor
market model with complimentarities between native-born and low-skilled immigrants may be
better suited. That being said, I do not go into the details of the impact of coordination
and cooperation and how these will arise in the current model, it is sufficient to have it as a
possibility even if it is a rare one.
16A complete demonstration of matching and its application is provided in Sonmez & Unver (2009)
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The marginal migrant creates a positive and/or negative externality. The marginal migrant
has a positive externality on other immigrants because matches with positive surplus will occur.
The marginal migrant may impose a negative or positive externality on native-born. The nega-
tive externality to native-born occurs if the marginal migrant is non-assimilating. The negative
externality creates conflict between the two sides of the market. Non-assimilating immigrants
and native-born are in conflict because of the surplus foregone had the marginal migrant been
assimilating instead. The positive externality to native-born occurs if the marginal migrant is
assimilating.
Positive and negative externalities
Assuming the population of the North is given as one and the population in the South is
L, let m be the level of immigration and a the level of assimilating immigration. The two
variables are aggregate variables but have a specific impact on native-born and immigrants. Let
I = {i|i = 1, ..., L} be the set of potential migrants, N = {n|n = 1, ..., N} be the set of native-
born, M = {p|p = 1, ...,m} ⊆ I be the set of all immigrants, and A = {j|j = 1, ..., a} ⊆ M
is the set of all assimilating immigrants. Moreover, let (di, ai) be the strategy pair for the
potential migrant i so that di takes a value of one if the potential migrant decides to migrate
and a value of zero otherwise. Similarly, ai takes a value of one if the potential migrant decides
to assimilate, and zero otherwise. This is the basic strategy (di, ai) and outcome (m, a) profile
of Konya (2007). Once the strategy pair is given for the set of all potential migrants i ∈ I then
the aggregate outcomes are constructed as
m =
L∑
i=1
di and a =
L∑
i=1
ai. (3.1)
Based on the dis-aggregated outcomes, the marginal migrant imposes an externality to all other
immigrants that is positive, an externality to native-born that is negative if the immigrant is
non-assimilating but positive if assimilating.
40
Proposition 1. (a) The externality imposed on immigrants by the marginal migrant is
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
2 +
∑L
i=1 di
−
∑L
i=1 di
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
1 +m
2 +m
− m
1 +m
> 0 (3.2)
(b) On the other hand, the externality imposed on native-born by the marginal migrant is
2 +
∑L
i=1 ai
2 +
∑L
i=1 di
− 1 +
∑L
i=1 ai
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
2 + a
2 +m
− 1 + a
1 +m
> 0 (3.3)
if the marginal migrant is assimilating. If the marginal migrant is non-assimilating, the
externality on native-born is
1 +
∑L
i=1 ai
2 +
∑L
i=1 di
− 1 +
∑L
i=1 ai
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
1 + a
2 +m
− 1 + a
1 +m
< 0 (3.4)
Proof. The proof of proposition 1 is in the appendix
There isn’t much more to take away from equations (2)-(4) at this time but it formalizes the
externalities and will be a useful tool for analysis at a later point in the paper. The following
corollary will also be useful.
Corollary 1. The positive externality on native-born from an assimilating marginal migrant
is larger than the positive externality on other immigrants from any type of marginal migrant.
2 + a
2 +m
− 1 + a
1 +m
>
1 +m
2 +m
− m
1 +m
Proof. Equation (3) is larger than equation (2) for any m, a and m ≥ a which must also be
true as the set of assimilating immigrants are a subset of all immigrants.
Size and composition effect
As was discussed in proposition 1, the marginal migrant creates a positive externality for other
immigrants and native-born if they are assimilating, and a negative externality on native-born
if they are non-assimilating. The trade-off between size and composition works through the
positive and negative externalities. The externality of equation (2) is measured simply as the
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gain in the expected benefit to immigrants from an additional immigrant. This additional
immigrant increases the level of immigration and may change the composition. However, the
definition of the externality on immigrants (exclusively a measure of benefit gain/loss for immi-
grants) does not capture the composition effect, only the size effect. This is because equation
(2) does not require the marginal migrant to be specified as assimilating or not; purely a size
effect. On the other hand, the externality on native-born of equations (3) and (4) are mea-
sured as the expected gain/loss to native-born from an additional immigrant. The externality
on native-born captures the composition effect. If the marginal migrant is assimilating then
there is a positive externality as the numerators of equation (3) increased at the same rate
as their respective denominators. If the marginal migrant is non-assimilating then a negative
externality appears. Thus the size effect is neutral to the type of immigration and is measured
by the externality to all other immigrants, while the composition effect is sensitive to changes
in the type of immigration relative to changes in the level of immigration and is measured by
the externality to native-born. The Northern immigration authorities are interested in increas-
ing immigration levels upto the point where the negative and positive externalities cancel each
other out.
Bianchi (2013) discusses size and composition effects in the context of the equilibrium skills
ratio (high-skilled relative to low-skilled immigrants). The high-skill/low-skill dichotomy is
substituted for the assimilating/non-assimilating dichotomy in this model. Changes in the
policy will have an impact on the size and composition of immigration by internalizing the
externalities to all other immigrants and native-born. The following proposition discusses this
trade-off in the size and composition of immigration.
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Proposition 2. For any m, a > 0 the size and composition effects trade-off according to
m

> a(2a+ 1)/2(1 + a), the size effect dominates the composition effect
= a(2a+ 1)/2(1 + a), externalities cancel out
< a(2a+ 1)/2(1 + a), the composition effect dominates the size effect
Proof. Using the following condition to equate the total positive and negative externalities
m
(
1 +m
2 +m
− m
1 +m
)
+ a
(
2 + a
2 +m
− 1 + a
1 +m
)
= (m− a)
(
1 + a
2 +m
− 1 + a
1 +m
)
and some algebra will solve for the level of m as a(2a + 1)/2(1 + a) which separates the size
and composition effects.
Proposition 2 is a description of the level of immigration that satisfies Northern interests.
The size of immigration is positively related to the composition, dm/da > 0, and is increasing
at an increasing rate, d2m/da2 > 0. This is a different planner outcome from maximizing the
total welfare of the incumbent native-born population. Optimizing immigration authorities in
the North would solve the following maximization problem
maximize
a,m
1 + a
1 +m
Subject to (m− a) ≥ 0
But such a policy dictates that m = a is the only solution. The optimizing Northern planner
is minimizing negative externalities and maximizing atleast some of the positive externalities.
This policy is highly restrictive and more involved than the one described by proposition 2.
This result on size and composition effects deserves greater attention because of its direct
policy relevance. The immigration policies administered by governments in major immigrant
receiving countries are set by the pre-existing “base” population, which are either predomi-
nately native-born or immigrants. If the receiving country’s base population is mostly native-
born then there is likely to be averseness to higher levels of immigration, especially if it is the
non-assimilating type. On the other hand, if the receiving country’s base population is mostly
immigrants then it is more open to higher levels of immigration.
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Thresholds
From this point onwards I will drop the subscript i indicator for the potential migrant and
discuss further the potential migrant’s decision problem, how heterogeneity is introduced into
the model, derive the equilibrium thresholds for migrating and assimilating, and discuss the
equilibria that come out of the random matching immigration problem. The migration cost is
Migration cost = µc
Where c is an individual-specific migration cost that is distributed over all potential migrants
in the South, c ∼ F (c) and c ∈ [0, 1]. And µ < 1 is an index of physical distance between
the North and the South. Migration costs are included in the model because the migration
models developed in Chiswick (1999) and Borjas (1987) attribute these costs to selection bias.
The specification of migration costs are identical to Konya (2007) but the assimilation cost is
different. I introduce the decision to invest as a part of assimilation costs. That is, potential
migrants are allowed to invest in themselves incurring costs of
Assimilation cost = θτ
= θνι
Where θ < 1 is an index of cultural differences between the North and the South and τ
is an individual-specific distribution of assimilation costs in the South as in Konya (2007).
In this paper τ is replaced with investment into cultural assimilation ι and a unit cost of
investing ν. Assimilation costs are determined by the level of investment that is undertaken. It
encompasses all aspects of potential migrants’ investments into making integration as simple as
possible. This is accomplished through several avenues; through learning the official language,
understanding cultural differences when living in a multicultural society, or building effective
communication skills. Investment is a part of the process of cultural capital accumulation that is
either amassed over time in a passive learning process. Or, formal and informal investments may
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be made towards learning the culture as a decisive step towards integration. This formulation
of assimilation costs better accomodates differences in immigrants’ potential investment into
cultural capital accumulation.
Learning is introduced through the capital accumulation process. Learning is distinguished
at their pre- and post-immigration levels where pre-immigration experience with the local
culture is an individual-specific distribution in the source country, while post-immigration
learning comes as a form of investment into learning the local culture after the migration
decision has been made. Further learning in the host country are individual-specific decisions
that are a function of the investment returns and costs.
Cultural capital has two components, x = φ1ι+ φ2ω where x ∈ [0, 1] is the total number of
native-born that the migrant can communicate with given the level of investment ι and pre-
immigration experience ω. Cultural capital is dichotomous; immigrants can either talk to all
native-born (x = 1) or some (x = ω). Pre-immigration experience ω is accumulated capital or
endowment. Accumulated capital ω is distributed W (ω), ω ∈ [0, 1]. It represents accumulated
learning that includes the potential migrant’s experience with host country culture prior to
migrating. Investment is a dichotomous variable representing further learning, ι ∈ {0, 1}. New
immigrants with large pre-immigration experience (ω is large) face the lowest cost of investment
(ι = 1− ω).
The parameters φ1, φ2 ≥ 0 are constant conversion factors of pre- and post-immigration
experience into the units of x. Alternatively, φ1 and φ2 may be interpreted as the returns to
further learning and pre-immigration experience. For simplicity I suppose that φ1 = φ2 = 1.
Potential migrants that are assimilating can generate a surplus of one when they are
matched with other immigrants or native-born. Potential migrants that are non-assimilating
can generate surplus with other immigrants and the chance of meeting another immigrant
is m/(1 + m). Non-assimilating create no surplus when they are matched with native-born.
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Those potential migrants that stay in the South will generate a surplus of h < 1 (this condition
ensures that migration only moves from South to North; that is, matches are more efficient
in the North than in the South). The potential migrant’s decisions are summarized by the
following set of value functions
Va = 1− θν(1− ω)− µc (3.5)
Vn =
m
1 +m
− µc (3.6)
Vs = h (3.7)
The first value function is the utility from assimilating immigration. The assimilating immi-
grant can trade with anyone and earn a surplus of one, but must incur the cost of migration
and assimilation. The second value function is the utility from non-assimilating immigration.
The non-assimilating immigrant only trades with other immigrants but faces no assimilation
cost. The third value function is the utility from not migrating. All meetings with Southerners
will produce a surplus of h with no migration and assimilation costs incurred.
Based on equations (5) to (7), the threshold levels for migrating (or not) and assimilating
(or not) can be derived in (ω, c) space. Equating (5) and (6), and solving for ω derives the
threshold level for assimilating immigration such that ω ≥ ωa there is assimilating immigration,
and non-assimilating immigration otherwise. Equating (5) and (7), and solving for c determines
the threshold level for migration such that c ≤ ca(ω) there is migration (assimilating or non-
assimilating), and no migration otherwise (the potential migrant remains in the South). The
threshold levels are
ωa = 1− 1
θν(1 +m)
(3.8)
ca(ω) =
1− h− θν(1− ω)
µ
(3.9)
The different regions and threshold levels are depicted in figure 1 below. Note that c′a(ω) > 0,
c′′a(ω) = 0, and when ca(ω) = 0, ω = 1 − (1 − h)/θν ≡ ω. This determines the shape of the
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Figure 3.1: The interior equilibrium
threshold function ca(ω). Moreover, let cn ≡ ca(ωa) so that
cn =
1− h− 1
1+m
µ
(3.10)
This equation characterizes the threshold for non-assimilating immigration. The level of cn
depends explicitly on m; equilibrium is not unique because non-assimilating immigration is
more lucrative as the level of immigration increases.
The cultural capital term x represents formal/informal investments into cultural accumu-
lation through learning in a class, self-study or purposefully engaging with native-born people,
institutions and media. To distinguish the two components of x further, the following example
will be helpful: two potential migrants A and B in a less developed and non-English speaking
country are currently in limbo about migrating or not to a more developed English speaking
country. Moreover, both A and B feel that assimilation is the way to go so they both must
atleast learn the local language. However, relative to the predefined endowment threshold ωa,
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that distinguishes between an assimilating and non-assimilating immigrant, A finds that his
current language speaking characteristic does not meet the requirement for assimilating immi-
gration, his accumulated capital in English (the culmination of his lifetime experiences with
the English language) is small. For A to come on par with the threshold ωa, he must make a
formal/informal investment of at least ι = 1− ω into English speaking skills to be considered
assimilating. The potential migrant B on the other hand does have the necessary English
speaking skills that are already a part of her pre-immigration experience because she went to
an English speaking school and worked for an American company for most of her life in the
home country. She finds her accumulated capital ω to be more than sufficient to be part of the
assimilating group, ω > ωa. B does not require to make any more of an investment because
she is already assimilating based on the distribution of the component ω, thus she sets ι to
zero.
Similar to the experiences of A and B I can identify several cases where the potential
migrant may face a decision on how much to invest, conditional on their endowment ω and
whatever the equilibrium assimilation threshold ωa happens to be. Accumulated capital or
endowment is given before migration and those with a little accumulated capital must make
a decision on whether to assimilate and invest. Four distinct cases are possible and these are
depicted in Figure 3.2 below.
Case 1
Case 3
Case 2
Non-assimilating 
Immigration
Assimilating
Immigration
0
0
0 


Do Not 
Migrate
_ a
_
_
a
a
1
1
1
Figure 3.2: Cases for the assimilation-specific investment
The three cases in the diagram will occur when assimilation is beneficial (Va > Vn). In
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the first case ω ≤ ω < ωa: the investment will be the difference ι = 1 − ω. In the second
case ω < ω: do not migrate. In the third case ω > ωa: the investment will be ι = 0. The
fourth case is trivial: when assimilation is not beneficial (Va < Vn), the investment will be
zero. The investment is dichotomous and takes two values: zero when there is non-assimilating
immigration and max{1− ω, 0} when there is assimilating immigration.
Equilibrium
The first two conditions describe a mixed equilibrium where both types of immigration is
present.
m− a = LF (cn) (3.11)
a = L
∫ 1
ωa
F (ca(ω))dW (ω) (3.12)
When the assimilation threshold is large enough ωa > ω, the equilibrium is said to be interior
with assimilating and non-assimilating types. From ωa > ω I can infer that h < m/(1 + m),
the source country must be sufficiently poor for mixed immigration. The left-hand side of
(3.11) is the actual number of non-assimilating immigrants and the right-hand side is the
expected number of non-assimilating immigrants. Similarly, the left-hand side of (3.12) is
the actual number of assimilating immigrants equated to the expected number of assimilating
immigrants.
In a corner equilibrium all immigration is assimilating. The corner equilibrium occurs when
the assimilation threshold is small enough ωa = ω. That is,
m = L
∫ 1
ω
F (ca(ω))dW (ω) (3.13)
and a = m. Given that ωa = ω, I can infer that the source country must be rich enough for
purely assimilating immigration h = m/(1 +m). Combining equations (3.11) - (3.13), a single
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equation characterizes the three possibilities
m = LF (cn) + L
∫ 1
max{ω,ωa}
F (ca(ω))dW (ω). (3.14)
The first term of equation (3.14) is the number of non-assimilating immigrants, which becomes
zero when the corner occurs (i.e. cn = 0 and F (0) = 0). The second term is the number of
assimilating immigrants due to a large endowment effect, which is always positive but varies
in size depending depending on whether the corner (i.e. ωa = ω) or interior (i.e. ωa > ω) case
occurs. The following table summarizes the outcomes given ωa
Table 1: Interior or corner equilibrium outcomes given ωa.
k ωa h Outcome
≤ 1 = 1− (1− h)/θν Rich Corner
< 1 > 1− (1− h)/θν Poor Interior
It is clear that if the sending country is rich enough then all immigration is assimilating.
When the sending country is poor then immigration is mixed. The following proposition states
this result formally.
Proposition 3. Let (a∗,m∗) be a unique solution to the immigration problem. There exists an
h(θ, µ, ν, L) satisfying
h
1− h = L
∫ 1
ω
F
(
1− h− θν(1− ω)
µ
)
dW (ω) (3.15)
such that if h > h, then a corner equilibrium occurs. And if h < h, then the equilibrium is
interior.
Proof. In the interior/investor equilibrium ωa > ω or analogously cn > 0. Define m by the
equation cn > 0 so that m > h/(1 − h). Since cn is increasing in m, the interior/investor
equilibrium occurs for any m∗ > m, and corner otherwise. Thus, m is the cut-off between the
two equilibrium, and at the cut-off both equilibrium occur. So substituting m into (3.15) gives
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the left-hand side of (3.15). Finally replace everywhere h = h so (3.15) solves for the seperating
level of h.
The left-hand side of (3.15) is increasing and the right-hand side is decreasing in h. Ad-
ditionally, the left-hand side is less than the right-hand side at h = 0, and the left-hand side
is greater than the right-hand side at h = 1. Thus, there is a unique h ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
(3.15). Finally, since dm/dh < 017, if h < h then m∗ > m, and if h > h then m∗ < m.
Rich countries would send only assimilating immigrants and poor countries send some non-
assimilating immigrants aswell. The model results are identical to those produced by Konya
(2007) but re-stated in terms of pre-immigration experience rather than assimilation costs.
The intuition behind proposition 3 is that efficiency of matches in the South has an impact
on the level of immigration. As the South gets poorer there is more migration from the South
because matches in the North become relatively more productive. That is, incurring the migra-
tion (and possibly assimilation) costs, and foregoing the matches that could have been made in
the South (the opportunity cost), the potential migrant finds these costs are small relative to
the gains from matches in the North. This is the productivity effect described in Konya (2007).
Alternatively, non-assimilating immigrants in the North experience a debilitating communica-
tion effect because they cannot interact efficiently with native-born. In Konya (2007), if the
South is sufficiently poor then the productivity effect dominates the communication effect so
the benefit of migrating without assimilating gets larger. In the current setup of the model the
communication effect is fully determined by a selection effect. The likelihood of investing in
further learning given the endowment has the potential to strengthen the communication effect
post-immigration. The selection effect functions through the endowment. A large endowment
implies a larger pre-immigration exposure to the local culture.
To be able to clearly see the relationship between h and m, a convert the variables to
17See comparative statics in the appendix.
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common units α = m/L and β = a/L. Using the fact that
∂β
∂h
= − 1
µ
∫ 1
ωa
F ′(ca(ω)) dW (ω) < 0,
∂2β
∂h2
=
1
µ2
∫ 1
ωa
F ′′(ca(ω)) dW (ω) > 0,
∂α
∂h
=
∂(α− β)
∂h
+
∂β
∂h
= − 1
µ
F ′(cn) +
∂β
∂h
< 0
∂2α
∂h2
=
1
µ2
F ′′(cn) +
∂2β
∂h2
> 0
and (α−β) is simply the vertical distance between α and β. Figure 3.3 depicts the cases when
the source country is poor (h < h1) or rich (h ≥ h1).
0 h
_
1

_

_
Interior Corner
 
_
 
, 
_ 
h

_
- 
_

_ 
= 
_
Figure 3.3: The equilibrium outcomes
Social planner optimum
This section discusses outcomes from the perspective of a hypothetical social planner. The
social planner discussed in this paper is a world planner. A discussion of socially optimal
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outcomes is necessary to be able to judge the welfare properties of the equilibrium outcomes
in the previous section. The world planner is not simply interested in maximizing welfare in
the North, but also the South. The world planner solves the following problem
maximize
α,β
(1− α)hL+ βL+ (α− β) αL
1 + αL
L+
1 + βL
1 + αL
− C(.)L
Subject to α− β ≥ 0
The first term is the benefit to remaining in the South, the second term is the benefit to
assimilating immigration, the third term is the benefit to non-assimilating immigration and the
fourth term is the benefit to native-born. The inequality constraint accounts for the possibility
of the corner outcome in which α = β. The last term in the planner’s problem is the cost
function. The cost function is given by
C(α, β;ω, ν, θ, µ, c) = β(θν(1− ω) + µc) + (α− β)(µc) (3.16)
The first term in the cost function is the cost of assimilating and migrating. The second term
is the cost of non-assimilating immigration. The first-order conditions from the maximization
problem are
φα ≡− hL+ αL
1 + αL
L+ (α− β) L
(1 + αL)2
L− 1 + βL
(1 + αL)2
L− L(µc) + λ = 0 (3.17)
φβ ≡L− αL
1 + αL
L+
L
1 + αL
− L(θν(1− ω) + µc) + L(µc)− λ = 0. (3.18)
The second-order condition in terms of h yields the following results for the planner optimal
α = α˜ and β = β˜
φαh = −L < 0
φβh = 0.
Plotting the relationship between h and α, β shows the threshold level of h = h˜1 between the
interior and corner outcomes. The two cases are depicted in Figure 3.4 below: the interior
case which occurs for h < h˜1, and the corner case which occurs for h ≥ h˜1.
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Figure 3.4: The social planner optimum
Using the first order condition (3.17) and applying the conditions for the corner case α = β
and cn = 0, as well as the interior solution λ = 0 the system becomes
φα ≡− h˜L+ αL
1 + αL
L− L
1 + αL
L = 0 (3.19)
φβ ≡L− αL
1 + αL
L+
L
1 + αL
− L(θν(1− ω) + µc) = 0 (3.20)
Solving (3.19) for αL in terms of h˜ and since αL = m,
m =
1 + h˜
1− h˜
. (3.21)
The h˜ required to solve (3.19) is smaller than the h required to solve for the left-hand side of
(3.15), therefore h˜ < h.
There are three regions to consider. The trivial first case is for very rich sending countries,
h > h, the corner optimum and equilibrium coincide. This is in fact a global optimum (already
proved in footnote (8) of Konya (2007)). Among the poorest sending countries, h < h˜, the
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interior optimum and equilibrium coincide. In this case, it is optimal to have some non-
assimilating immigrants. For intermediate countries, h˜ < h < h, the interior equilibrium
coincides with the corner optimum. There is too much non-assimilating immigrants when
there should be none. Finally, for poor countries, h < h˜, is not optimal in the composition and
size of immigration.
The social planner cut-offs for assimilating immigration, non-assimilating immigration and
migration are obtained by solving the first-order conditions (3.17) and (3.18). These are as
follows:
ω˜a = 1− 2
θν(1 +m)
, (3.22)
c˜a(ω) =
1− h− θν(1− ω)
µ
+
2(m− a)
µ(1 +m)2
, (3.23)
c˜n =
1− h− θν(1− ωa)
µ
+
2(m− a)
µ(1 +m)2
. (3.24)
A relationship between m and a may be constructed that shows how changes in the size
of immigration are associated with changes in the composition of immigration. In a corner
optimum, this relationship is trivially m = a. In the interior, the relationship is given by
m = L
∫ 1
ω˜a
F (c˜a(ω))dW (ω) + a (3.25)
where c˜n, c˜a(ω) and ω˜a denote the social planner cut-offs of (3.22)-(3.24). Since c˜n > cn,
c˜a(ω) > ca(ω), ω˜a < ωa, and ω˜ < ω, it can be shown that the planner’s optimal level of
immigration must be less than or equal to the equilibrium level. The following section depicts
these results graphically.
3.3 Policy
In this section I will discuss the policy options available for immigration authorities in the
North to achieve first-best results in the size and composition of immigration. Assuming that
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Northern interests coincide with the joint maximization of immigrant and native-born interests
(excluding those that remain in the South), it is shown that Northern interests will diverge
from the social planner optimum and a unique (m, a) combination exists where Northern and
social planner interests coincide.
Figure 3.5 describes the choices available to the Northern planner when choosing the size
and composition of immigration with m and a. The equation m = a(2a+ 1)/2(1 +a) identifies
the set of optimal combinations m, a ≥ 0 such that the total positive and negative externalities
associated with the size and composition of immigration cancel each other out. This was
derived as proposition 2 and depicted as the “externalities” line in figure 3.5. The equation
m = a describes the corner optimum case when negative externalities associated with non-
assimilating immigration are set to zero and atleast some of the positive externalities associated
with assimilating immigration are available; the “corner” solution in figure 3.5. The third
optimality proposition is the “interior optimum” given by the function (3.25). And equation
m = LF (cn) + a is the “interior equilibrium” line derived from the single equation equilibrium
(3.14) when the interior occurs and the integral denotes a. Moreover, LF (cn) ≥ 0.
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Figure 3.5: Policy outcomes in Northern interests
The line denoting the interior equilibrium outcome approaches an interior optimum in the
special case when F (cn) = F (c˜n). Or the corner optimum when either cn = 0. However, the
second best outcome (a1,m1) is still available. In this next best case, the total positive and
negative externalities cancel each other out. Total immigration of m1 will be accepted with a1
levels of assimilating and m1 − a1 levels of non-assimilating immigration.18
Point system
Language is a crucial component to admitting potential migrants. In Canada, the point system
for admitting immigration applicants was introduced in 1967. Language accounted for 21% of
total points required to be granted permanant residency status in 1996; education also recieved
the same number of points (Green & Green, 1999). In 2013, language accounted for 28% of total
18Visually, the level of non-assimilating immigration is the vertical distance between m1 and the m = a line.
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points; 3 percentage points higher than education (Tani, 2014). In this section of the paper I
discuss the role of pre-immigration experience in serving as a signal to immigration authorities
of the receiving country in selecting potential migrants. I also discuss the implications of a
stricter selection policy.
The total cost to assimilating immigration θν(1− ω) + µc is decreasing in ω. Since assim-
ilation costs are decreasing in pre-immigration experience, those potential migrants with the
largest ω will be the first to migrate. Since ω is fully observable to the planner. Let ω be
the minimum language skill requirement for admittance to the North so that all potential mi-
grants with ω ≥ ω are admitted, and denied entry otherwise. Moreover, suppose that ω < ωa.
Under this system, the size of immigration will decrease by the number of non-assimilating
immigrants. As follows
m− a = L (W (ωa)−W (ω))F (cn)
a = L
∫ 1
ωa
F (ca(ω))dW (ω).
There is a negative effect on the size of immigration and a positive effect on the composition. In
figure 3.5, a restrictive policy on the selection of immigration will move the interior equilibrium
line rightwards, closer towards the interior optimum policy line.
On the other hand, when ω is set too high so that ω > ωa, then all immigration would be
assimilating:
m = L
∫ 1
ω
F (ca(ω))dW (ω).
This is associated with an extreme rightward shift of the interior equilibrium line in figure 3.5
till it coincides with the corner optimum policy line. However, there is potential loss of surplus
from the minimum skill requirement being set too high. The lost surplus is the assimilating
immigration given by
a0 = L
∫ ω
ωa
F (ca(ω))dW (ω).
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Which directly affects native-born through smaller positive externalities. Since the Northern
planner could achieve the same result with a smaller surplus loss by a more lenient selection
policy, so that no assimilating immigration is given up, the best policy for the Northern planner
is to set ω = ωa.
3.4 Empirical Results
This section will test the implications of the theoretical model. There are five subparts to
this section: a description of the data, a statement of the model’s theoretical predictions, the
empirical model identification strategy, and estimation results.
Data
The data used in this study is from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada (LSIC).
The survey is a three wave study conducted on new immigrants and refugees to Canada, atleast
15 years of age, in the period October 2000 and September 2001 (approximately 65,000 new im-
migrants). The survey excludes applications for immigration or asylum made within Canada.
The cohort of immigrants captured in the survey were subject to the non-discriminatory char-
acter of the 1976 Immigration Act (Bodvarsson & Berg, 2013) and were admitted prior to the
2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The first wave is collected between April 2001
and March 2002, six months after arrival (12,040 immigrants of the 65,000 were recorded).
A second wave of data is collected on this same group of individuals, six months later, be-
tween December 2002 and November 2003 (9,500 immigrants were re-recorded). A final wave
is conducted, one year later, between November 2004 and October 2005 (7,715 immigrants
were re-re-recorded) (Haan, 2012). The attrition rate is 21.1% and 18.8% in waves 2 and 3.
Attrition is especially important in a study such as this because those immigrants that were
lost from the sampling between waves 1-2 and waves 2-3 have important information about
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their level of assimilation or non-assimilation.
The focus of this study is new immigrants with little pre-immigration experience and low
levels of exposure to Canadian culture. The subsample used in this study are immigrants whose
mother tongue is non-English and do not reside in Quebec. This subsample is used throughout
unless mentioned otherwise.
Immigrants may become missing from subsequent waves for various reasons: change in
address and no follow-up contact information was provided, become deceased, or return to the
home country. The reason for becoming missing from subsequent waves is not recorded. This
becomes an issue because immigrants that returned to their home country due to difficulties in
the assimilation process will bias the final results of the model. Only the remaining successful
assimilates will be recorded and immigrant assimilation is overestimated. Characteristics of
the returnees may be nonrandom and the bias will be exacerbated.
The advantages of using LSIC data for this research over the Canadian Census of Population
are: (1) the data is longitudinal so that causal effects of learning on assimilating immigration
are obtainable, (2) all landed immigrants were admitted under the same policy, and (3) there
is a large amount of pre-immigration information.
Model predictions
An empirical test of the implications in the model requires a direct test of equilibrium propo-
sition 3
ρ =

1 if k = 1 or h ≥ h
ρ(m(L, h, µ, θ), h, θ, µ) if k < 1 and h < h
Where ρ = a/m is the likelihood of assimilating immigration. The model makes predictions
on the effect of parameters L, h, µ and θ on the likelihood of assimilating. The predictions are
summarized in table 2 below.
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The threshold effect of changes in the parameters on ρ(.) is the effect on assimilation levels
through changes in equation (3.15). On the other hand, direct effects on ρ(.) are established
through the interior equilibrium conditions (3.11) - (3.12). And indirect effects on ρ(.) are
determined through transmissions from increases in the size of the immigrant group.19
Table 2: The effect of parameters on likelihood of assimilation
Parameter
ρ(m(L, h, µ, θ), h, θ, µ)
Threshold Direct Indirect
L − 0 −
h + ? +
µ + ? +
θ + − ?
Empirical model
The estimation equation is a regression model to determine the effect of exogenous time-varying
individual and contextual characteristics (Xist), exogenous time-invariant source country and
personal characteristics (Xis), investment into language accumulation (ιist), and source country
richness (his). The Xist factors are exogenous controls; they include demographic information
on immigrants that vary overtime, for instance, marital status and months since arrival. ιist
is formal and informal investment into language accumulation; it enters endogenously into the
regression model. The Xis factors include the source country’s linguistic distance, population,
geographic distance, and pre-immigration experience with the local culture; pre-immigration
and contextual factors are exogenous. I also introduce the share of co-ethnics in CMA/CA of
arrival within Xis to control for sorting at the CMA/CA level. The assimilation variable is
proxied by English speaking proficiency ρist, where immigrant i is from source country s and
measured in period t.
19Further information on deriving the direct, indirect and threshold effects are provided in the appendix.
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The regression model treats the three waves of the survey as a panel and provides pooled
probit estimates to identify the exposure channel through source country richness affects as-
similation rates.
ρist = γ0 + γ1his + γ2ιist + γ3Xis + γ4Xist + ηi + ist (3.26)
Where ηi is the random error component of the structural model. I expect ηi to capture factors
that inhibit or ease the selection into formal language programs not currently captured in
(4.30), such as distance to nearest ESL course, time cost, program costs, and ability to learn
new languages. And ηi is correlated with ιist giving rise to the simultaneity. A first differences
estimator consistently estimates γ2 and coefficients on other time-varying covariates.
To test for unobserved effects I estimate a bivariate probit model to identify unobserved
correlation in English speaking proficiency across waves of the survey,
P (ρist = j, ρist+1 = j
′) = Φ(c(j)− α1this − α2tιist − α3tXis + α4tXist, (3.27)
c(j + 1)− α1t+1his − α2t+1ιist+1 − α3t+1Xis + α4t+1Xist+1, r)
where j, j′ = {1, 0} indicate high proficiency (1) and low proficiency (0) in speaking English.
The disturbances are distributed bivariate standard normal Φ with correlation r. The amount
of unobserved correlation across waves is measured by r = cov(ist−1, ist). Previous studies
have estimated an unfavorably large |r|. Given the set of covariates, the estimated |r| in this
paper is relatively small and decreasing over time. This phenomenon is indicative of decreasing
influence of unobservables on English speaking proficiency.
A standard set of controls are used throughout. The controls that enter the model are based
on previous studies that have shown the specific variable to be an important determinant
of English speaking proficiency. The variables used in this study are summarized in table
A1. Given that the language proficiency variable is subjectively determined there is potential
response error arising from lack of a stable benchmark. That is, respondents in the LSIC
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may report decreasing language proficiency across waves. Whether the decreases in language
proficiency are actually due to worsening language skills or due to a lack of a benchmark is
difficult to determine. This is problematic because, in the estimation strategy described above,
I may wrongly categorize a respondent to having worsening language proficiency when the
problem was simply a response error. This error will underestimate assimilation levels. The
extent of the measurement error is described in table 3 below
Table 3: Measurement error in English speaking proficiency across waves.
Wave 1 - 2 Wave 2 - 3
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Worse 14,798 15% 19,286 20%
Better 28,379 29% 21,812 22%
Same 53,870 56% 55,949 58%
Total 97,047 100% 97,047 100%
Note: The summary statistics produced in this table uses the raw categorical five-level English speaking
proficiency variable to be as accurate as possible.
Atmost 15% of new immigrants that provided responses in waves 1 and 2, and 20% in waves
2 and 3, could be attributed to the measurement error. Since this error would underestimate
assimilation levels, the results of this study may be interpreted as a lower bound. For the
remainder of the paper, the five-level categorical English speaking variable will be collapsed
into a dummy variable which would minimize the influence of the measurement error. Those
who speak English “very well, native” or “well” are considered assimilating, others are non-
assimilating. But if the error is non-random then the bias will persist. It is expected that the
measurement error is more likely to occur among refugees, those with low English speaking
proficiency, those who are less educated, and have less experience with the English language.
Table 4 shows there is no systematic response in worsening English speaking proficiency between
refugees and non-refugees, and between those with less than a high school education and those
with atleast a high school education. Moreover, those with pre-immigration experience with
the English language are more likely to respond with worsening English speaking skills than
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those without; either because they are understating their knowledge of the English language or
they discover, after immigration, that the quality of their pre-immigration experience is low.
On the other hand, those with lower English speaking proficiency in wave t are more
likely to report worsening English speaking proficiency in wave t + 1 compared to those with
higher proficiency in wave t. This evidence indicates there will be some bias associated with
measurement error. The measurement error in the dependent variable will bias coefficient
estimates of the time-invariant variables in the model.
Table 4: Worsening of English speaking proficiency across waves t and t + 1 by refugee sta-
tus, English speaking proficiency, education, and formal pre-immigration experience with the
English language.
Refugee Low proficiency Less than high school Pre-immigration experience
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Waves 1 - 2
Worse 14.76 15.28 29.39 9.62 13.86 15.49 17.74 7.92
Better 46.61 28.20 21.80 32.21 35.32 28.16 29.45 28.67
Same 38.63 56.53 48.81 58.17 50.82 56.34 52.81 63.41
Waves 2 - 3
Worse 22.96 19.69 39.09 12.57 20.75 19.72 21.42 15.41
Better 34.33 21.76 15.30 25.20 22.26 22.51 23.67 19.01
Same 42.71 58.55 45.61 62.23 56.99 57.77 54.91 65.58
Note 1: The summary statistics produced in this table uses the raw categorical five-level English speaking
proficiency variable.
Note 2: Low proficiency is measured by speaking English fairly well, poorly and not at all in wave t+ 1.
Note 3: Less than high school is measured by highest level of formal education attained outside Canada in
wave t+ 1.
Results
Equation (4.30) treats the data as a panel. The coefficient γ2 is consistently estimated by a
first differences estimator. Table 5 provides the set of regression results. The first column is a
pooled probit estimator of the structural model (4.30) by excluding pre- and post-immigration
investment. In this regression source country richness is allowed to affect assimilation rates
through any type of learning and exposure to co-ethnics. As expected, the effect is estimated
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to be significant and positive.
The second column includes pre-immigration experience with the local culture. The esti-
mated coefficient of γ1 becomes insignificant. This implies that a large part of the observed
effect of source country richness on assimilating immigration through the exposure channel
is due to pre-immigration learning of the local culture. Pre-immigration formal and informal
learning of English proxies for ω in the theoretical model. This variable is a major advantage
to this study as many other studies do not sufficiently treat the learning that occurs prior to
immigration. New immigrants with larger pre-immigration formal and informal learning of
English have lower learning costs. Pre-immigration learning of English enters significantly and
positive.
Table 5: Probit estimation results of English speaking proficiency: mother tongue is not English
and do not reside in Quebec.
Pooled Pooled Pooled
RGDP per capita (h) 0.156** 0.113 0.119
(0.0555) (0.0584) (0.0614)
Informal pre-immigration experience (ω) 0.347*** 0.360***
(0.0490) (0.0501)
Formal pre-immigration experience (ω) 0.610*** 0.618***
(0.0497) (0.0510)
Informal investment (ι) -0.272***
(0.0434)
Formal investment (ι) -0.241***
(0.0482)
Share of co-ethnic group in Canada (m) 1.709 0.268 0.0104
(1.038) (1.029) (1.037)
Population level (L) -0.0257*** -0.0154* -0.0168**
(0.00600) (0.00601) (0.00612)
Geographic distance (µ) 0.00000163 -0.0000154 -0.0000242*
(0.0000118) (0.0000120) (0.0000123)
Linguistic distance (θ) -0.0526 -0.0249 -0.00734
(0.219) (0.220) (0.222)
Months since arrival -0.0399* -0.0371 -0.0363
(0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0205)
Time-varying controls (Xist) X X X
Time-invariant controls (Xis) X X X
Survey wave controls (t) X X X
N 216,672 216,672 204,122
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Column 3 of table 5 includes further learning of the local culture through formal and infor-
mal means into the model. Formal and informal investment, as expected, enter endogenously
and the coefficient estimates are signed negative when it was expected to be positive. The
inclusion of further learning has no discernible impact on the coefficient of RGDP per capita.
The least squares estimates for the models are provided in table A4 of the appendix. The
first differences estimator in the fourth column. The estimated coefficients for formal and
informal learning are significant. The coefficient estimates are unbiased and standard errors
are clustered. The estimated coefficients are similar to those obtained by Orlov (2017). Orlov
(2017) estimates are larger 0.2910∗∗∗ using an IV-GMM approach20.
Months since immigration becomes insignificant after including pre- and post-immigration
learning into the model. As expected, learning through investment is more relevant than learn-
ing as a time dependent process. However, this result is inconclusive because the survey used
in this study records a single entry cohort (October 2000 - September 2001 landed immigrants)
so there are insignificant differences in immigrants’ time of arrival to account for changes in
language proficiency.
Country of birth variables such as population levels (L) relative to Canada, geographic
distance (µ) of the capital city in country of birth to Ottawa and linguistic distance (θ) of the
official language to English are included in the empirical model. The effect of source country
population levels on English speaking proficiency is significant negative. Densely populated
source countries are less likely to send assimilating immigrants.
Geographic distance is significant and negative which indicates that immigrants from more
distant source countries are less likely to send assimilating immigrants. Linguistic distance has
a negative effect on English speaking proficiency, but insignificant. This is an expected result
20George Orlov (2017) uses the LSIC to estimate the language transfer equation where the dependent variable
is a continuous speaking score calculated by Principal Component Analysis on five questions of English speaking
and comprehension competence. The independent variable of interest is time spent in an English as a Second
Language (ESL) course, which is a continuous measure of formal language training. The instrument used is
distance to the nearest ESL program. The coefficient estimate obtained by Orlov (2017) was 0.2910∗∗∗.
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and coincides with the prediction of the theoretical model.
Potential migrants are selected by the immigration policy of the host country. A group
share variable is calculated from the LSIC: wave 1. Share of co-ethnics admitted into Canada
at the time of arrival proxies for m in the theoretical model and exogenously controls for the
immigration policy. This variable is insignificant.
Refugees in the LSIC represent 15% of the sample. Although this is considerable, exclud-
ing this group from the estimation model makes no difference to the estimated coefficient on
language investment. Also, the survey weighting accounts for the oversampling.
The joint probability model of equation (4.29) allows for the extraction of correlation coef-
ficients across waves. The correlation across waves captures the effect of unobservables in the
model. If the effect of the unobservables is purely random overtime, then there will be zero
correlation between the error terms. A non-zero correlation between the error terms would be
expected if the effect of unobservables are relevant. For instance, if there were heterogeneity in
innate skills for language acquisition then there is strong correlation. If the correlation is lower
for non-adjacent (more distant) waves than for adjacent waves, there is a “regression to the
mean” phenomenon. That is, there is a decreasing effect of unobservables on English speaking
skills. Compared to Chiswick, Lee & Miller (2004) the estimated correlation coefficient is much
smaller but the regression to the mean phenomenon is present. The correlation coefficients are
presented in table 6 below.
Table 6: Estimates of correlation coefficients from bivariate probit models of English speaking
proficiency: mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec.
Wave 1 - 2 Wave 2 - 3 Wave 1 - 3
Correlation coefficient 0.560∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
Standard error (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
N 58,121 47,104 47,346
Note 1: Correlation coefficient estimates are estimated from weighted models
due to Statistics Canada RDC’s disclosure process on summary statistics.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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3.5 Extension: spatial sorting
Immigrants have strong location preferences in the host country. New immigrants tend to lo-
cate where there are existing concentrations of immigrant groups, called ethnic enclaves. The
location of immigrants determines their observed patterns of cultural and economic assimi-
lation (Massey, 1985). Enclaves serve as a means to minimize costs in communication with
co-ethnics and transportation from consumption of ethnic goods. Enclaves provide benefits to
new immigrants through social networks creating greater levels of economic mobility (Edin,
Fredriksson & Aslund, 2003), higher returns to foreign experience and education, and are places
of entrepreneurialism where individuals start ethnic businesses (Portes & Shafer, 2006). Living
in an ethnic enclave is essential to new immigrants beginning the integration process into host
country culture. However, new immigrants living among co-ethnics also have lower levels of
English language skill acquisition (Allen & Turner, 1992) and earnings (Allen & Turner, 1992;
Xie & Gough, 2011). In this paper I study communication frictions between new immigrants
and native-born and the means of cultural capital accumulation among new immigrants that
lead to decreasing frictions overtime. The accumulation of language skills introduced in this
model contributes to the literature of Bailey & Waldinger (1991) and Waldinger (1993), where
enclaves are viewed as a “training system” for new immigrants before entering the mainstream
economy. The model may be extended by including a spatial dimension in which new im-
migrants facing communication frictions will sort themselves into distinct ethnic enclaves to
minimize costs asscociated with these frictions.
The model developed in this paper supposes potential migrants in the South are randomly
matched with other immigrants and native-born in the North. Given the evidence that im-
migrants choose to be around other immigrants, non-assimilating immigrants avoid frictions
associated with being matched with native-born by sorting into communities of co-ethnics.
All non-assimilating immigrants will choose to live in neighbourhoods with large numbers of
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existing immigrants. On the other hand, assimilating immigrants are indifferent between living
among native-born and other immigrants. Given that the only source of friction in this model is
finding a partner to communicate with and all surplus created is through communicating effec-
tively, spatial segregation leads to increasing surplus within immigrant neighbourhoods. That
being said, English speaking profciency within immigrant neighbourhoods would decrease and
further segregate the enclave from the native-born. Moreover, as spatial segregation intensifies
and immigration increases, neighbourhoods converge in productivity because communication
becomes frictionless within neighbourhood.
There are two necessary conditions for such a model to explain actual new immigrant
integration. Firstly, the potential migrant must have access to information on the share of
immigrants living in neighbourhoods around the host country before forming the location
decision. The presence of strong migration networks allows for almost perfect information
exchange between sending and receiving country. Secondly, native-born flight to non-immigrant
neighbourhoods must also be incorporated into the model. Given these elements frictionless
communication is achieved by location decisions. In fact, the economic outcomes would be
similar to investment into cultural capital of the current model.
Since sorting and learning are competing explanations of the same phenomenon it is neces-
sary to disentangle the two effects. To test whether the estimated results are driven by learning
or sorting we follow the method proposed by Lazear (1999) and Ortega & Verdugo (2015). An
interaction term between formal/informal investment and ethnic share in CMA/CA of arrival
(Ris) is introduced into the regression equation of (4.30). The equation to estimate is
ρist = γ0 + γ1his + γ2ιist + γ3Xis + γ4Xist + γ5 (ιist ×Ris) + ηi + ist (3.28)
If the learning effect dominates, then γ5 will be significant and large. However, the results of the
robustness test depend crucially on the unobservables, such as, ability or willingness to learn
the local language, being insignificant and does not confound the sorting effect. High ability
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individuals might choose to locate in areas with fewer co-ethnics because they are confident in
their learning ability. The presence of unobservables would confound the effect of sorting. Un-
observables do have a large impact on language acquisition based on the correlation coefficient
estimate (table 6) of the joint probability model. Although, the influence of unobservables
appears to be decreasing overtime.
The estimated γ5 is significant for all of the interaction terms. The results of these estimates
are provided in table A5 of the appendix. I can conclude that sorting is influencing the
estimated coefficients in the model, and learning is not an isolated decision in driving cultural
assimilation for this cohort of new immigrants in Canada.
3.6 Conclusion
Immigrants face frictions in communication in their life within the host country due to cultural
gaps. Cultural assimilation plays a primary role in determining the success of immigrants by
overcoming those cultural barriers. Immigrants assimilate by a process of learning. Learning
is achieved through engagement with the local culture over long periods of time living in the
host country. However, this paper shows that learning through investments into language
accumulation is an important part of attaining frictionless communication with native-born.
Immigrants learn formally by attending language courses or informally through self-study,
media and interactions with others.
This paper has shown that formal and informal language accumulation is a strong contrib-
utor to cultural accumulation, especially during the early stages of living in the host country.
While learning over time can be an important source of cultural accumulation, it may take
years before any real growth is experienced. Investment allows new immigrants to assimilate
within a short period of time.
New immigrants from poorer source countries have greater incentives to migrate, increasing
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the share of co-ethnics in the host country and subsequently increase exposure to co-ethnics.
This exposure creates a positive externality to new immigrants because they face smaller cul-
tural frictions and do not need to invest in learning the local culture. However, new immigrants
come with pre-immigration experience with the local culture which reduces their learning costs.
Those with very large pre-immigration experience enter the assimilating group, others incur
an investment cost.
The empirical model estimated in this paper identifies the exposure channel through which
source country richness affects assimilation rates by controlling for alternate channels. The
effect of source country richness on the assimilation rate becomes insignificant when I control for
pre-immigration experience with the local culture. This is because pre-immigration experience
with the local culture decreases learning costs.
Using first differences, I provide causal effects of further learning on assimilating immigra-
tion. Formally learning the local culture has a significant positive effect on assimilation rates,
but informal learning has a negative effect.
Finally, it is shown that unobserved characteristics of new immigrants, including exposure
to co-ethnics, adaptability to a new culture or ability in learning new languages is a major de-
terminant of cultural assimilation. But the influence of unobservables are decreasing overtime.
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4 Cultural Assimilation: Learning and Sorting
72
4.1 Introduction
Immigrants exhibit strong location preferences in the host country. New immigrants tend to
locate where there are existing concentrations of immigrant groups, called ethnic enclaves.
The location of immigrants determines their patterns of cultural and economic assimilation
(Massey, 1985). Enclaves serve as a means to minimize costs in communication with co-
ethnics and transportation from consumption of ethnic goods. Enclaves provide benefits to
new immigrants through social networks creating greater levels of economic mobility (Edin,
Fredriksson & Aslund, 2003), higher returns to foreign experience and education, and are places
of entrepreneurialism where individuals start ethnic businesses (Portes & Shafer, 2006). Living
in an ethnic enclave is essential for new immigrants beginning the integration process into
host country culture. However, new immigrants living among co-ethnics also have lower levels
of English language skill acquisition (Allen & Turner, 1992) and earnings (Allen & Turner,
1992; Warman, 2006; Xie & Gough, 2011). Further empirical evidence is provided by Bauer,
Epstein & Gang (2005) to substantiate the claim that migrants choose smaller networks as
English language proficiency improves, and the quality of those networks matter greatly for
the economic and social outcomes of new immigrants. In this paper I study communication
frictions between new immigrants and native-born and how sorting and/or learning among
new immigrants alleviates those frictions. The size of the co-ethnic group combined with the
extent of clustering into co-ethnic communities are determinants of the level of exposure to
co-ethnics that new immigrants will experience in the host country. The assimilating decision
is compromised by choosing to live in a neighbourhood that is predominately co-ethnic but
reduces communication costs for the new immigrant. The theoretical model of Konya (2007)
is extended by including a spatial dimension.
This paper views ethnic enclaves as a “training system” for new immigrants before entering
the mainstream economy. The training system is a composite of labour market information,
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recruitment practices and skill accumulation. The enclave is an institution of formal and
informal traditions differing from the secondary and primary sectors of the economy. New
immigrants will choose to live in enclaves as a means to minimize communication costs while
learning the local culture (Bailey & Waldinger, 1991; and Waldinger, 1993).
The literature studying the relationship between language proficiency and enclaves, given
data limitations, cannot simultaneously include the role of learning. The likelihood of further
learning is complementary or substitutable to sorting into co-ethnic communities. Learning
and sorting are naturally opposing forces when viewed in a static environment. Davila & Mora
(2000) generalize this view where the association between language accumulation and location
choices are either temporary or permanent. It is temporary if immigrant labour is highly
mobile and will move to where returns to current English speaking skills are highest, thus
dissipating the enclave’s association with language skills. On the other hand, it is permanent
if new immigrants are caught in a mobility trap leading to lower levels of English speaking
proficiency, remaining in the enclave, and thus strengthening the implied association. Their
empirical study of Mexican-US border workers, a predominately minority language region,
indicates that the association is temporary, and regional wage gaps encourage migration of
Mexican immigrants away from the enclave. I do not address the issue of permanency because
of the short panel available and also because this is not borne out by the theoretical model.
Instead I am interested in whether exposure in an enclave to co-ethnics has any effect on
language proficiency in the short-run.
Preliminary evidence suggests that exposure to co-ethnics is associated with lower assim-
ilation rates. Using the 2001 Canadian Census of Population and focusing on the subsample
of immigrants with no English speaking background, that is, immigrants from non-English
speaking households whose mother tongue is non-English, 18-64 years old, and do not reside in
Quebec. New immigrants that have lived in Canada for under a year, some are living within en-
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claves consisting of predominately co-ethnics. The preliminary evidence suggests that 81.68%
of those living in an ethnic enclave21 spoke English and 83.37% of those living outside the
enclave did speak English. A difference of -1.69%** (0.0064). Among immigrants that have
lived in Canada for 2 years the difference increases to -2.71%*** (0.0031). Among immigrants
that have lived in Canada for 5 years the difference decreases drastically to -0.84%** (0.0029),
then -0.50%* (0.0028) after living in Canada for 10 years. In the short-run there are growing
differences in the composition of immigration inside ethnic enclaves compared to outside.
The model developed in this paper supposes potential migrants from the sending country
are randomly matched with other immigrants and native-born in the host country. Due to pro-
ductivity differences between the source and host country, immigration from poorer countries
is expected to be larger than from richer ones. Even conditional on individual location pref-
erences, such as relative size of family/friend networks, immigrants from poorer countries are
more likely to encounter co-ethnics than comparable immigrants from richer source countries.
This implies greater exposure to co-ethnics among immigrants from poorer source countries.
Given that the only source of friction in this model is finding a partner to communicate with
and all surplus created is through communicating effectively, the distribution of immigrants
among neighbourhoods in the source country matters greatly to new immigrants beginning
the integration process into host country culture. Non-random location choices among immi-
grant groups imply greater levels of clustering, increased exposure to co-ethnics and decreasing
assimilation rates.
Using data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada: Waves 1-3 where cul-
tural assimilation is measured by proficiency in English, investment into native-born culture
is measured by formal/informal learning of English, and location in an ethnic enclave is deter-
mined jointly by use of an unofficial language at work and clustering of co-ethnics in CMA/CA
21Construction of the ethnic enclave variable is discussed in the appendix.
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of arrival. I provide estimates of sorting on cultural assimilation, and test the implications of
the theoretical model. I find that sorting is an important component of the channel through
which source country richness affects assimilation rates, but conditional on learning and sort-
ing, source country richness still has a significant positive effect on assimilating immigration.
There is an alternate channel unaccounted for by the current model through which sountry
richness affects assimilation rates. I show that this alternate channel functions prior to sorting
and it is probably related to quality of the immigrant group, rather than size of immigration.
In the next section I formulate a simplified model that incorporates location choice among
neighbourhoods in the host country and show that multiple equilibria are possible. In section
3 of the paper I empirically test these findings.
4.2 Model
The mechanism functioning to transmit personal and contextual characteristics into language
proficiency are generalized as exposure, incentives and efficiency (van Tubergen & Kalmijn,
2009). Exposure and incentives function interactively to determine the level of cultural inte-
gration. However, the mechanism relating to exposure is determined by location preferences of
new immigrants upon arrival. Selection into neighbourhood must be introduced into the model
to better identify the true relationship between exposure and language accumulation. Expo-
sure is measured by the size of the immigrant group. An increase in the size of the immigrant
group decreases incentives to learn the local culture. Additionally, exposure is determined by
the size of immigration in the host country. This would have a feedback effect through changes
in the immigration levels as more immigrants choose to migrate; further increasing exposure to
other immigrants and decreasing incentives for new immigrants to invest in learning the local
culture. These exposure effects are stronger within ethnic enclaves, leading to drastic effects on
the composition of immigration within the enclave and outside of it. I will present a theoretical
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model accounting for these features and derive the equilibria that arise from this environment.
Communication frictions between native-born and immigrants are modelled into the host
country environment through a random matching framework. I assume there are only two
countries in the world: North and South where the South is less developed relative to the
North. Thus migration flows from South to North. The North is further segmented into
neighbourhoods, but for simplicity I assume that there are only two neighbourhoods. There
are two sets of agents: native-born and immigrants. The native-born agents are located in the
North and potential migrants are located in the South. The potential migrants in the South
make a decision about whether to stay in the South or migrate to the North. Additionally,
potential migrants must also decide whether to assimilate or not, and simultaneously choose
which neighbourhood in the North to locate.
Whence the migrate problem has been solved the new immigrant must choose a neighbour-
hood to live/work in the North. This decision depends on the relative size of their networks
among the neighbourhoods of the North. Potential migrants choose a strategy that gives the
best outcome based on a set of individual-specific and contextual characteristics.
Individuals in the North are drawn together randomly so that matches are created. Efficient
matching is the primary mode of production. The model introduces communication frictions
that inhibit ease of production by randomly matching agents. A match between persons of
similar culture are able to generate a surplus but matches between persons of different culture
create no surplus. Matches between non-assimilating and native-born create no surplus while
matches between non-assimilating and assimilating immigrants, or assimilating immigrants and
native-born, do generate a surplus. The randomness in meeting people of common cultures are
effectively reduced in the presence of location choice. Potential migrants that fail to assimilate
choose less communication frictions by living in neighbourhoods with a large number of immi-
grants. As new immigrants enter the host country their location decisions are determined by
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the immigrant distribution and in turn influence their learning decision. The location decision
of other new immigrants is influenced by the location and learning decisions of prior immigrant
cohorts. Equilibrium is achieved when no individual has an incentive to relocate from their
current neighbourhood and their learning decisions are optimized.
Thresholds
In this section I will discuss further the potential migrant’s decision problem, how heterogeneity
is introduced into the model, derive the equilibrium thresholds for migrating and assimilating,
and discuss the equilibria that come out of the random matching immigration problem. The
migration cost is
Migration cost = µc
where c is an individual-specific migration cost that is distributed over all potential migrants
in the South, c ∼ F (c) and c ∈ [0, 1]. And µ < 1 is an index of physical distance between
the North and the South. Migration costs do not differ across neigbourhoods in the North.
Potential migrants may face assimilation costs of
Assimilation cost = θνι
where θ < 1 is an index of cultural differences between the North and the South and ι is invest-
ment into cultural assimilation by unit cost of investing ν. Assimilation costs are determined
by the level of investment that is undertaken. Investment is a part of the process of cultural
capital accumulation that is either amassed over time in a passive learning process where im-
migrants learn about the host country’s culture through time spent in the host country. Or,
formal and informal investments may be made towards learning the culture as a decisive step
towards integration.
Learning is introduced through the capital accumulation process. Learning is distinguished
at their pre- and post-immigration levels where pre-immigration experience with the local
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culture is an individual-specific distribution in the source country, while post-immigration
learning comes as a form of investment into learning the local culture after the migration
decision has been made. Further learning in the host country are individual-specific decisions
that are a function of the investment returns and costs.
Cultural capital has two components, x = φ1ι+ φ2ω where x ∈ [0, 1] is the total number of
native-born that the migrant can communicate with given the level of investment ι and pre-
immigration experience ω. Cultural capital is dichotomous; immigrants can either talk to all
native-born (x = 1) or some (x = ω). Pre-immigration experience ω is accumulated capital or
endowment. Accumulated capital ω is distributed W (ω), ω ∈ [0, 1]. It represents accumulated
learning that includes the potential migrant’s experience with host country culture prior to
migrating. Investment is a dichotomous variable representing further learning, ι ∈ {0, 1}. New
immigrants with large pre-immigration experience (ω is large) face the lowest cost of investment
(ι = 1− ω).
Assimilating immigrants can generate surplus with other immigrants or native-born. Non-
assimilating immigrants can generate surplus with other immigrants but the chance of meeting
another immigrant depends on the neighbourhood they will choose to live and the size of their
network. Suppose there are two neighbourhoods i = A,B, the potential migrant’s neighbour-
hood choice is given by a general preference parameter, β ∼ B(β) and β ∈ [0, 1], which is an
individual-specific variable measuring the size of the immigrant’s network in neighbourhood i
relative to neighbourhood j.22 New immigrants with a large network in i = A,B prefer this
neighbourhood over any other j 6= i. The potential migrant’s decisions are summarized by the
22This formulation is similar to cultural segregation in a variant of the model presented in Bonn (2012a).
79
following set of value functions
V ia = β (1− θν(1− ω)− µc) (4.1)
V ja = (1− β) (1− θν(1− ω)− µc) (4.2)
V in = β
(
mi
1 +mi
− µc
)
(4.3)
V jn = (1− β)
(
mj
1 +mj
− µc
)
(4.4)
Vs = h (4.5)
where i, j = A,B and j 6= i, the total number of native-born in neighbourhood i is normalized to
one, and mi is the total number of immigrants in neighbourhood i = A,B. Equations (4.1) and
(4.2) are the utility from assimilating immigration within neighbourhood i, j = A,B and j 6= i.
The assimilating immigrant can trade with anyone within their own neighbourhood and earn a
surplus of one, but must incur the cost of migration and assimilation. Equations (4.3) and (4.4)
are the utility from non-assimilating immigration within neighbourhood i, j = A,B and j 6= i.
The non-assimilating immigrant only trades with other immigrants within the neighbourhood
but face no assimilation cost. New immigrants with the largest ω have the lowest assimilating
cost and the largest incentive to learn the local culture. Assimilating immigrants are not
limited to trading with other immigrants, they can also trade with native-born. However, even
assimilating immigrants are limited to trading within the neighbourhood. Equation (4.5) is the
utility from not migrating. All meetings with Southerners will produce a surplus of h with no
migration and assimilation costs incurred. Among those that stay in the South will generate a
surplus of h < 1 (this condition ensures that migration only moves from South to North; that
is, matches are more efficient in the North than in the South).
Equating (4.1) and (4.3), and solving for ω derives the threshold level for assimilating
in neighbourhood i = A,B, such that ω ≥ ωa there is assimilating immigration, and non-
assimilating immigration otherwise. There are two seperate threshold conditions for each
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i = A,B.
ωia = 1−
1
θν(1 +mi)
, (4.6)
ωja = 1−
1
θν(1 +mj)
, (4.7)
where i, j = A,B and j 6= i. Among those in the assimilating group, the neighbourhood
choice is given by the threshold βa. The location choice for the assimilating group is derived
by equating (4.1) and 4.2), and solving for β, as such
βa = 1/2 (4.8)
Those assimilating immigrants with β ≥ βa there is immigration to neighbourhood i, otherwise
neighbourhood j. Similarly among non-assimilating immigrants, the neighbourhood choice is
derived by equating (4.3) and (4.4), and solving for β (or for c). This is the threshold βn(c)
(or c(βn))
βn(c) =
mj/(1 +mj)− 2µc
mi/(1 +mi) +mj/(1 +mj)− 2µc, (4.9)
or c(βn) =
mj/(1 +mj)− (mi/(1 +mi))(βn/(1− βn))
2µ
(4.10)
Non-assimilating immigrants with β > βn(c) will choose to live in neighbourhood i, others will
choose neighbourhood j. In addition to threshold conditions (4.6) - (4.9) which describe the
individual’s assimilation and location incentives, the following four conditions determine the
individual’s migration choices which must also be satisfied. Equating (4.5) to either (4.1) or
(4.2) provides the threshold for assimilating immigration to neighbourhood i or j, respectively.
Similarly, equating (4.5) to either (4.3) or (4.4) is the threshold for non-assimilating immigration
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to neighbourhood i or j, respectively. The set of immigration thresholds are
cia(ω, β) =
1− θν(1− ω)− h/β
µ
(4.11)
cja(ω, β) =
1− θν(1− ω)− h/(1− β)
µ
(4.12)
cin(β) =
mi/(1 +mi)− h/β
µ
(4.13)
cjn(β) =
mj/(1 +mj)− h/(1− β)
µ
(4.14)
Only those Southerners with small migration costs will migrate. Non-assimilating immigration
to neighbourhood i = A,B must satisfy c ≤ cin(β), ω < ωia and β > βn(c). Non-assimilating
immigration to neighbourhood j must satisfy c ≤ cjn(β), ω < ωja and β < βn(c). These condi-
tions for the non-assimilating group may be plotted in (c, β) space (see figure 4.1). Similarly,
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Figure 4.1: Non-assimilating immigration; mj ≥ mi
assimilating immigration to neighbourhood i = A,B must satisfy c ≤ cia(ω, β), ω > ωia, and
β > βa = 1/2. Assimilating immigration to neighbourhood j must satisfy c ≤ cja(ω, β), ω > ωja,
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and β < βa = 1/2. Figure 4.2 shows these conditions for the assimilating group in (c, β) space
assuming ω > ωin.
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Figure 4.2: Assimilating immigration; mj ≥ mi and ω > ωin
It is more useful to view the decision space for both groups in a single diagram. However,
this requires one of the two variables, ω or β, to be held constant while the other is graphed
as a function of c. I have chosen to hold β constant and depict the various regions in (c, ω)
space. Note that the assimilating immigration thresholds cia(ω, β) and c
j
a(ω, β) are a function
of β and ω. For given values of β, the two functions are related as follows
cia(ω, β)

> cja(ω, β) if β > 1/2
= cja(ω, β) if β = 1/2
< cja(ω, β) if β < 1/2
Figure 4.3 depicts the non-assimilating and assimilating immigration groups for different levels
of ω and c in the case when β > 1/2. A similar graph exists for β < 1/2 which would depict
assimilating immigration to neighbourhood j. Non-assimilating immigration to neighbourhood
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Figure 4.3: Mixed equilibrium; β > 1/2, mj ≥ mi and h < mimj/(mi +mj + 2mimj)
j must satisfy the condition that c ≤ cjn(β), ω < ωja and β < βn(c). The first two conditions
are identifiable in figure 4.3, but the last condition is not a function of ω. To be able to plot
this condition in (c, ω) space insert βn(c) into c
j
a(ω, β) and solve for c. The result is
cja(ω, βn(c)) ≡ cjn(ω) =
mi/(1 +mi)(1− θν(1− ω))− h(mi/(1 +mi) +mj/(1 +mj))
µ(mi/(1 +mi)− 2h) (4.15)
Similarly, non-assimilating immigration to neighbourhood i must satisfy the condition that
c ≤ cin(β), ω < ωia and β > βn(c). Substitute βn(c) into cia(ω, β) and implicitly define cin(ω) as
cin(ω) +
h
µ
(
mi/(1 +mi)
mj/(1 +mj)− 2µcin(ω)
)
=
1− θν(1− ω)− h
µ
(4.16)
Equations (4.15) and (4.16) are depicted in figure 4.3. This information is sufficient to identify
the non-assimilating immigrant groups in both neighbourhoods.
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Equilibria
Two equilibrium states are possible: a sorting and mixed equilibrium. One of the two states
will emerge given levels of h. Each equilibrium has certain qualitative features. For simplicity
of exposition let the the level of ω at which cin(ω) = 0 and c
j
n(ω) = 0 be defined respectively as
ωi ≡ 1− 1− h(1 +m
i(1 +mj)/mj(1 +mi))
θν
ωj ≡ 1− 1− h(1 +m
j(1 +mi)/mi(1 +mj))
θν
In a mixed equilibrium, immigration is mixed within neighbourhoods. That is, there is positive
levels of immigration in both neighbourhoods and there is assimilating and non-assimilating
immigration present. The mixed equilibrium outcome in neighbourhood i = A,B is given by
ai = L
∫ 1
ωia
∫ 1
1/2
F (cia(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω) (4.17)
mi − ai = LW (ωia)
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0, F (cin(β))− F (c(βn))}dB(β) (4.18)
and ωia > ω
i.
The left-hand side of (4.17) - (4.18) is the actual number of assimilating immigrants (ai) and
non-assimilating immigrants (mi − ai), respectively. These are equated to their respective
expected values. Similarly, the outcomes in a mixed equilibrium for neighbourhood j = A,B
where j 6= i is given by
aj = L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω) + l
j (4.19)
mj − aj = L (W (ωja)−W (ωj)) ∫ m
j(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) (4.20)
and ωja > ω
j.
The left-hand side of (4.19) - (4.20) is the actual number of assimilating immigrants (aj) and
non-assimilating immigrants (mj−aj), respectively. These are equated to their expected values.
Total immigration is m = mi +mj and total assimilating immigration is a = ai + aj.
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Table 1: Mixed or sorting equilibrium outcomes given h.
k ωia ω
j
a h Outcome
< 1 ≥ ωi = ωj Rich Sorting
≤ 1 ≥ ωi > ωj Poor Mixed
In a sorting equilibrium there is mixed immigration in one neighbourhood and only assim-
ilating immigration in the other. The sorting equilibrium is given by equations (4.17) - (4.20)
and
k(1− ω) < 1, ωia ≥ ωi and ωja = ωj
for all i, j = A,B and j 6= i. Immigration to neighbourhood i is mixed but only assimilating
in neighbourhood j. Table 1 further summarizes the outcomes given h.
Although the equilibria are not unique, they are stable under very reasonable conditions.
Stability in the two neighbourhood case must satisfy the following condition
‖J(mi,mj)‖ < 1 (4.21)
onD = {(mi,mj) |mi,mj > 0} where J(mi,mj) is the Jacobian matrix of first-order derivatives
of the equation system describing the mixed equilibrium outcomes in neighbourhoods i and j.
mi = L
∫ 1
ωia
∫ 1
1/2
F (cia(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω) (4.22)
+W (ωia)
2
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0, F (cin(β))− F (c(βn))}dB(β) ≡ Γi(mi,mj)
mj = L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω) (4.23)
+ L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)2 ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) ≡ Γj(mi,mj)
ωia ≥ ωi and ωja > ωj.
The first-order derivatives are provided in the comparative statics section of the appendix.
Stability of the mixed equilibrium system requires that the eigenvalues of J(mi,mj) are signed
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as follows
∂Γi
∂mi
< 0 and
∂Γj
∂mj
< 0. (4.24)
The stability conditions also imply that ∂Γj/∂mi > 0. The stability of a sorting equilibrium
must also satisfy condition (4.24), although ∂Γj/∂mj < 0 and ∂Γj/∂mi > 0 hold without
assumption. The first-order derivatives in the sorting case are also provided in the comparative
statics section of the appendix.
Finally, the emergence of either equilibrium type is dependent on the level of h as proposed
in column 4 of table 1. Proposition 4 below proves the existence of a level of h that switches
the equilibrium outcome from a mixed to a sorting.
Proposition 4. If mj ≥ mi, where i, j = A,B and j 6= i, and k(1 − ω) < 1. There exists an
h, such that, for h < h the equilibrium is sorting, and mixed for h > h.
Proof. Let mj be the solution to ωja > ω
j in a mixed equilibrium outcome. Similarly, the
sorting outcome is given by substituting ωja = ω
j into the right-hand side of equation (4.23).
Equating the former mj with the latter gives the following implicit function defining h by
h
1− 2h− h/mi(L, h, µ, θ) = L
∫ 1
ωj
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω). (4.25)
Note that both sides of the equation include mi(L, h, µ, θ), as defined by equation 4.22, which is
also a function of h. Let φ(mi(L, h, µ, θ),mj(L, h, µ, θ), L, h, µ, θ) = 0 be the difference between
the left-hand and right-hand side of equation (4.25). The comparative statics in the appendix
show that ∂mi/∂h < 0, as such, the left-hand side of equation (4.25) is monotonically increasing
in h ∈ [0, 1), but is discontinuous at h = 1, at which point it becomes zero. The right-hand
side is continuous and monotonically decreasing in h ∈ [0, 1], and zero at h = 1. At h = 0
the right-hand side is larger than the left-hand side. And, at h = 1 the left-hand side and
right-hand side are both zero and equal. Figure 4.4 shows clearly the existence of h. The left-
hand hand side of equation (4.25) is clearly shown by the upward sloping linear function with
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Figure 4.4: Existence of h; mj ≥ mi
a discontinuity at h = 1. Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (4.25) and mi(L, h, µ, θ)
is also depicted as the downward sloping functions, where mj ≥ mi. The three equations
depicted in figure 4.4 are not linear in h, instead they are concave/convex at different levels
of h ∈ (0, 1); linearity is imposed for the sake of simplicity in exposition. Since the functions
are monotonically increasing/decreasing in h ∈ (0, 1), linearity suffices to depict the existence
of h. The threshold level of h at which point the equilibrium changes from the mixed to the
sorting case is indicated by
h =
mimj
mi +mj + 2mimj
. (4.26)
Consistent with the graphical depiction is the result that a higher h is associated with a
lower level of immigration in both neighbourhoods. Moreover, changes in the parameter set
{L, h, µ, θ} will have implications for the level of h and, in turn, on the equilibrium outcome.
Under proposition 4 a richer source country does not necessarily imply that all immigration
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will be assimilating, as was the case in Konya (2007). Instead I find that one of the two
neighbourhoods in the North continues to receive the non-assimilating type even if the source
country is rich.
The intuition behind this result is best understood as a productivity, network and commu-
nication effect, where the communication effect is composed of a selection effect. Efficiency of
matches in the South has an impact on the level of immigration. As the South gets poorer there
is more migration from the South because matches in the North become relatively more pro-
ductive. Incurring the migration costs and foregoing the matches that could have been made in
the South (the opportunity cost), the potential migrant finds these costs are small relative to
the gains from matches in the North. This represents a productivity effect increasing the total
number of immigrants from poorer source countries. Non-assimilating immigrants experience
a debilitating communication effect if their pre-immigration experience with the local culture
is not large. Some of them will have large enough pre-immigration experience with the local
culture to enter the assimilating group; a selection effect. The selection effect determines the
composition of immigration within neighbourhoods. Only if the communication effect is larger
than the productivity effect will all immigration become assimilating.
Given the productivity and communication effects, networks function to induce new im-
migrants to choose neighbourhoods where they have more family/friends. If the productivity
effect is large enough then total immigration is increasing. But based on relative size of pre-
existing networks new immigrants will have a general preference for some neighbourhoods over
others.
4.3 Empirical Results
This section will test the implications of the theoretical model. There are four subparts to
this section: a description of the data, a statement of the model’s theoretical predictions, the
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empirical model identification strategy, estimation results, and further insights.
Data
The data used in this study is from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada (LSIC).
The survey is a three wave study conducted on new immigrants and refugees to Canada, atleast
15 years of age, in the period October 2000 and September 2001 (approximately 65,000 new im-
migrants). The survey excludes applications for immigration or asylum made within Canada.
The cohort of immigrants captured in the survey were subject to the non-discriminatory char-
acter of the 1976 Immigration Act (Bodvarsson & Berg, 2013) and were admitted prior to the
2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The first wave is collected between April 2001
and March 2002, six months after arrival (12,040 immigrants of the 65,000 were recorded).
A second wave of data is collected on this same group of individuals, six months later, be-
tween December 2002 and November 2003 (9,500 immigrants were re-recorded). A final wave
is conducted, one year later, between November 2004 and October 2005 (7,715 immigrants
were re-re-recorded) (Haan, 2012). The attrition rate is 21.1% and 18.8% in waves 2 and 3.
Attrition is especially important in a study such as this because those immigrants that were
lost from the sampling between waves 1-2 and waves 2-3 have important information about
their level of assimilation or non-assimilation.
The focus of this study is new immigrants with little pre-immigration experience and low
levels of exposure to Canadian culture. The subsample used in this study are immigrants whose
mother tongue is non-English and do not reside in Quebec. This subsample is used throughout
unless mentioned otherwise.
Immigrants may become missing from subsequent waves for various reasons: change in
address and no follow-up contact information was provided, become deceased, or return to the
home country. The reason for becoming missing from subsequent waves is not recorded. This
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becomes an issue because immigrants that returned to their home country due to difficulties in
the assimilation process will bias the final results of the model. Only the remaining successful
assimilates will be recorded and immigrant assimilation is overestimated. Characteristics of
the returnees may be nonrandom and the bias will be exacerbated.
The advantage of using the LSIC over cross-sections in Konya (2007) and Lazear (1999) is
that all the respondents were admitted under the same immigration policy and empirical issues
associated with differences in the quality of the immigration cohort do not enter.
Model predictions
An empirical test of the relationships implied by the model requires the following definition for
assimilating immigration ρj = aj/mj in neighbourhood j = A,B. The measure of assimilating
immigration ρ measures within neighbourhood composition of immigration in the North. Since
the jth neighbourhood receives no non-assimilating immigration in the sorting equilibrium
under the assumption of mj ≥ mi, the predicted outcomes of the model are summarized
simply by
ρj =

1 if h ≥ h or k = 1
ρj(mj(h, θ, µ, L),mi(h, θ, µ, L), h, θ, µ) if h < h and k ≤ 1
(4.27)
where h is defined by φ(mi(h, θ, µ, L),mj(h, θ, µ, L), h, θ, µ, L) from equation (4.25), i, j = A,B
and i 6= j. The parameters (L, h, µ, θ) impact the type of equilibrium through a threshold, di-
rect or indirect effect. The threshold effect determines the type of equilbrium in neighbourhood
j through changes in φ(.). Changes in the parameters have a direct impact on the composition
of immigration within the mixed equilibrium through changes in ρj(.). The indirect effects
of the model are associated with changes in the composition through the size of immigra-
tion. Since there are two neighbourhoods to consider, the parameters effect the composition of
immigration through mi(.) and mj(.). Table 2 summarizes the various effects.
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Table 2: The effect of parameters on likelihood of assimilation ρj
Parameter
ρj(mj(h, θ, µ, L),mi(h, θ, µ, L), h, θ, µ)
Threshold Direct Indirect
mj(h, θ, µ, L)
Indirect
mi(h, θ, µ, L)
L − 0 ? ?
h + ? ? ?
µ + − ? ?
θ ? ? ? ?
The full effect of the parameters on the composition of immigration are ambiguous, the
empirics cannot be used as a test of the model. On the other hand, although most immigrant
receiving countries will restrict immigration through a quota or points system, the total size of
immigration is typically exogeneously fixed at m = mi + mj. However, the model predictions
function through the relative size of immigration across neighbourhoods, which is determined
by individual preferences, some source country characteristics, and not the immigration author-
ities. Let ζ ≡ mi/(mi +mj) measure the distribution of immigrants across neighbourhoods in
the North. The effects of the parameters on the distribution of immigration are also estimated
and discussed in the further insights section.23
Empirical model
Exposure to co-ethnics is the effective channel through which source country richness impacts
assimilating immigration in the model. Since sorting amplifies the effects of exposure I expect
source country richness’ effect on assimilating immigration to function through the sorting
variable.
Identifying the exposure channel through which source country richness affects assimilating
immigration requires a regression framework that controls for alternate channels, such as,
23See the appendix for further discussion on the direct, indirect and threshold effects.
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selection from within the source country, exposure within the household and immigration
policy in the host country. Similarly, confounding factors, such as, pre-immigration experience
with the local culture, individual learning costs and other unobservable characteristics of the
immigrant will probably affect the sorting and learning decisions simultaneously. Each of these
are discussed and treated appropriately in the following sections.
Sorting increases exposure to co-ethnics, through which, source country richness affects
assimilation rates. A proxy for the sorting variable is included in the model which overadjusts
for the exposure channel. The proxy variable for sorting is expected to interact with source
country richness. This addition to the model may be used to determine if sorting is indeed
a relevant component of the path through which source country richness affects assimilation
rates.
The estimation equation is a regression model to determine the effect of exogenous time-
varying characteristics (Xist), exogenous time-invariant variables (Xis), investment into lan-
guage accumulation (ιist), living/working in an ethnic enclave in CMA/CA of arrival (ζis), and
source country richness (his) on the immigrant’s decision to assimilate overtime. The Xist and
Xis factors are treated as exogenous; they include demographic and economic information on
immigrants as well as pre-immigration experience with the local culture and friend/family net-
works. The time-invariant variable Xis includes contextual variables, such as, source country’s
linguistic distance, population, geographic distance, and a measure of the share of co-ethnics
in Canada at the time of arrival mis. The variable ιist includes formal and informal investment
into language accumulation. Living/working in an ethnic enclave ζis is measured by choosing
to initially live in a CMA/CA where co-ethnics are clustered and working in an organization
that is predominately co-ethnic; this variable is endogenous. The assimilation variable ρist is
proxied by language proficiency, where immigrant i is from source country s and measured in
period t.
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The three waves of the survey are treated as a panel. The benchmark regression model to
estimate is simply the effect of source country richness (his) on assimilating immigration (ρist).
ρist = γ0 + γ1his + γ3ιist + γ4Xis + γ5Xist + ηi + ist. (4.28)
Equation (4.28) is the equation of interest. The estimated effect of his on ρist through the
hypothesized exposure channel is γ̂1. Moreover, exposure to co-ethnics occurs within or across
neighbourhoods, and allows for non-random location choices. The time-varying and -invariant
variables in the model control for alternate channels and confounding relationships. If the
observed relationship between source country richness and assimilating immigration is through
the exposure channel then the distribution measure is overadjusting the exposure effect by
including it in the model. The following regression model includes the measure for distribution
of immigrants across neighbourhoods (ζis),
ρist = γ0 + γ1his + γ2ζis + γ3ιist + γ4Xis + γ5Xist + ηi + ist. (4.29)
The coefficient estimate of language investment is biased because of simultaneity; non-assimilating
immigrants are more likely to invest into learning the local culture. There is correlation between
ιist and the individual-level error component ηi, implying that the coefficient on language in-
vestment will not be signed precisely without a fixed effects estimator. That being said, causal
effects of investment are not the purpose of this paper.
I expect ηi to capture factors that inhibit or ease the selection into formal language programs
not currently captured in (4.28), such as distance to nearest ESL course, time cost, program
costs, and ability to learn new languages. Finally, the time-invariant variable ζis is endogenous
because new immigrants with low English speaking skills will choose smaller communication
frictions by locating in ethnic enclaves where access to immigration services are concentrated
and learning the local culture can happen in a costless environment.
Immigrants that live and work in an ethnic enclave are identified using data from the
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada: wave 1 and the 2001 Canadian Census of
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Population. The LSIC was used to provide information on whether the immigrant worked in
an organization that predominately spoke a language other than English or French, in wave 1.
The Census was used to identify whether a given ethnic group is over-represented in a census
tract (CT) relative to the CMA/CA in which it is located. If more than 50% of CTs are over-
representative of the ethnic group then the CMA/CA is considered to be clustering co-ethnics.
Immigrants in the LSIC are identified as living/working in an ethnic enclave if they work in
an organization predominately speaking a langauge other than English or French in wave 1,
and if they belong to an ethnic group that lived in a CMA/CA of first arrival that clustered
co-ethnics as determined by the Census.
A standard set of controls are used throughout. The controls that enter the model are based
on previous studies that have shown the specific variable to be an important determinant of
English speaking proficiency. The variables used in this study are described in table A1 of
the appendix. Given that the language proficiency variable is subjectively determined there is
potential response error arising from lack of a stable benchmark. That is, respondents in the
LSIC may report decreasing language proficiency across waves. Whether the decreases in lan-
guage proficiency are actually due to worsening language skills or due to a lack of a benchmark
is difficult to determine. This is problematic because, in the estimation strategy described
above, I may wrongly categorize a respondent to having worsening language proficiency when
the problem was simply a response error. This error will underestimate assimilation levels.
The extent of the measurement error is described in table 3 below
Atmost 15% of new immigrants that provided responses in waves 1 and 2, and 20% in waves
2 and 3, could be attributed to the measurement error. Since this error would underestimate
assimilation levels, the results of this study may be interpreted as a lower bound. For the
remainder of the paper, the five-level categorical English speaking variable will be collapsed
into a dummy variable which would minimize the influence of the measurement error. But if
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Table 3: Measurement error in English speaking proficiency across waves.
Wave 1 - 2 Wave 2 - 3
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Worse 14,798 15% 19,286 20%
Better 28,379 29% 21,812 22%
Same 53,870 56% 55,949 58%
Total 97,047 100% 97,047 100%
Note: The summary statistics produced in this table uses the raw categorical five-level English speaking
proficiency variable to be as accurate as possible.
the error is non-random then the bias will persist. It is expected that the measurement error
is more likely to occur among refugees, those with low English speaking proficiency, those who
are less educated, and have less experience with the English language. Table 4 shows there is
no systematic response in worsening English speaking proficiency between refugees and non-
refugees, and between those with less than a high school education and those with atleast
a high school education. Moreover, those with pre-immigration experience with the English
language are more likely to respond with worsening English speaking skills than those without;
either because they are understating their knowledge of the English language or they discover,
after immigration, that the quality of their pre-immigration experience is low.
On the other hand, those with lower English speaking proficiency in wave t are more
likely to report worsening English speaking proficiency in wave t + 1 compared to those with
higher proficiency in wave t. This evidence indicates there will be some bias associated with
measurement error. The measurement error in the dependent variable will bias coefficient
estimates of the time-invariant variables in the model.
Results
Firstly, I estimate the benchmark model of equation (4.28). The probit estimates are presented
below in the first column of table 5. The effect of source country richness on assimilating
immigration is measured by the coefficient on RGDP per capita. Source country richness has
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Table 4: Worsening of English speaking proficiency across waves t and t + 1 by refugee sta-
tus, English speaking proficiency, education, and formal pre-immigration experience with the
English language.
Refugee Low proficiency Less than high school Pre-immigration experience
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Waves 1 - 2
Worse 14.76 15.28 29.39 9.62 13.86 15.49 17.74 7.92
Better 46.61 28.20 21.80 32.21 35.32 28.16 29.45 28.67
Same 38.63 56.53 48.81 58.17 50.82 56.34 52.81 63.41
Waves 2 - 3
Worse 22.96 19.69 39.09 12.57 20.75 19.72 21.42 15.41
Better 34.33 21.76 15.30 25.20 22.26 22.51 23.67 19.01
Same 42.71 58.55 45.61 62.23 56.99 57.77 54.91 65.58
Note 1: The summary statistics produced in this table uses the raw categorical five-level English speaking
proficiency variable.
Note 2: Low proficiency is measured by speaking English fairly well, poorly and not at all in wave t+ 1.
Note 3: Less than high school is measured by highest level of formal education attained outside Canada in
wave t+ 1.
a positive effect on assimilating immigration. But this effect is insignificant because learning
is included in the right-hand side.
The second column includes the network variable (β) into the model. This variable con-
trols for individual preference in neighbourhood choice. Networks are proxied by whether the
immigrant had family/friends in their current area (or nearby area) of residence and chose the
area because family/friends live there. The effect of this variable on assimilating immigration
is negative but insignificant. The source country richness coefficient also remains insignificant.
The third column includes the ethnic enclave variable, which has the effect of changing
the coefficient estimate of RGDP per capita and also making it significant. Ethnic enclave,
or non-random distribution of immigrants among neighbourhoods, is interacting with RGDP
per capita. Either, source country richness affects assimilation through sorting and exposure
to co-ethnics, or there is an alternate channel through which source country richness affects
assimilation rates.
The ethnic enclave variable ζ is endogenous because immigrants with low English speaking
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skills are more likely to choose to live and work within the enclave. Additionally, the ethnic
enclave variable is interacting with source country richness. I instrument the ethnic enclave
variable with housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival from the 2001 Canadian Census of Pop-
ulation. Housing costs are significantly and positively correlated with living and working in
an ethnic enclave because new immigrants will choose to live in the low cost ethnic enclave if
the CMA/CA has high average cost of housing. Table 6 provides a sorting regression where
the coefficient estimate of housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival is significant and positive.
Also, housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival has no observed association with assimilation rates.
The fourth column instruments the ethnic enclave variable with housing costs in CMA/CA
of arrival. The estimated effect of living and working in an ethnic enclave becomes larger.
The coefficient effect of source country richness is still significant, implying the presence of an
alternate channel. The further insights section discusses a possible alternate pathway.
Investment ι is measured by further learning of English in Canada. Further learning is
differentiated by formal and informal means. Formal and informal investment have a significant
effect on assimilating immigration. The sign of formal and informal learning is negative because
of simultaneity.
A dummy variable for pre-immigration formal and informal learning of English proxies for ω
in the theoretical model. Pre-immigration learning of English enters significantly and positive.
This is expected since individuals with higher levels of pre-immigration experience with the
local culture are more likely to enter the assimilating group if their experience is large, or have
a low investment cost to learning the local culture.
The restrictions implied by the immigration policy in place at the time of arrival are proxied
by ethnic share in Canada at the start of the survey (m). The coefficient estimate of this variable
on assimilating immigration is positive but insignificant.
Finally, population levels (L) relative to Canada, linguistic distance (θ) and geographic
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distance (µ) of the capital city in country of birth to Ottawa are estimated. The effect of
source country population on English speaking proficiency is negative. Geographic distance
and cultural differences have no significant effect on assimilating immigration.
In table A3 of the appendix I estimate the benchmark model of equation 4.28 by OLS.
The last column of table A3 subsets the data to those source countries that scored “low” or
“very low” on the English proficiency index (EF EPI, 2017)24. There is much less variation in
RGDP per capita and the countries were predominately low income. As expected the coefficient
estimate on RGDP per capita is insignificant but still positive.
Refugees in the LSIC represent 15% of the sample. Although this is considerable, excluding
this group from the estimation model makes no difference to the estimated coefficients on
language investment and living/working in an ethnic enclave. Also, the survey weighting
accounts for the oversampling.
Further insights
Source country richness impacts assimilating immigration through exposure, of which, in the
model developed in this paper, is determined by sorting into co-ethnic neighbourhoods. The
distribution of co-ethnics, or sorting, measure is defined as ζ ≡ mj/(mi + mj). The effect of
source country richness on the distribution of co-ethnics is given by the estimating equation
ζis = α0 + α1his + α2Xis + α3Xist + α4Iis + ist, (4.30)
where Iis is housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival. The regression model (4.30) is estimated
by probit, the results of the estimates are provided in table 6 below. This result supports
the hypothesis of the enclave as a “training system” for new immigrants (Bailey & Waldinger,
1991; and Waldinger, 1993). Those without pre-immigration experience with the local culture
24Many African and Eastern European countries were not surveyed for the index. These were also omitted
in the sub-sample.
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Table 5: Probit estimation results of English speaking proficiency: households whose mother
tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec.
Dependent variable: English speaking
proficiency
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled IV
RGDP per capita (h) 0.119 0.116 0.129∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0630) (0.0569)
Network (β) -0.0827 -0.0716 0.0363
(0.0572) (0.0573) (0.0574)
Ethnic enclave (ζ) -0.368∗∗∗ -2.588∗∗∗
(0.0602) (0.384)
Informal investment (ι) -0.272∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.144∗
(0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0431) (0.0641)
Formal investment (ι) -0.241∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0483) (0.0542)
Formal pre-immigration experience (ω) 0.618∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗
(0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0512) (0.119)
Informal pre-immigration experience (ω) 0.360∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.174∗
(0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0837)
Share of co-ethnic group in Canada (m) 0.0104 0.0522 0.553 3.200∗∗
(1.037) (1.036) (1.042) (1.074)
Population level (L) -0.0168∗∗ -0.0169∗∗ -0.0183∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗
(0.00612) (0.00611) (0.00620) (0.00586)
Geographic distance (µ) -0.0000242∗ -0.0000237 -0.0000231 -0.00000563
(0.0000123) (0.0000123) (0.0000123) (0.0000116)
Linguistic distance (θ) -0.00734 -0.0102 0.00866 0.0378
(0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.176)
Months since arrival -0.0363 -0.0366 -0.0373 -0.0290
(0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0180)
Time-varying controls (Xist) X X X X
Time-invariant controls (Xis) X X X X
Survey wave controls (t) X X X X
N 204,122 204,122 203,858 203,858
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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are more likely to live and work in the ethnic enclave, although the effects reported are not
significant. The ethnic enclave provides new immigrants with an environment that minimizes
communication frictions with native-born until the local culture is learned.
Table 6: Probit estimation results of living/working in an ethnic enclave: households whose
mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec.
Dependent variable: Living/working in an ethnic enclave Pooled
RGDP per capita (h) 0.211**
(0.0771)
Housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival (I) 0.104***
(0.0309)
Informal pre-immigration experience (ω) -0.0920
(0.0736)
Formal pre-immigration experience (ω) -0.0892
(0.0782)
Share of co-ethnic group in Canada (m) 6.923***
(1.648)
Network (β) 0.162
(0.0961)
Population level (L) -0.0268**
(0.00885)
Geographic distance (µ) 0.0000296
(0.0000207)
Linguistic distance (θ) 0.0862
(0.356)
Months since arrival -0.0150
(0.0236)
Time-varying controls (Xist) X
Time-invariant controls (Xis) X
Survey wave controls (t) X
N 216,414
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Consistent with the results presented in the previous section is a network interpretation
of the model. The positive effect of source country richness on assimilating immigration can
be explained by greater exposure to co-ethnics. But greater exposure to co-ethnics cannot be
solely attributed to size of immigration and clustering of immigrants. There are other factors
that determine clustering of co-ethnics; for instance, the qualitative features of the immigrant
network must also matter.
Relative RGDP per capita may be interpreted as the immigrant group’s average quality.
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New immigrants that belong to a higher quality group are incentivised to locate among co-
ethnics because the group, as a whole, assimilates more easily to the local culture. In this sense,
quality of the network, rather than size, also plays a role. This is clear from table 6. Source
country richness has a significant positive impact on clustering into co-ethnic communities,
conditional on size of immigration. Similarly, connectedness of the co-ethnic community in
addition to group quality and size might also be relevant.
4.4 Conclusion
Immigrants face frictions in communication in their life within the host country due to cultural
gaps. Cultural assimilation plays a primary role in determining the success of immigrants by
overcoming those cultural barriers. Immigrants assimilate by a process of learning. However,
location choices are expected to crowd incentives to further learning so that exposure to other
immigrants becomes the primary determinant on cultural accumulation.
Immigrants from poorer source countries have a lower assimilation rate than comparable
immigrants from richer countries. This paper shows that exposure to co-ethnics is the primary
determinant of lower assimilation rates because immigrants from poor source countries expe-
rience the largest productivity gains from migrating, leading to an increase in their presence
within the host country. Location preferences among new immigrants in the host country
further increases exposure to co-ethnics, further clustering into enclaves, lower communication
frictions and fewer learning the local culture.
There are externalities (feedback) associated with the size of immigration within neigh-
bourhoods. Some neighbourhoods will recieve more immigrants relative to others. Those
neighbourhoods with a large number of immigrants will attract more of the non-assimilating
type. Since immigrants from poor source countries are a bigger group, their exposure to co-
ethnics will be larger and co-ethnic neighbourhoods will have lower assimilation rates. Among
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rich source countries total immigration to the host country is smaller. There are fewer exter-
nalities and the composition of immigration within neighbourhoods is favorable towards the
assimilating type. Immigrants will sort, so that, neighbourhoods with fewer immigrants will
receive all assimilating types.
Empirically, the implications of the model are tested using longitudinal Canadian data. As
predicted immigrating from a richer source country has a positive effect on assimilating immi-
gration. Exposure to co-ethnics through sorting is a major determinant of assimilation rates in
the host country. Conditional on sorting, source country richness still has a significant positive
effect on assimilation rates. There appears to be an alternate channel present. Presumably,
this alternate channel is the quality, rather than size, of immigration.
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Table A1: Number of female and male headed households with in-laws, grandchildren, broth-
ers/sisters, other relatives, and unrelated persons living in the household (excludes migrants),
by number of persons.
Number of
persons in the
household
Female headed households
In-laws Grandchildren Brothers/sisters Other relatives Unrelated persons
0 2344 (78.34) 2454 (82.02) 2845 (95.09) 2620 (87.57) 2936 (98.13)
1 551 (18.42) 234 (7.821) 115 (3.844) 241 (8.055) 44 (1.471)
2 89 (2.975) 163 (5.448) 22 (0.735) 75 (2.507) 5 (0.167)
3 6 (0.201) 88 (2.941) 10 (0.334) 33 (1.103) 4 (0.134)
4 2 (0.0668) 30 (1.003) 10 (0.334) 3 (0.100)
5 16 (0.535) 7 (0.234)
6 5 (0.167) 2 (0.0668)
7 1 (0.0334) 2 (0.0668)
8 1 (0.0334) 1 (0.0334)
9
12 1 (0.0334)
Total 2992 (100.00) 2992 (100.00) 2992 (100.00) 2992 (100.00) 2992 (100.00)
Male headed households
0 6048 (77.20) 6128 (78.22) 7370 (94.08) 6960 (88.84) 7587 (96.85)
1 1498 (19.12) 682 (8.706) 357 (4.557) 566 (7.225) 187 (2.387)
2 255 (3.255) 550 (7.021) 80 (1.021) 159 (2.030) 34 (0.434)
3 31 (0.396) 265 (3.383) 23 (0.294) 76 (0.970) 19 (0.243)
4 1 (0.0128) 121 (1.545) 3 (0.0383) 30 (0.383) 3 (0.0383)
5 1 (0.0128) 46 (0.587) 15 (0.191) 2 (0.0255)
6 24 (0.306) 9 (0.115) 1 (0.0128)
7 7 (0.0894) 1 (0.0128) 8 (0.102)
8 6 (0.0766) 4 (0.0511)
9 3 (0.0383) 5 (0.0638)
12 1 (0.0128)
13 1 (0.0128)
10 1 (0.0128)
16 1 (0.0128)
14 1 (0.0128)
Total 7834 (100) 7834 (100) 7834 (100) 7834 (100) 7834 (100)
Column percent in parentheses
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Table A2: Number of migrant and non-migrant households with in-laws, grandchildren, broth-
ers/sisters, other relatives, and unrelated persons living in the household (excludes migrants),
by number of persons.
Number of
persons in the
household
Non-migrant households
In-laws Grandchildren Brothers/sisters Other relatives Unrelated persons
0 4274 (86.34) 4340 (87.68) 4646 (93.86) 4390 (88.69) 4777 (96.51)
1 589 (11.90) 231 (4.667) 233 (4.707) 378 (7.636) 120 (2.424)
2 78 (1.576) 185 (3.737) 54 (1.091) 107 (2.162) 28 (0.566)
3 8 (0.162) 115 (2.323) 16 (0.323) 40 (0.808) 16 (0.323)
4 51 (1.030) 1 (0.0202) 17 (0.343) 6 (0.121)
5 1 (0.0202) 15 (0.303) 7 (0.141) 2 (0.0404)
6 10 (0.202) 1 (0.0202) 1 (0.0202)
7 5 (0.101)
8 2 (0.0404) 1 (0.0202)
9 1 (0.0202) 3 (0.0606)
12
13
10 1 (0.0202)
Total 4950 (100) 4950 (100) 4950 (100) 4950 (100) 4950 (100)
Migrant households
0 4118 (70.08) 4242 (72.19) 5569 (94.78) 5190 (88.33) 5746 (97.79)
1 1460 (24.85) 685 (11.66) 239 (4.067) 429 (7.301) 111 (1.889)
2 266 (4.527) 528 (8.986) 48 (0.817) 127 (2.161) 11 (0.187)
3 29 (0.494) 238 (4.050) 17 (0.289) 69 (1.174) 7 (0.119)
4 3 (0.0511) 100 (1.702) 2 (0.0340) 23 (0.391)
5 47 (0.800) 15 (0.255)
6 19 (0.323) 10 (0.170)
7 8 (0.136) 1 (0.0170) 5 (0.0851)
8 5 (0.0851) 4 (0.0681)
9 2 (0.0340) 2 (0.0340)
12 1 (0.0170) 1 (0.0170)
13 1 (0.0170)
16 1 (0.0170)
14 1 (0.0170)
Total 5876 (100.00) 5876 (100.00) 5876 (100.00) 5876 (100.00) 5876 (100.00)
Column percent in parentheses
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Table A3: Number of households with members that migrated for work, study, marriage, other
family, and security reasons, by number of migrants.
Number of
migrant
members
Work Study Marriage Other family Security
0 6986 (64.53) 9441 (87.21) 8871 (81.94) 9936 (91.78) 10819 (99.94)
1 2930 (27.06) 1013 (9.357) 1488 (13.74) 444 (4.101) 6 (0.0554)
2 719 (6.641) 279 (2.577) 380 (3.510) 237 (2.189) 1 (0.00924)
3 151 (1.395) 72 (0.665) 77 (0.711) 118 (1.090)
4 29 (0.268) 18 (0.166) 8 (0.0739) 44 (0.406)
5 9 (0.0831) 2 (0.0185) 2 (0.0185) 26 (0.240)
6 1 (0.00924) 1 (0.00924) 10 (0.0924)
7 1 (0.00924) 3 (0.0277)
8 2 (0.0185)
9 3 (0.0277)
10 1 (0.00924)
11 1 (0.00924)
12 1 (0.00924)
Total 10826 (100) 10826 (100) 10826 (100) 10826 (100) 10826 (100)
Percent in parentheses
Figure 4.5: Inferring migrant husbands, migrant wives, and non-migrant couples from available
information in the DHS, Nepal 2011 (household file).
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Table A.S1: Summary Statistics of Nepali households that supply migrants to India.
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Count
Migrant Husband (0 or 1) Household has a migrant husband (see figure 1) 0.389 0.488 548
Extended Family (0 or 1) Presence of extended family member in the household 0.429 0.495 548
Poor (0 or 1) Household is poor based on wealth index 0.582 0.494 548
Urban (0 or 1) Household is located in an urban area 0.201 0.401 548
Eastern (0 or 1) Household is located in the Eastern region of Nepal 0.128 0.334 548
Central (0 or 1) Household is located in the Central region of Nepal 0.137 0.344 548
Western (0 or 1) Household is located in the Western region of Nepal 0.161 0.367 548
Mid-western (0 or 1) Household is located in the Mid-western region of Nepal 0.223 0.416 548
Cluster Altitude (Continuous) Location of household above sea level (in meters) 678.726 651.090 548
Age of Oldest Child (Continuous) Family life cycle variable 13.929 9.029 548
Secondary Education (Continuous) Proportion of household members aged 25+ with a secondary education 0.013 0.066 548
Higher Education (Continuous) Proportion of household members aged 25+ with higher education 0.015 0.083 548
Literacy Program (Continuous) Proportion of household members aged 25+ that have participated in literacy program 0.072 0.133 548
Male Members (Continuous) Proportion of male members in the household 0.412 0.200 548
Male Headed (0 or 1) Household is male headed 0.432 0.496 548
Age of Head (Continuous) Age of head of the household 40.797 14.209 548
Age at Migration (Continuous) Age at migration of the migrant 19.607 15.083 759
Mumbai (0 or 1) Location of migrant: Mumbai 0.088 0.284 759
Delhi (0 or 1) Location of migrant: Delhi 0.126 0.333 759
Punjab (0 or 1) Location of migrant: Punjab 0.050 0.218 759
Other city in India (0 or 1) Location of migrant: Other city in India 0.391 0.488 759
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Table A.S2: Summary Statistics of Nepali households that supply migrants within Nepal.
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Count
Migrant Husband (0 or 1) Household has a migrant husband (see figure 1) 0.156 0.363 1534
Extended Family (0 or 1) Presence of extended family member in the household 0.471 0.499 1534
Poor (0 or 1) Household is poor based on wealth index 0.419 0.494 1534
Urban (0 or 1) Household is located in an urban area 0.264 0.441 1534
Eastern (0 or 1) Household is located in the Eastern region of Nepal 0.225 0.418 1534
Central (0 or 1) Household is located in the Central region of Nepal 0.267 0.443 1534
Western (0 or 1) Household is located in the Western region of Nepal 0.151 0.358 1534
Mid-western (0 or 1) Household is located in the Mid-western region of Nepal 0.198 0.398 1534
Cluster Altitude (Continuous) Location of household above sea level (in meters) 805.688 674.130 1534
Age of Oldest Child (Continuous) Family life cycle variable 16.450 10.348 1534
Secondary Education (Continuous) Proportion of household members aged 25+ with a secondary education 0.034 0.103 1534
Higher Education (Continuous) Proportion of household members aged 25+ with higher education 0.040 0.128 1534
Literacy Program (Continuous) Proportion of household members aged 25+ that have participated in literacy program 0.082 0.134 1534
Male Members (Continuous) Proportion of male members in the household 0.459 0.200 1534
Male Headed (0 or 1) Household is male headed 0.716 0.451 1534
Age of Head (Continuous) Age of head of the household 46.175 13.907 1534
Age at Migration (Continuous) Age at migration of the migrant 10.928 12.181 2917
Kathmandu (0 or 1) Location of migrant: Mumbai 0.113 0.316 2917
Other city in Nepal (0 or 1) Location of migrant: Delhi 0.143 0.350 2917
Rural area in Nepal (0 or 1) Location of migrant: Punjab 0.268 0.443 2917
Proofs
Proof to Proposition 1(a). Let i = i′ be the marginal migrant that comes to the North
from the South and changes the level of migration from m to m′. The decision to migrate
indicator for i′ is di′ = 1. The positive externality to immigrants from i′ is given by
m′
1 +m′
− m
1 +m
=
di′ +
∑L
i=1 di
1 + di′ +
∑L
i=1 di
−
∑L
i=1 di
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
2 +
∑L
i=1 di
−
∑L
i=1 di
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
1 +m
2 +m
− m
1 +m
> 0
The first equality comes from dis-aggregating m, m′, and separating di′ from the summation.
The final equality uses the assumption that i′ is an immigrant di′ = 1.
Proof to Proposition 1(b). Let i = i′ be the marginal migrant that comes to the North
from the South and changes the level of migration from m to m′ as well as the level of assimi-
lating immigration a to a′. The decision to migrate indicator for i′ is di′ = 1 and the decision
to assimilate indicator is ai′ = 1. The negative externality to native-born from i
′ is given by
1 + a′
1 +m′
− 1 + a
1 +m
=
1 + ai′ +
∑L
i=1 ai
1 + di′ +
∑L
i=1 di
− 1 +
∑L
i=1 ai
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
2 +
∑L
i=1 ai
2 +
∑L
i=1 di
− 1 +
∑L
i=1 ai
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
2 + a
2 +m
− 1 + a
1 +m
> 0
if the marginal migrant i′ is assimilating. The first equality comes form dis-aggregating m, m′,
a, a′, and separating di′ and ai′ from the summation. The final equality uses the assumption
that i′ is an immigrant di′ = 1 and non-assimilating ai′ = 1. On the other hand, if the marginal
migrant were non-assimilating we have ai′ = 0 in the second equality and have the following
instead
1 +
∑L
i=1 ai
2 +
∑L
i=1 di
− 1 +
∑L
i=1 ai
1 +
∑L
i=1 di
=
1 + a
2 +m
− 1 + a
1 +m
< 0
Comparative statics over the thresholds
The following are a set of useful comparative statics used throughout the main body of the
text in derivations, proofs and analysis. The effect of θ and m on the threshold for assimilating
is given by
ωa = 1− 1
θν(1 +m)
,
∂ωa
∂θ
=
1
θ2ν(1 +m)
> 0,
∂ωa
∂m
=
1
θν(1 +m)2
> 0.
The equation ca(ω) is the thresholds for assimilating immigration. The following derivatives
provide the effect of changes in h, µ and θ.
ca(ω) =
1− θν(1− ω)− h
µ
,
∂ca(ω)
∂h
= − 1
µ
< 0,
∂ca(ω)
∂µ
= −1− θν(1− ω)− h
µ2
< 0,
∂ca(ω)
∂θ
= −ν(1− ω)
µ
< 0.
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The equation cn is the threshold for non-assimilating immigration. The following set of deriva-
tives provide the effect of changes in h, µ and m.
cin(β) =
mi/(1 +mi)− h/β
µ
,
∂cn
∂h
= − 1
µ
< 0,
∂cn
∂µ
= −m/(1 +m)− h
µ2
{
≥ 0 if h ≥ h
< 0 if h < h
,
∂cn
∂m
=
1
µ(1 +m)2
> 0,
where h = m/(1 + m) is the threshold between the interior and corner equilibria. The effect
of geographic distance on non-assimilating immigration depends on the prevailing equilibrium.
Finally, the level of ω at which the corner equilibrium occurs is ω. Changes associated with ω
due to h and θ are provided
ω = 1− 1− h
θν
,
∂ω
∂h
=
1
θν
> 0,
∂ω
∂θ
=
1− h
θ2ν
> 0
Comparative statics over Γ(m)
Consider an interior equilibrium outcome cn > 0. The set of first-order partial differentials of
Γ(m) in terms of m and P ≡ {L, h, µ, θ} are as follows,
m = LF (cn)W (ωa) + L
∫ 1
ωa
F (ca(ω))dW (ω)
∂Γ
∂m
= LF ′(cn)
∂cn
∂m
W (ωa) + LF (cn)W
′(ωa)
∂ωa
∂m
− LF (ca(ωa))∂ωa
∂m
∂Γ
∂L
= F (cn)W (ωa) +
∫ 1
ωa
F (ca(ω))dW (ω) > 0
∂Γ
∂h
= LF ′(cn)
∂cn
∂h
W (ωa) + L
∫ 1
ωa
F ′(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂h
dW (ω) < 0
∂Γ
∂µ
= LF ′(cn)
∂cn
∂µ
W (ωa) + L
∫ 1
ωa
F ′(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂µ
dW (ω) < 0,
∂Γ
∂θ
= LF (cn)W
′(ωa)
∂ωa
∂θ
− LF (ca(ωa))∂ωa
∂θ
+ L
∫ 1
ωa
F ′(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂θ
dW (ω) S 0,
In a corner equilibrium outcome cn = 0. The first-order differentials of Γ(m) in terms of m
and {L, h, µ, θ} are as follows,
m = L
∫ 1
ω
F (ca(ω))dW (ω),
∂Γ
∂m
= 0,
∂Γ
∂L
=
∫ 1
ω
F (ca(ω))dW (ω) > 0,
∂Γ
∂h
= L
∫ 1
ω
F ′(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂h
dW (ω)− LF (ca(ω))∂ω
∂h
dW (ω) < 0,
∂Γ
∂µ
= L
∫ 1
ω
F ′(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂µ
dW (ω) < 0,
∂Γ
∂θ
= L
∫ 1
ω
F ′(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂θ
dW (ω)− LF (ca(ω))∂ω
∂θ
< 0,
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Comparative statics over m(L, h, µ, θ)
Since m = Γ(m;P) implicitly defines m, where P ≡ {L, h, µ, θ}. Then totally differentiating
with respect to the parameters in P is given by
dm
dP
=
∂Γ
∂m
∂m
∂P
+
∂Γ
∂P
,
dm
dP
=
∂Γ/∂P
1− ∂Γ/∂m
The signs of the partial differentials of ∂Γ/∂P have already been determined in the previous
section. Moreover, the stability conditions require that ∂Γ/∂m < 1. Using this information
the effect of P on m in the interior and corner cases are given as
dm
dL
> 0,
dm
dh
< 0,
dm
dµ
{
≶ 0 if h ≥ h
< 0 if h < h
,
dm
dθ
S 0.
Direct effects
The direct effects of table 2 are determined by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on ρ = a/m. To
simplify the calculations, let η ≡ A/B, where
A = L
∫ 1
ωa
F (ca(ω)dW (ω) > 0
B = LF (cn) > 0
Now ρ can be written in a simpler form, as a function of η. It can then be inferred that ρ is a
monotonic increasing function of η.
ρ =
η
η +W (ωa)
,
∂ρ
∂η
> 0
The parameters in the model P = {L, h, µ, θ} are expected to have a direct effect on ρ = a/m.
These effects are estimated by the relationship
∂ρ
∂P
=
∂ρ
∂η
× ∂η
∂P
, where
∂η
∂P
=
∂A/∂P× B− ∂B/∂P× A
B2
.
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All that remains to sign the direct effect by differentiating A and B in terms of the elements
in P = {L, h, µ, θ}.
∂A
∂L
=
∫ 1
ωa
F (ca(ω))dW (ω) > 0,
∂A
∂h
= L
∫ 1
ωa
f(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂h
dW (ω) < 0,
∂A
∂µ
= L
∫ 1
ωa
f(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂µ
dW (ω) < 0,
∂A
∂θ
= −LF (ca(ωa))∂ωa
∂θ
+ L
∫ 1
ωa
f(ca(ω))
∂ca(ω)
∂θ
dW (ω) < 0,
∂A
∂m
= −LF (ca(ω))∂ωa
∂m
< 0,
∂B
∂L
= F (cn) > 0,
∂B
∂h
= Lf(cn)
∂cn
∂h
< 0,
∂B
∂µ
= Lf(cn)
∂cn
∂µ
< 0
∂B
∂θ
= 0,
∂B
∂m
= Lf(cn)
∂cn
∂m
dB(β) > 0.
Indirect effects
The indirect effects of table 2 are determined by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on ρ = a/m
through changes in m(L, h, µ, θ). These effects are estimated by the relationship
∂ρ
∂P
=
∂ρ
∂η
× ∂η
∂m
× ∂m
∂P
, where
∂η
∂m
=
∂A/∂m× B− ∂B/∂m× A
B2
.
The signs for ∂A/∂m and ∂B/∂m were determined in the previous section. The signs for the
indirect effects are as follows,
∂ρ
∂L
< 0,
∂ρ
∂h
> 0,
∂ρ
∂µ
> 0,
∂ρ
∂θ
S 0.
Threshold effects
The threshold effects are identified by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on equation (3.15), or
Φ(m(L, h, µ, θ), L, h, µ, θ). These effects are provided below.
dΦ
dL
< 0,
dΦ
dh
> 0,
dΦ
dµ
> 0,
dΦ
dθ
> 0.
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Tables
Table A1: Ethnic, linguistic and changes in birthplace diversity indices across major immigrant
receiving countries
% change in birthplace diversity 1990-2000
Country Ethnic Linguistic All Migrants
Australia 0.093 0.335 -4% 3%
Austria 0.107 0.152 119% 3%
Belgium 0.555 0.541 15% 2%
Canada 0.712 0.577 8% 1%
France 0.103 0.122 -1% 1%
Germany 0.168 0.164 33% 1%
Netherlands 0.514 0.335 2% 2%
Norway 0.059 0.067 46% 1%
New Zealand 0.397 0.166 8% 17%
Switzerland 0.531 0.544 0% 3%
USA 0.490 0.251 40% -3%
UK 0.121 0.053 21% 2%
Source: Alesina, Alberto; Harnoss, Johann & Rapoport, Hillel (2015). Birthplace Diversity and Economic
Prosperity. Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 21, issue 2 (June 2016), pp. 101-138.
Table A2: Descriptions of variables used in this study.
Variable Name Description
Speaking proficiency English speaking proficiency of the respondent (Dummy)
Formal investment Learned to speak English in language class or school (Dummy)
Informal investment Learned to speak English through family & friends, work, non-language
classes, media, self-study and/or other (Dummy)
CMA of arrival: Toronto The respondent lives in Toronto at the time of landing in Canada
(Dummy)
CMA of arrival: Vancouver The respondent lived in Vancouver at the time of landing in Canada
(Dummy)
Share of co-ethnic group in Canada Share of the co-ethnic population that the respondent belongs to
admitted into Canada in 2000 (Continuous)
Share of co-ethnic group in CMA/CA
of arrival
Share of the ethnic population that the respondent belongs to living in
the same CMA/CA of first arrival (Continuous; Canadian Census of
Population, 2001)
Education outside Canada: Bachelor’s
or higher
Highest level of formal education attained outside of Canada is
Bachelor’s or higher (Dummy)
Formal learning of English outside of
Canada
Learned most of their English before coming to Canada through
language classes, a private tutor or schooling (Dummy)
Informal learning of English outside of
Canada
Learned most of their English before coming to Canada from
family/friends, self-study, work, media, everyday interactions or other
(Dummy)
Age at immigration Age of the respondent (Continuous)
Male Gender of the respondent = Male (Dummy)
Married Marital status of the respondent = Married (Dummy)
Employed The respondent is employed full-time (Dummy)
Savings brought from outside Canada Total amount of savings brough from outside Canada (Continuous)
Family class Immigration category = Family class (Dummy)
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Table A2: Descriptions of variables used in this study.
Variable Name Description
Number of immigrating members Size of the immigrating party at the time of landing (Continuous)
Number of joining members Number of members that have joined the household since landing
(wave 1) or since the last interview (waves 2 and 3) (Continuous)
Number of household members Size of household (Continuous)
Number of children Percentage of children living in the household (Continuous)
Months since arrival Number of months elapsed since landing in Canada (Continuous)
RGDP in place of Birth Real GDP of place of birth of the respondent relative to Canada
(Continuous; Heston, Summers & Aten, 2005)
Population in place of birth Population of place of birth of the respondent relative to Canada
(Continuous; Heston, Summers & Aten, 2005)
Distance from capital city in place of
birth
Distance of the capital city in the place of birth of the respondent
relative to Canada (Continuous; Mayer & Zignago, 2011)
Linguistic distance Linguistic distance of the official language in the place of birth of the
respondent relative to English (Continuous; Melitz & Toubal, 2014)
Table A3: Summary statistics.
Full sample Sub-sample
Variable Name Count Mean SD Count Mean SD
Speaking proficiency 291,135 0.692 0.462 229,362 0.700 0.458
Formal investment 276,555 0.314 0.464 216,129 0.349 0.477
Informal investment 290,853 0.503 0.500 229,080 0.554 0.497
CMA of arrival: Toronto 291,141 0.484 0.500 229,368 0.554 0.497
CMA of arrival: Vancouver 291,141 0.135 0.341 229,368 0.159 0.366
Ethnic share in Canada 291,141 0.069 0.070 229,368 0.078 0.072
Ethnic share in CMA/CA of arrival 291,141 0.014 0.013586 229,368 0.015 0.014
Atleast a Bachelor’s education outside Canada 291,141 0.283 0.451 229,368 0.307 0.461
Formal pre-immigration investment 291,066 0.744 0.436 229,368 0.807 0.395
Informal pre-immigration investment 291,066 0.262 0.440 229,368 0.290 0.454
Age at immigration 291,141 35.307 12.688 229,368 35.395 12.847
Male 291,141 0.494 0.500 229,368 0.491 0.500
Married 291,141 0.760 0.427 229,368 0.765 0.424
Employed 290,294 0.491 0.500 228,715 0.497 0.500
Savings brought from outside Canada 275,625 6.311 4.560 217,260 6.227 4.617
Family class 291,141 0.328 0.470 229,368 0.348 0.476
Number of immigrating members 291,141 2.718 1.541 229,368 2.782 1.549
Number of joining members 291,141 0.626 1.222 229,368 0.671 1.288
Number of household members 291,141 3.833 1.723 229,368 3.981 1.753
Number of children 291,141 0.662 0.902 229,368 0.679 0.908
Months since arrival 291,141 27.554 17.454 229,368 27.558 17.456
RGDP in place of birth 291,141 0.847 0.899 229,368 0.882 0.911
Population in place of birth 291,141 10.113 14.104 229,368 11.459 14.623
Distance from capital city in place of birth 291,141 10080.31 2,751.119 229,368 10645.9 2306.757
Linguistic distance in place of birth 291,141 0.864 0.194 229,368 0.897 0.135
Note 1: Sub-sample is of those whose mother tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec
Note 2: All variables are weighted using the weights provided with the LSIC by Statistics Canada.
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Table A4: OLS estimation results of English speaking proficiency: mother tongue is not English
and do not reside in Quebec.
Pooled Pooled Pooled First differences
RGDP per capita (h) 0.0479*** 0.0395** 0.0409**
(0.0135) (0.0140) (0.0141)
Informal pre-immigration experience (ω) 0.0875*** 0.0871***
(0.0116) (0.0116)
Formal pre-immigration experience (ω) 0.192*** 0.194***
(0.0156) (0.0159)
Informal investment (ι) -0.00651 -0.0107
(0.0137) (0.0149)
Formal investment (ι) -0.0940*** 0.0513*
(0.0171) (0.0227)
Share of co-ethnic group in Canada (m) 0.379 0.0341 0.113
(0.257) (0.250) (0.251)
Population level (L) -0.00719*** -0.00468*** -0.00528***
(0.00142) (0.00140) (0.00138)
Geographic distance (µ) -0.00000244 -0.00000652* -0.00000793*
(0.00000337) (0.00000330) (0.00000332)
Linguistic distance (θ) 0.0297 0.0447 0.0583
(0.0561) (0.0546) (0.0529)
Months since arrival -0.0115* -0.0101* -0.00977
(0.00509) (0.00501) (0.00503)
Time-varying controls (Xist) X X X X
Time-invariant controls (Xis) X X X X
Survey wave controls (t) X X X X
N 216,672 216,672 204,122 138,783
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A5: Probit estimation results of English speaking proficiency: mother tongue is not
English and do not reside in Quebec.
Dependent variable: English speaking proficiency Pooled
Informal investment (ι) × Share of co-ethnics in CMA/CA of arrival (R) -8.759∗∗∗
(2.245)
Formal investment (ι) × Share of co-ethnics in CMA/CA of arrival (R) 9.226∗∗
(2.915)
Informal investment (ι) -0.142∗∗
(0.0546)
Formal investment (ι) -0.368∗∗∗
(0.0635)
Time-varying controls (Xist) X
Time-invariant controls (Xis) X
Survey wave controls (t) X
N 204,122
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada RDC’s disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Comparative statics over the thresholds
The following are a set of useful comparative statics used throughout the main body of the text in derivations,
proofs and analysis. The effect of θ and mi on the threshold for assimilating is given by
ωia = 1−
1
θν(1 +mi)
,
∂ωia
∂θ
=
1
θ2ν(1 +mi)
> 0,
∂ωia
∂mi
=
1
θν(1 +mi)2
> 0.
ωja = 1−
1
θν(1 +mj)
,
∂ωja
∂θ
=
1
θ2ν(1 +mj)
> 0,
∂ωja
∂mj
=
1
θν(1 +mj)2
> 0.
The function c(βn) is the threshold between choosing to locate in neighbourhood j over i. The following
derivatives provide the effect of changes in µ, mi and mj .
c(βn) =
mj/(1 +mj)− (mi/(1 +mi))(βn/(1− βn))
2µ
,
∂c(βn)
∂µ
= −m
j/(1 +mj)− (mi/(1 +mi))(βn/(1− βn))
2µ2
> 0 if β > 1/2,
∂c(βn)
∂mi
= − βn
2µ(1 +mi)2(1− βn) < 0,
∂c(βn)
∂mj
=
1
2µ(1 +mj)2
> 0.
The equations cia(ω, β) and c
j
a(ω, β) are the thresholds for assimilating immigration in neighbourhoods i and j.
The following derivatives provide the effect of changes in h, µ and θ.
cia(ω, β) =
1− θν(1− ω)− h/β
µ
, cja(ω, β) =
1− θν(1− ω)− h/(1− β)
µ
,
∂cia(ω, β)
∂h
= − 1
µβ
< 0,
∂cja(ω, β)
∂h
= − 1
µ(1− β) < 0,
∂cia(ω, β)
∂µ
= −1− θν(1− ω)− h/β
µ2
< 0,
∂cja(ω, β)
∂µ
= −1− θν(1− ω)− h/(1− β)
µ2
< 0,
∂cia(ω, β)
∂θ
= −ν(1− ω)
µ
< 0.
∂cja(ω, β)
∂θ
= −ν(1− ω)
µ
< 0.
The equations cin(β) and c
j
n(β) are the threshold between non-assimilating immigration in neighbourhoods i
and j. The following set of derivatives provide the effect of changes in h, µ, mi and/or mj .
cin(β) =
mi/(1 +mi)− h/β
µ
, cjn(β) =
mj/(1 +mj)− h/(1− β)
µ
∂cin(β)
∂h
= − 1
µβ
< 0,
∂cjn(β)
∂h
= − 1
µ(1− β) < 0,
∂cin(β)
∂µ
= −m
i/(1 +mi)− h/β
µ2
< 0,
∂cjn(β)
∂µ
= −m
j/(1 +mj)− h/(1− β)
µ2
,
∂cin(β)
∂mi
=
1
µ(1 +mi)2
> 0,
∂cjn(β)
∂mj
=
1
µ(1 +mj)2
> 0,
(4.31)
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Comparative statics over ωi and ωj
The equations ωi and ωi are defined as the ω at which cin(ω) = 0 and c
j
n(ω) = 0. The effect of changes in h, θ,
mi and mj are given as
ωi = 1− 1− h(1 +m
i(1 +mj)/mj(1 +mi))
θν
, ωj = 1− 1− h(1 +m
j(1 +mi)/mi(1 +mj))
θν
,
∂ωi
∂h
=
1 +mi(1 +mj)/mj(1 +mi)
θν
> 0,
∂ωj
∂h
=
1 +mj(1 +mi)/mi(1 +mj)
θν
> 0,
∂ωi
∂mi
=
h
θν
1 +mj
mj(1 +mi)2
> 0,
∂ωj
∂mi
= − h
θν
mj
(mi)2(1 +mj)
< 0,
∂ωi
∂mj
= − h
θν
mi
(mj)2(1 +mi)
< 0,
∂ωj
∂mi
=
h
θν
1 +mi
mi(1 +mj)2
> 0,
∂ωi
∂θ
=
1− h(1 +mi(1 +mj)/mj(1 +mi)
θ2ν
< 0,
∂ωj
∂θ
=
1− h(1 +mj(1 +mi)/mi(1 +mj)
θ2ν
< 0,
Comparative statics over Γi(mi,mj) and Γj(mi,mj)
Consider a mixed equilibrium outcome k(1 − ω) ≤ 1, ωia ≥ ωi and ωja > ωj . The elements of the Jacobian
matrix J(mi,mj) are the set of first-order partial differentials of Γi(mi,mj) and Γj(mi,mj) in terms of mi and
mj . As follows,
mi = L
∫ 1
ωia
∫ 1
1/2
F (cia(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω)
+ LW (ωia)
2
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0, F (cin(β))− F (c(βn))}dB(β) ≡ Γi(mi,mj)
∂Γi(mi,mj)
∂mi
= −L
∫ 1
1/2
F (cia(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωia
∂mi
+ 2LW (ωia)W
′(ωia)
∂ωia
∂mi
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0, F (cin(β))− F (c(βn))}dB(β)
+ LW (ωia)
2
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0, f(cin(β))
∂cin(β)
∂mi
− f(c(βn))∂c(βn)
∂mi
}dB(β)
∂Γi(mi,mj)
∂mi
= LW (ωia)
2
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0,−f(c(βn))∂c(βn)
∂mj
}dB(β) = 0
mj = L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω)
+ L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)2 ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) ≡ Γj(mi,mj)
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂mi
= −2L (W (ωja)−W (ωj))W ′(ωj) ∂ωj∂mi
∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β)
+ L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)2 ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
f(c(βn))
∂c(βn)
∂mi
dB(β)
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂mj
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωja
∂mj
+ 2L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)(
W ′(ωja)
∂ωja
∂mj
−W ′(ωj) ∂ω
j
∂mj
)∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β)
+ L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)2 ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
f(c(βn))
∂c(βn)
∂mj
dB(β)
Since Γi(mi,mj) and Γj(mi,mj) are also directly affected by the parameters {L, h, µ, θ}. These comparative
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statics are provided as well in the mixed equilibrium case.
∂Γi(mi,mj)
∂L
=
∫ 1
ωia
∫ 1
1/2
F (cia(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω)
+W (ωia)
2
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0, F (cin(β))− F (c(βn))}dB(β) > 0
∂Γi(mi,mj)
∂h
= L
∫ 1
ωia
∫ 1
1/2
f(cia(ω, β))
∂cia(ω, β)
∂h
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0
∂Γi(mi,mj)
∂µ
= L
∫ 1
ωia
∫ 1
1/2
f(cia(ω, β))
∂cia(ω, β)
∂µ
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0
∂Γi(mi,mj)
∂θ
= −L
∫ 1
1/2
F (cia(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωia
∂θ
+ L
∫ 1
ωia
∫ 1
1/2
f(cia(ω, β))
∂cia(ω, β)
∂θ
dB(β)dW (ω)
+ 2LW (ωia)
2W ′(ωia)
∂ωia
∂θ
∫ 1
h(1+mi)
mi
max{0, F (cin(β))− F (c(βn))}dB(β) S 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂L
=
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω)
+
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)2 ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) > 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂h
= L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂h
dB(β)dW (ω)
− 2L (W (ωja)−W (ωj))W ′(ωj)∂ωj∂h
∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) < 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂µ
= L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂µ
dB(β)dW (ω)
+ L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)2 ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
f(c(βn))
∂c(βn)
∂µ
dB(β) < 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂θ
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωja
∂θ
+ L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂θ
dB(β)dW (ω)
+ 2L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
)(
W ′(ωja)
∂ωja
∂θ
−W ′(ωj)∂ω
j
∂θ
)∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) S 0
In a sorting equilibrium outcome k(1 − ω) ≤ 1, ωia ≥ ωi and ωja = ωj . The first-order differentials of
Γi(mi,mj) in terms of mi and mj , and {L, h, µ, θ} are the same as in the mixed case. But the set of first-order
differentials of Γj(mi,mj) are as follows,
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂mi
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωj
∂mi
< 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂mj
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωj
∂mj
< 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂L
=
∫ 1
ωj
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω) > 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂h
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωj
∂h
+ L
∫ 1
ωj
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂h
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂µ
= L
∫ 1
ωj
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂µ
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0
∂Γj(mi,mj)
∂θ
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωj
∂θ
+ L
∫ 1
ωj
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂θ
dB(β)dW (ω) S 0
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Comparative statics over mi(L, h, µ, θ) and mj(L, h, µ, θ)
Since mi = Γi(mi,mj ;P) and mj = Γj(mi,mj ;P) implicitly define mi and mj , where P ≡ {L, h, µ, θ}. Then
totally differentiating with respect to the parameters in P is given by
dmi
dP
=
∂Γi
∂mi
∂mi
∂P
+
∂Γi
∂mj
∂mj
∂P
+
∂Γi
∂P
,
dmj
dP
=
∂Γj
∂mi
∂mi
∂P
+
∂Γj
∂mj
∂mj
∂P
+
∂Γj
∂P
.
Solving the two equation systems simultaneously provides the following set of reduced form solutions to the
differentials of mi and mj in terms of P.
dmi
dP
=
∂Γi/∂mj × ∂Γj/∂P+ ∂Γi/∂P× (1− ∂Γj/∂mj)
(1− ∂Γi/∂mi)(1− ∂Γj/∂mj)− ∂Γi/∂mj × ∂Γj/∂mi ,
dmj
dP
=
∂Γj/∂mi × dmi/dP+ ∂Γj/∂P
1− ∂Γj/∂mj .
The signs of the partial differentials, ∂Γi/∂P and ∂Γj/∂P, have already been determined in the previous section.
Additionally, ∂Γi/∂mj = 0 which simplifies the problem further. Moreover, the stability conditions require that
∂Γi/∂mi < 0 and ∂Γj/∂mj < 0. Finally, ∂Γj/∂mi > 0 is also implied by the stability conditions. Using this
information the effect of P on mi and mj in the mixed and sorting cases are given as
dmi
dL
> 0,
dmi
dh
< 0,
dmi
dµ
< 0,
dmi
dθ
S 0,
dmj
dL
> 0,
dmj
dh
< 0,
dmj
dµ
< 0,
dmj
dθ
S 0.
Direct effects
The direct effects of table 2 are determined by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on ρj = aj/mj . To simplify the
calculations, let η ≡ A/B, where
A = L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω) > 0
B = L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
) ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) > 0
Now ρj can be written in a simpler form, as a function of η. It can then be inferred that ρj is a monotonic
increasing function of η.
ρj =
η +
∫ ωja
ωj
k(1− ω)dW (ω)
η +
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
) , ∂ρj
∂η
> 0 ∀ k(1− ω) ≤ 1
The parameters in the model P = {L, h, µ, θ} are expected to have a direct effect on ρj = aj/mj . These effects
are estimated by the relationship
∂ρj
∂P
=
∂ρj
∂η
× ∂η
∂P
, where
∂η
∂P
=
∂A/∂P× B− ∂B/∂P× A
B2
.
128
All that remains to sign the direct effect is differentiating A and B in terms of the elements in P = {L, h, µ, θ}.
∂A
∂L
=
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)dW (ω) > 0,
∂A
∂h
= L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂h
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0,
∂A
∂µ
= L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂µ
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0,
∂A
∂θ
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))dB(β)
∂ωja
∂θ
dW (ω) + L
∫ 1
ωja
∫ 1/2
0
f(cja(ω, β))
∂cja(ω, β)
∂θ
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0,
∂A
∂mi
= 0,
∂A
∂mj
= −L
∫ 1/2
0
F (cja(ω, β))
∂ωja
∂mj
dB(β)dW (ω) < 0,
∂B
∂L
=
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
) ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) > 0,
∂B
∂h
= −LW ′(ωj)∂ω
j
∂h
∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) < 0,
∂B
∂µ
= L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
) ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
f(c(βn))
∂c(βn)
∂µ
dB(β) > 0,
∂B
∂θ
= L
(
W ′(ωja)
∂ωja
∂θ
−W ′(ωj)∂ω
j
∂θ
)∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β) S 0,
∂B
∂mi
= −LW ′(ωj) ∂ω
j
∂mi
∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β)
+ L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
) ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
f(c(βn))
∂c(βn)
∂mi
dB(β) S 0,
∂B
∂mj
= L
(
W ′(ωja)
∂ωja
∂mj
−W ′(ωj) ∂ω
j
∂mj
)∫ mj(1+mi)
mi+mj+2mimj
0
F (c(βn))dB(β)
+ L
(
W (ωja)−W (ωj)
) ∫ mj(1+mi)mi+mj+2mimj
0
f(c(βn))
∂c(βn)
∂mj
dB(β) S 0.
Indirect effects
The indirect effects of table 2 are determined by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on ρj = aj/mj through changes in
mi(L, h, µ, θ). These effects are estimated by the relationship
∂ρj
∂P
=
∂ρj
∂η
× ∂η
∂mi
× ∂m
i
∂P
, where
∂η
∂mi
=
∂A/∂mi × B− ∂B/∂mi × A
B2
.
But since ∂B/∂mi was ambiguously signed, all the indirect effects through mi(L, h, µ, θ) are ambiguous as well.
Similarly, I can estimate the indirect effects through mj(L, h, µ, θ) as
∂ρj
∂P
=
∂ρj
∂η
× ∂η
∂mj
× ∂m
j
∂P
, where
∂η
∂mj
=
∂A/∂mj × B− ∂B/∂mj × A
B2
.
Again, ∂B/∂mj is ambiguously signed, all the indirect effects through mj(L, h, µ, θ) are ambiguous. The results
are depicted as such in table 2.
129
Threshold effects
The threshold effects are identified by changes in P = {L, h, µ, θ} on equation (4.25), or φ(.). These effects are
provided below.
dφ
dL
< 0,
dφ
dh
> 0,
dφ
dµ
> 0,
dφ
dθ
S 0.
Tables
Table A1: Descriptions of variables used in this study.
Variable Name Description
Speaking proficiency English speaking proficiency of the respondent (5-level categorical)
Ethnic enclave Arrived in a CMA/CA that is overrepresented by co-ethnics (Census of
Population 2001), and worked in an organization that is mostly
co-ethnic (Dummy)
Housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival
(in $’000’s)
Average cost of housing in CMA/CA of arrival. (Continuous; Census of
Population 2001)
Formal investment Learned to speak English in language class or school (Dummy)
Informal investment Learned to speak English through family & friends, work, non-language
classes, media, self-study and/or other (Dummy)
CMA of arrival: Toronto The respondent lives in Toronto at the time of landing in Canada
(Dummy)
CMA of arrival: Vancouver The respondent lived in Vancouver at the time of landing in Canada
(Dummy)
Share of co-ethnic group in Canada Share of the co-ethnic population that the respondent belongs to
admitted into Canada in 2000 (Continuous)
Education outside Canada: Bachelor’s
or higher
Highest level of formal education attained outside of Canada is
Bachelor’s or higher (Dummy)
Formal learning of English outside of
Canada
Learned most of their English before coming to Canada through
language classes, a private tutor or schooling (Dummy)
Informal learning of English outside of
Canada
Learned most of their English before coming to Canada from
family/friends, self-study, work, media, everyday interactions or other
(Dummy)
Friend/family networks Respondent had friends/family in current area (or nearby area) and
chose this area because friends/family live here, in wave 1 (Dummy)
Age at immigration Age of the respondent (Continuous)
Male Gender of the respondent = Male (Dummy)
Married Marital status of the respondent = Married (Dummy)
Employed The respondent is employed full-time (Dummy)
Savings brought from outside Canada Total amount of savings brough from outside Canada (Continuous)
Family class Immigration category = Family class (Dummy)
Number of immigrating members Size of the immigrating party at the time of landing (Continuous)
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Table A1: Descriptions of variables used in this study.
Variable Name Description
Number of joining members Number of members that have joined the household since landing
(wave 1) or since the last interview (waves 2 and 3) (Continuous)
Number of household members Size of household (Continuous)
Number of children Percentage of children living in the household (Continuous)
Months since arrival Number of months elapsed since landing in Canada (Continuous)
RGDP in place of Birth Real GDP of place of birth of the respondent relative to Canada
(Continuous; Heston, Summers & Aten, 2005)
Population in place of birth Population of place of birth of the respondent relative to Canada
(Continuous; Heston, Summers & Aten, 2005)
Distance from capital city in place of
birth
Distance of the capital city in the place of birth of the respondent
relative to Canada (Continuous; Mayer & Zignago, 2011)
Linguistic distance Linguistic distance of the official language in the place of birth of the
respondent relative to English (Continuous; Melitz & Toubal, 2014)
Table A2: Summary statistics.
Full sample Sub-sample
Variable Name Count Mean SD Count Mean SD
Speaking proficiency 291,135 0.692 0.462 229,362 0.700 0.458
Ethnic enclave 290,877 0.123 0.329 229,104 0.136 0.342
Formal investment 276,555 0.314 0.464 216,129 0.349 0.477
Informal investment 290,853 0.503 0.500 229,080 0.554 0.497
CMA of arrival: Toronto 291,141 0.484 0.500 229,368 0.554 0.497
CMA of arrival: Vancouver 291,141 0.135 0.341 229,368 0.159 0.366
Housing costs in CMA/CA of arrival 291,141 13.111 2.207 229,368 13.630 1.848
Ethnic share in Canada 291,141 0.069 0.070 229,368 0.078 0.072
Atleast a Bachelor’s education outside Canada 291,141 0.283 0.451 229,368 0.307 0.461
Formal pre-immigration investment 291,066 0.744 0.436 229,368 0.807 0.395
Informal pre-immigration investment 291,066 0.262 0.440 229,368 0.290 0.454
Family/friend networks 291,141 0.818 0.386 229,368 0.832 0.374
Age at immigration 291,141 35.307 12.688 229,368 35.395 12.847
Male 291,141 0.494 0.500 229,368 0.491 0.500
Married 291,141 0.760 0.427 229,368 0.765 0.424
Employed 290,294 0.491 0.500 228,715 0.497 0.500
Savings brought from outside Canada 275,625 6.311 4.560 217,260 6.227 4.617
Family class 291,141 0.328 0.470 229,368 0.348 0.476
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Table A2: Summary statistics.
Full sample Sub-sample
Variable Name Count Mean SD Count Mean SD
Number of immigrating members 291,141 2.718 1.541 229,368 2.782 1.549
Number of joining members 291,141 0.626 1.222 229,368 0.671 1.288
Number of household members 291,141 3.833 1.723 229,368 3.981 1.753
Number of children 291,141 0.662 0.902 229,368 0.679 0.908
Months since arrival 291,141 27.554 17.454 229,368 27.558 17.456
RGDP in place of birth 291,141 0.847 0.899 229,368 0.882 0.911
Population in place of birth 291,141 10.113 14.104 229,368 11.459 14.623
Distance from capital city in place of birth 291,141 10080.31 2,751.119 229,368 10645.9 2306.757
Linguistic distance in place of birth 291,141 0.864 0.194 229,368 0.897 0.135
Note 1: Sub-sample of 18-64 year old from non-English speaking households whose mother tongue is not En-
glish, and do not reside in Quebec
Note 2: All variables are weighted using the weights provided with the LSIC by Statistics Canada.
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Table A3: OLS estimation results of English speaking proficiency: households whose mother
tongue is not English and do not reside in Quebec.
Dependent variable:
English speaking
proficiency
Pooled Pooled Pooled, sub-sample Pooled Pooled IV
RGDP per capita (h) 0.0407** 0.0399** 0.0395 0.0424** 0.0678**
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0202) (0.0142) (0.0231)
Network (β) -0.0227 -0.00591 -0.0199 0.0124
(0.0131) (0.0218) (0.0130) (0.0236)
Ethnic enclave (ζ) -0.0984*** -1.033*
(0.0161) (0.406)
Informal investment (ι) -0.0465*** -0.0459*** -0.0416* -0.0447*** -0.0321*
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0172) (0.0101) (0.0151)
Formal investment (ι) -0.0648*** -0.0652*** -0.0875*** -0.0666*** -0.0834***
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0205) (0.0130) (0.0191)
Formal pre-immigration 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.104*** 0.194*** 0.181***
experience (ω) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0241) (0.0158) (0.0223)
Informal pre-immigration 0.0881*** 0.0876*** 0.0645*** 0.0851*** 0.0652***
experience (ω) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0188) (0.0116) (0.0196)
Share of co-ethnic group in -0.0390 -0.0322 -2.782*** 0.0901 1.210
Canada (m) (0.247) (0.246) (0.612) (0.246) (0.628)
Population level (L) -0.00495*** -0.00496*** 0.00620 -0.00529*** -0.00831**
(0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00638) (0.00138) (0.00255)
Geographic distance (µ) -0.00000820* -0.00000800* 0.000000995 -0.00000760* -0.00000377
(0.00000328) (0.00000329) (0.00000434) (0.00000327) (0.00000443)
Linguistic distance (θ) 0.0519 0.0505 -0.350*** 0.0515 0.0624
(0.0530) (0.0530) (0.104) (0.0528) (0.0672)
Months since arrival -0.0103* -0.0103* -0.0143 -0.0103* -0.0121
(0.00504) (0.00504) (0.00850) (0.00503) (0.00673)
Time-varying controls
(Xist)
X X X X X
Time-invariant controls
(Xis)
X X X X X
Survey wave controls (t) X X X X X
N 204,122 204,122 78,405 203,858 203,858
∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001
Note 1: All models are weighted due to Statistics Canada’s RDC disclosure process.
Note 2: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note 3: The sub-sample excludes new immigrants from source countries that scored
“medium” or “high” on the EF EPI (2017).
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